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Abstract 
The phenomenon of multinational corporations (MNCs) taking on traditional 
government activities within their corporate social responsibility (CSR) agenda is 
receiving increasing attention due to ensuing legitimacy challenges for the corporation 
and democracy at large. Recently, ‘political CSR’ has become the new normative frame 
for theorizing on these political role and responsibilities within the business ethics and 
society and business literature. Political CSR scholarship assumes that MNCs should, and 
already do, engage in traditional government activities of political and social regulation 
(Scherer & Palazzo, 2007) and operate as new providers of public goods (Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2011; Scherer, Palazzo, & Matten, 2009). However, despite these increasing 
normative demands and concomitant concerns over MNCs undermining the public 
good, the extent to which companies can and do conform to these normative demands 
and how this impacts the main affected stakeholders remains theoretically 
underdeveloped and empirically under-explored. 
This PhD thesis embraces the legitimacy challenges of MNCs’ political engagement and 
the lack of attention to the impact of corporate responses on affected stakeholders as a 
starting point for a systematic in-depth empirical inquiry. The company Royal Dutch 
Shell is particularly suitable due to its distinctive company characteristics, complex 
operating environment and access to data. This PhD thesis provides a new perspective 
on the political role and responsibilities of MNCs, which extends current theorizing with 
regard to the scope of political responsibilities and the conditions corporate legitimacy. 
It also conceptualizes a rather more complex and dynamic picture of MNCs’ responses 
to political CSR demands than that presented in the extant literature. Notably, it 
identifies previously unidentified responses to normative political CSR demands and 
takes into account MNCs’ self-interested active agency and power relationships, which 
challenge the predominantly positivist assumptions and the ‘bright side’ bias of 
exemplary cases of political CSR. In this way, the thesis reveals crucial insights into the 
‘dark side’ not only of the company’s (mal)practices, but also regarding the weaknesses 
of the broader system of business and society.  
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Chapter 1: General introduction 
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The introduction provides a comprehensive and informative backdrop to the following 
7 chapters, thus embedding them in the broader research context. In the first section I 
introduce a new political perspective on corporate social responsibilities (political CSR) 
and its relevance in both theory and practice. I then move on to provide an overview of 
political CSR’s key elements beyond Scherer and Palazzo’s literature review (2011). The 
aim is to establish a theoretical framework for this PhD thesis as a basis for theorizing 
on the political role and responsibilities of multinational corporations (MNCs). In the 
following section I identify the research gaps and state the research questions for the 
following chapters, which address these gaps. I then explain the methodologies used in 
this thesis and briefly review the findings. I close this section by highlighting a new 
perspective on political CSR to which this research contributes. 
1.1. Relevance of the topic and research focus 
“The large corporation has become the most important new political institution in the 
contemporary political order” (Mitchell, 1986, p. 208) 
In recent years, the political impact of corporate social responsibilities (CSR) has gained 
increasing momentum. In the light of their global expansion and increased power, 
particularly MNCs are increasingly expected to take on a political role and contribute to 
the provision of public goods and business regulation, which were previously regarded 
as a preserve of the state. Many MNCs have already started to engage in self-regulating 
multi-stakeholder inititatives (MSI) such as the UN Global Compact to create a global 
platform of discourse for the implementation of basic human rights and environmental 
principles, to SA8000 as an accountability tool for globally expanded supply chains, to 
the Global Reporting Initiative todevelop standards for the reporting on CSR, and to 
Transparency International to fight against corruption.  
There has also been rising scholarly interest in the political aspects of CSR over the last 
decade (Mäkinen & Kasanen, 2014; Mäkinen & Kourula, 2012; Rodriguez, Siegel, 
Hillman, & Eden; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007) as a field of research. 
Scholars have pointed to the political role of companies as providers of public goods and 
community services in areas such as health and education (Blowfield & Frynas, 2005; 
Boddewyn & Doh, 2011; Newell & Frynas, 2007), peace building (Fort & Schipani, 2004; 
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Nelson, 2000), global governance (Kobrin, 2008, 2009; Scherer, Palazzo, & Baumann, 
2006), censorship (Brenkert, 2009; Schrempf, 2011), public health (Maguire, Hardy, & 
Lawrence, 2004) (Schrempf, 2012), and corruption (Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008). 
They have also addressed the rising role of self-regulatory business behaviour through 
voluntary initiatives to fill governance voids at the national and global level (Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Bartley, 2007; Slager, Gond, & Moon, 2012). As a consequence, 
“CSR is now as much about the social, governmental, and multi-actor regulation of 
business as about self-regulation of companies for community benefit” (Rasche, de 
Bakker, & Moon, 2013, p. 654). Increasingly, these political CSR initiatives are not only 
seen as a new form of corporate governance, but even as a way of governing society at 
large (Maclean & Crouch, 2011).  
This political role and engagement in traditional government activities is highly 
contested by the public and corporations alike as it raises important questions with 
regard to the legitimacy of corporations and democracy at large. Some authors raise 
concern that MNCs have become the new ‘leviathans’ of our time (Chandler & Mazlish, 
2005) and many critical scholars point to recent corporate scandals and globally 
networked economic, social, and environmental side effects of business activities. For 
instance, MNCs are accused of violating human rights, escaping local jurisdictions, taking 
advantage of local systems ill-adapted for effective corporate regulation, and steering 
financial investments and moving production sites to more hospitable places (Arnold & 
Bowie, 2003; Banerjee, 2007; Buckley & Ghauri, 2004; Kobrin, 2009; Shamir, 2004, p. 
637). Scholars have also suggested that MNCs continue to exercise political pressure via 
lobbying, traditional political channels and membership in advisory committees to 
influence regulatory changes in relation to social and environmental issues (Barley, 
2007; Child & Tsai, 2005; den Hond, Rehbein, de Bakker, & Lankveld, 2014; McWilliams, 
Van Fleet, & Cory, 2002). As a consequence many MNCs have entered into direct 
political struggles with civil society organizations due to the negative impact of their 
practices. In this sense, Ruggie (2008) warns 
“history teaches us that markets pose the greatest risks - to society and business 
itself - when their scope and power far exceed the reach of the institutional 
underpinnings that allow them to function smoothly and ensure their political 
sustainability. This is such a time and escalating charges of corporate-related 
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human rights abuses are the canary in the coal mine, signalling that all is not 
well” (Ruggie, 2008, p. 3). 
The growing positive and negative impact of MNCs has raised some important and 
troubling questions in this context. For example, main affected (and often marginalized) 
stakeholders ask how to hold MNCs accountable for their impact on the world? How to 
make sure that the company makes public welfare choices in the best interest of the 
public taking into account they have no democratic mandate for engagement in public 
responsibility strategies and cannot be held accountable by a civic polity? Also for 
organizations crucial questions arise. The normative pressure to provide goods and 
services not related to the core business competencies might endanger the profit 
motive or even the very existence of a corporation (Steinmann, 2007). Managers are left 
bereft with the central challenge of “how to arrive at some workable balance” (Goiaia, 
1999: 231 in Margolis & Walsh, 2003) between normative pressure to effectively 
address public concerns and instrumental demands to maximize their shareholders’ 
wealth. 
Clearly, the political role and responsibilities of MNCs has gathered momentum by 
scholars and practitioners alike. During the last ten years, the CSR literature has 
increasingly started to conceptualize corporations as political actors (Matten & Crane, 
2005; Wettstein, 2009; Hsieh, 2009; Néron & Norman, 2008; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; 
van Oosterhout, 2008) (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). This thesis 
will focus on ‘political CSR’ (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007), which 
has become recently the new normative benchmark for theorizing the political role and 
responsibilities of MNCs within the business and society and the business ethics 
literature. In a nutshell, political CSR suggests an  
“extended model of governance with business firms contributing to global 
regulation and providing public goods. It goes beyond the instrumental view on 
politics in order to develop a new understanding of global politics where private 
actors such as corporations and civil society organizations play an active role in 
the democratic regulation and control of market transactions” (Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2011, p. 901).  
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This new frame of reference was found particularly relevant as a theoretical background 
for this PhD thesis since it provides a politically enlarged conceptualization of CSR. The 
emerging political engagement of corporations and the concurrent growing positive and 
negative impact of corporations cannot be explained within the mainstream liberal 
theory of the firm (Barley, 2007 for the negative impact; Walsh, 2005 for the positive 
impact in Palazzo & Scherer, 2008). And current theorizing on CSR and MNCs’ role in the 
contemporary political order is mainly confined to the economic theory of the firm 
(Garriga & Melé, 2004; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007), which broadly 
agrees on business occasionally ‘doing’ political activities. Political CSR’s new frame of 
theorizing is based on a comprehensive literature review of recent research in the 
overall debate on the business-society interface and includes adjacent disciplines such 
as global governance, political philosophy and legal studies. 
While Scherer and Palazzo’s literature review have provided a sophisticated alternative 
normative framework for theorizing on the political role and responsibilities, it has not 
been matched with sound empirical evidence. When I developed this research project 
in 2009, the normative framework of political CSR was still in ‘the making’ and no 
empirical study has researched its empirical implications. Still today, they have seldom 
been studied empirically in-depth and over time (Frynas & Stephens, 2014) and 
examplary cases of political CSR such as the Forest Stewardship Council have been 
criticized for a lack of input legitimacy (Edward & Willmott, 2011) and output legitimacy 
(Moog, Spicer, & Böhm, 2015). This thesis will address this gap with an in-depth case 
study of the multinational company Royal Dutch Shell1. The in-depth analysis of Shell is 
salient for developing new theoretical insights for its distinct company characteristics, 
its complex operating environment and the author’s privileged access to affected 
stakeholders.  
1.2. Theoretical background: towards a framework of political CSR  
Since political CSR’s recently developed frame for theorizing has not been formalized 
into a conceptual framework (Palazzo, 2012) and there is no agreed-upon definition 
                                                 
1 Royal Dutch Shell plc. and the companies in which it directly or indirectly owns investments are 
separate and distinct entities. But in this thesis, the collective expression ‘Shell’ may be used for 
convenience where reference is made in general to these companies. 
6 
among political CSR scholars (Frynas & Stephens, 2014), I will outline in the following 
section the main dimensions of political CSR. This section also serves to complement 
relevant theoretical background information of the studies of this thesis, which have not 
been published due to the constraints of the respective publication outlet. 
Current theorizing on CSR and MNC’s role in the contemporary political order is mainly 
confined to the economic theory of the firm (Garriga & Melé, 2004; Margolis & Walsh, 
2003; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). This literature broadly agrees on business occasionally 
‘doing’ political activities and highly contests the political nature of the firm - in the sense 
of actually ‘being’ a political actor in itself. This economic view of CSR is based on four 
premises: (1) the nation-state has the containment power to regulate business activities, 
to provide public goods, and to compensate or avoid externalities (Sundaram & Inkpen, 
2004, pp. 354-355); (2) corporations have to focus on profit maximization and managers 
on their fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders (Friedman, 1970; Sundaram & Inkpen, 
2004); (3) societal responsibilities can only be assumed if they are instrumental for the 
long-term value of the firm (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2002; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; 
Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004); and (4) there is a strict separation of private and public 
domains (Friedman, 1962; Jensen, 2002). However, the emerging political engagement 
of corporations provokes many questions for globalized CSR theory and practice and has 
led to a call for a politically enlarged conceptualization of CSR (Dubbink, 2004; Margolis 
& Walsh, 2003; Matten & Crane, 2005). As a consequence, a lively scholarly debate has 
evolved about the political roles and responsibilities of corporations. The debate has 
spanned across a range of disciplines including political science (e.g. Cutler, Haufler, & 
Porter, 1999), legal studies (e.g. Clapham, 2006), philosophy (e.g. Young, 2006), 
management studies (e.g. Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994), and sociology (e.g. Burris, 2001).  
Within the business ethics and business and society literatures, ‘political CSR’ (Scherer 
& Palazzo, 2011) has become the new normative benchmark for theorizing MNCs’ 
engagement in global regulation and public goods problems within their CSR policies. It 
is based upon conceptual ideas of the Habermasian concept of deliberative democracy 
(Habermas, 1996b; Habermas, 1998a; Habermas, 2001), Young’s concept of social 
connectedness (Young, 2006) and (normative) stakeholder theory (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995, p. 71). This normative societal frame of reference also extends a body of 
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work that positively describes and explains, the political duties and activities of MNCs as 
"extended corporate citizenship" (Matten & Crane, 2005), and "corporations as 
government" (Crane, Matten & Moon, 2008: chaps. 3,4, 8). Scherer and Palazzo define 
political CSR as an “extended model of governance with business firms contributing to 
global regulation and providing public goods” (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, p. 901). The 
authors claim that MNCs should, and already do, engage in traditional government 
activities of political and social regulation even in areas not directly related to their 
business (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007) and operate as new providers of public goods 
(Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer et al., 2009). In other words, business firms’ 
interaction with the political sphere should be in the name of the public interest (Scherer 
et al., 2009, p. 577) which blurs the traditional boundaries between the political and 
economic spheres of society (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, p. 905). The authors claim that 
this new political conception of CSR aims at producing a paradigm shift in CSR studies 
(Scherer & Palazzo, 2011) as it challenges the traditional economic conception of the 
business firm and the related instrumental conception of CSR (e.g. Friedman, 1970; 
Jensen, 2002; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Porter & Kramer, 2011; Sundaram & Inkpen, 
2004). 
Political CSR is strongly associated with the globalist transition process. In the author’s 
words, “the politicization of the corporation seems to be the unavoidable consequence 
of the emerging democratic governance in a world society without a world state” 
(Scherer et al., 2006, p. 84). The authors hold that the national context of governance is 
eroding in developed and developing countries alike due to the limits of juridical and 
enforcement mechanisms beyond national borders and the limits of positive law and 
bureaucracy to solve conflicts and coordination issues (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; 
Habermas, 2001). At the international level, neither nation-states nor international 
institutions alone are able to sufficiently regulate the global economy and to provide 
global public goods due to unclear, non-existent rules of the global game, lack of 
expertise relevant to global issues, and a lack of enforcement power and monitoring 
capability (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; Wolf, 2005 in Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). Thus, a 
central idea of the discussion is that globalization erodes the traditional divisions of 
moral labor between the political and economic spheres of society leading to the 
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politicization of business firms in a way that goes beyond the scope of instrumental CSR 
(Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; 2008; 2011; Scherer, Palazzo & Matten, 2009; Dubbink, 2004; 
Kobrin, 2001). 
A political role of MNC is seen by Scherer and Palazzo to be legitimate within a new 
societal frame of reference of five interrelated legitimacy dimensions: Multi-stakeholder 
governance, reliance on soft law, political responsibility, moral legitimacy, and 
deliberative democracy. With this framework, the “legitimacy of corporate activities can 
be normatively accessed when no universal criteria of ethical behavior are available in a 
post-modern and post-national world” (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, p. 906). In the 
following I further conceptualize these five dimensions to establish a first theoretical 
framework of political CSR as a baseline for this thesis. Table 1 provides an overview of 
the legitimacy dimensions and political CSR’s main assumptions. 
1.2.1. Multi-stakeholder governance  
The first legitimacy dimension is related to MNC’s engagement in political processes 
associated with solving societal problems in cooperation with at least one of the two 
actors – civil society and governments. This type of collaboration has been discussed 
under various labels such as public policy networks (deLeon & Varda, 2009; Hajer & 
Wagenaar, 2003; Reinicke, 1998; Reinicke & Deng, 2000), private government (Mendel, 
2010), or MSI  (Martens, 2007). They are characterized by a “decentring of authority and 
an emergence of political power and authority for originally non-political and non-state 
actors, such as NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, and MNCs” (Beck, 2000; Risse, 
2002; Zürn, 2002) in (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, p. 904). The changing ontology of the 
governance of public issues is characterized by a network logic (Detomasi, 2007). Thus, 
it relies on decentralized “structures and processes of governing beyond the state where 
there exists no supreme or singular political authority” (Held & MCGrew, 2002, p. 8). On 
the one hand governance regimes have shifted from a domestic to a global logic (Koenig-
Archibugi, 2004) as a new form of trans-national regulation: global governance, the 
definition and implementation of standards of behavior with global reach (Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2011, p. 909). On the other hand, at the local level, the trend towards private 
businesses achieving public goals is nowhere “more evident than in developing 
9 
countries” (Valente & Crane, 2010, p. 52) where the state systems fail to administer 
citizenship rights and corporations are increasingly expected to fill the void (Matten & 
Crane, 2005; Valente, 2010). In sum, (Scherer et al., 2006, p. 522) assume that this 
political embeddedness of corporate decision making increases corporate legitimacy 
and at the same time launches a learning process through which democratization effects 
are strengthened. Global governance “arenas of deliberation can thus function as 
schools of democracy" (Fung, 2003, p. 52 in). In other words, to address the legitimacy 
deficit, MNC should engage in global governance regimes to regulate the global 
economy and provide global public goods. 
1.2.2. Reliance on soft-law 
The second legitimacy dimension advances a form of regulation that is characterized by 
voluntary action (low level of obligation), imprecise rules, and delegation of authority to 
non-state actors (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). The shift of regulatory authority to the global 
level and a regulatory vacuum at the local level in many developing countries confronts 
MNCs with the need to regulate the so-called ‘side-effects’ of their business activities 
themselves which are “typically not viewed as essential to their core economic 
activities” (Haufler, 2001, p. 14). Here, MNCs should engage at different levels with 
other members of MSI – typically NGOs or government actors – in a political and 
decentralized deliberation process that aims at addressing regulatory challenges: 1) 
provision of learning platforms; 2) issue of certifications and labels; 3) development of 
behavioral standards and 4) mechanisms of auditing and compliance (Palazzo & Scherer, 
2010). These ‘soft law’ initiatives are based on ‘civil regulation’, that is, “voluntary, 
private, non-state industry and cross-industry codes that specify the responsibilities of 
global firms for addressing labor practices, environmental performance, and human 
rights policies” (Vogel, 2010, p. 68). In sum, Scherer and Palazzo assume that through 
their engagement in processes of self-regulation, corporations “become subjects of new 
forms of democratic processes of control and legitimacy” (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, p. 
918). In other words, to address the legitimacy deficit, MNCs should engage in self-
regulation based on voluntary action, imprecise rules and delegation of authority to 
non-state actors. 
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1.2.3. Political responsibility 
In line with the changing ontology of governance regimes, the third legitimacy 
dimension assumes that MNCs should “operate with an enlarged understanding of 
responsibility and help to solve political problems in cooperation with state actors and 
civil society actors” (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, p. 918; Scherer & Palazzo, 2008, p. 16). 
This concept of responsibility is based on Young’s model of social interconnectedness 
and interdependence in that it assumes a network logic in problems and a network logic 
for the solutions as well (Young, 2006; Young, 2008). In this sense, political responsibility 
is not left to MNCs alone, but includes a broad set of actors who are involved in human 
rights violations, or social and environmental issues, qua structural connectedness 
(Young, 2004). In other words, non-state actors also become objects of legitimacy claims 
who can be held responsible for "an action that caused a harm even if they did not 
intend the outcome” (Young, 2004, p. 368 in Scherer et al. 2006, p. 521) Under this 
liability model, one assigns responsibility to a particular agent (or agents) whose actions 
can be shown to be causally connected to the circumstances for which responsibility is 
sought” (Young, 2006, p. 116). Thus, this broader concept of responsibilities for 
injustices expands the narrower concept of complicity (Clapham, 2006) or the 
contractual relationship as advocated by the theory of the firm and agency theory 
(Jensen, 2002; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). In sum, Scherer and Palazzo (2011) hold that 
this concept of political responsibility is legitimate for its turn from the economic, utility-
driven, and output-oriented view on CSR to a communication-driven and input oriented 
concept of organizational responsibility (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, p. 913). Thus, to 
address the legitimacy deficit, MNC should engage in a political responsibility based on 
social interconnectedness and communication. 
1.2.4. Moral legitimacy 
For Scherer and Palazzo, the fourth legitimacy dimension is associated with a shift from 
pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy to moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). To preserve 
their legitimacy, MNCs should adopt “a pro-social logic that differs fundamentally from 
narrow self-interest” (Suchman, 1995, p. 579 in Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). Moral 
legitimacy is also “socially and argumentatively constructed by means of considering 
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reasons to justify certain actions, practices, or institutions and is thus present in 
discourses between the corporation and its relevant publics” (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, 
p. 916) and rests on the ‘forceless force of the better argument’ (Habermas, 1990, p. 
185 in Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, p. 916). Thus, the legitimacy of the political role of MNCs 
is expressed in a strong link between corporate decision-making and processes of will-
formation in a corporation’s stakeholder network (Young, 2003 in Palazzo & Scherer, 
2006, p. 79). In other words, a new way of preserving MNCs’ legitimacy consists of a 
complex communicative process of accountability in which societal limits to profit 
making are defined and redefined in a continuous process of deliberative discourse 
(Palazzo & Scherer, 2006, p. 82). In sum, to address the legitimacy deficit, political CSR 
proposes that MNCs should adopt moral legitimacy, which is socially and 
argumentatively constructed.  
1.2.5. Deliberative democracy  
The fifth legitimacy dimension advances a concept of deliberative democracy based on 
discursive politics (Habermas, 1996) and the argumentative involvement of the citizens 
in the decision-making processes themselves (Risse, 2004 in Scherer and Palazzo, 2011, 
p. 21). In this sense, “democratic legitimacy in this alternative approach is created by a 
strengthened link between the decisions in the political institutions and the processes 
of public will-formation as driven by non-governmental organizations, civil movements, 
and other civil society actors who map, filter, amplify, bundle, and transmit private 
problems, values, and needs of the citizens (Habermas, 1996 in Scherer and Palazzo, 
2011, p. 20). Political CSR scholars discuss the deliberative theory of democracy an 
alternative model for democratic governance structures for MSI and corporate 
democratic governance. For example, Mena and Palazzo (2012) depict a set of criteria 
for a legitimate transfer of regulatory power from traditional democratic nation state 
processes to private regulatory schemes along input and output legitimacy criteria. 
Input legitimacy incorporates internal and external accountability. To guarantee internal 
accountability, corporations must abide by the MSI’s rules and accept the MSI as having 
a rightful authority over them (Nanz, 2006 in Mena & Palazzo, 2012, p. 538). External 
accountability must ensure that stakeholders who do not participate in the MSI, accept 
the regulatory regime as having a right to regulate (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Black, 
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2008 in Mena & Palazzo, 2012, p. 538). Thus, input legitimacy is determined by 1) 
stakeholder inclusion; 2) procedural fairness; 3) consensual orientation, and 4) 
transparency (Mena & Palazzo, 2012, p. 538). Output legitimacy refers to the capacity 
of regulatory regimes to effectively take a regulatory role by ensuring 1) coverage; 2) 
efficacy, and 3) rule enforcement and monitoring (Mena & Palazzo, 2012, p. 539). This 
conception of deliberative democracy aims to embed MNCs “in processes of democratic 
will formation and problem solving which implies to open corporate decision-making to 
civil society discourses and to interact in a governance structure that aims at a broad 
level of equal participation and deliberation (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). In other words, 
to address the legitimacy deficit, political CSR scholarship suggests that MNC should 
adopt a deliberative concept of corporate governance based on the criteria for input 
and output legitimacy. 
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Table 1 Overview of political CSR's main dimensions and assumptions 
 
 
Dimensions Assumptions Criterion Examples 
Multi-
stakeholder  
governance 
MNCs should 
 help to solve political problems in cooperation 
with state actors and civil society actors  
 produce global public goods in the area of 
public health, education, social security, and 
the protection of human rights and the 
environment 
 MNCs’ engagement in public policy  
 Locus of governance: global and multilevel 
 Main political actor: MNC, civil society & state 
 Heterarchic mode of governance (private-
public or private-private partnerships) 
 Domestication of economic rationality & focus 
on public interest 
Forest Stewardship Council:  
 Global multi-stakeholder initiative  
 sets forth responsible forestry principles, 
criteria, and standards, spanning economic, 
social, and environmental concerns, guiding 
forest management to sustainable outcomes 
 
Reliance on soft 
law regulation 
 
MNCs should 
 implement voluntary standards at different 
levels: company, industry, global  
 participate in initiatives that follow various 
regulatory objectives, from mere dialogue to 
the definition of standards and processes, or 
the development of monitoring and 
sanctioning systems  
 Imprecise and informal rules 
 Monitoring by MNCs themselves or third 
parties 
 Low enforcement of rules 
 
 UN Global Compact Principles: Ten principles 
that focus on human rights, labor, the 
environment, and anti-corruption 
 Oil companies’ (BP, Chevron, Shell) 
formulation and formalization of a corporate 
code of conduct, engagement in CSR activities 
at the local (community) and global level  
Political 
responsibility 
MNCs should 
 operate with an enlarged understanding of 
responsibility based on global social 
connectedness 
 turn from the economic, utility-driven, and 
output-oriented view on CSR to a political, 
communication-driven, and input oriented 
concept of organizational responsibility 
 can be hold responsible precisely for things 
they themselves have not done 
 Basis for responsibility: social connectedness 
(shared responsibility & not isolating 
perpetrators) & complicity  
 Judging background conditions to understand 
mediated connection that agents have to 
structural injustices 
 Direction: prospective to find a solution (not 
backward-looking to attribute guilt) 
 Sphere of influence: global & broad 
 
 
 Anti-sweatshop movement pressed claims on 
consumers and corporations (Nike among 
others) to take responsibility for sweatshop 
conditions based on the claim that all who 
participate by their actions in processes that 
produce injustice share responsibility for its 
remedy  
 Nike’s concept of responsibility goes beyond 
liability, and has an increased credibility due 
to transparency and accountability based on 
factory audits and supply chain management 
Moral 
legitimacy 
MNCs should 
 focus on moral legitimacy  
 Proactive corporate engagement 
 Moral legitimacy: input related and discursive  
Nike's process of "civil learning":  
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 based on processes of active justification vis-
à-vis society through communicative 
engagement in public deliberation 
 
 
 launched a multi-stakeholder initiatives in 
collaboration with NGOs, labor organizations, 
and public bodies 
 accompanied by growing transparency as well 
as by stricter monitoring and reporting 
 implies a proactive sensitivity for ethical 
challenges and an intensive networking of 
corporate and public discourses 
Deliberative 
democracy  
MNCs should  
 become subjects of new forms of democratic 
processes of control based on explicit 
participation in public processes of political 
will formation instead of implicit compliance 
with assumed societal norms and 
expectations  
 open corporate decision-making to civil 
society discourses 
 interact in a governance structure that aims at 
a broad level of equal participation and 
deliberation 
 be embedded in processes of democratic will 
formation and problem solving 
 be monitored and controlled by third party 
auditors 
 Discursive politics  
 Public deliberation: argumentative 
involvement of citizens in decision-making 
processes 
 Democratic governance structures and 
processes based on input and output 
legitimacy criteria 
 
The Forest Stewardship Council:  
 General Assembly, as the highest decision-
making body of the FSC, is organized into 
three membership chambers - environmental, 
social, and economic - for balancing the voting 
power of its diverse members 
 The FSC certification is approved by 
independent bodies and the certification 
process itself contains rigorous standards and 
independent monitoring procedures 
Chiquita:  
 Chiquita transformed antagonistic industrial 
relations with unions and NGOs into 
collaborative ones through a strong link 
between corporate decision-making and 
processes of will-formation in a corporation’s 
stakeholder network 
Source: own elaboration (based on Palazzo, 2012; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2008; Scherer et al., 2006; Scherer, Palazzo, & Baumann, 2007; Scherer et al., 
2009; Waddock, 2008; Werre, 2003; Zadek, 2004) 
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Altogether, the concept of political CSR advances a concept of political legitimacy with 
the following features. Firstly, it is weaker than in the traditional understanding, since it 
refers to processes of self-regulation and production of transnational ‘soft law’ instead 
of national hard law and because it refers to the discourses of a globalizing civil society 
as the source of legitimacy instead of a nationally defined community. Secondly, it is 
broader because it includes non-state actors as objects of legitimacy claims and expands 
the understanding of responsibility beyond the common liability concept of 
responsibility and a shift of corporate attention and money to societal challenges 
beyond immediate stakeholder pressure (Scherer et al., 2007, p. 1115). Thirdly, it is an 
input related and discursive concept of legitimacy in that it involves organizations in 
processes of active justification vis-à-vis society rather than simply responding to the 
demands of powerful groups (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006, p. 71). With this ‘deliberative 
turn’, the model of political CSR aims to overcome the public-private divide based on an 
argumentative mode of legitimacy generation and the embeddedness of corporate 
political activities in processes of democratic will-formation and control. 
1.3. Research gaps and questions 
Having established the relevance of political CSR in practice and theory, this section 
identifies the gaps, which persist in the literature. It also outlines the research questions 
to address the key gaps. 
The political CSR literature is notable for both its conceptual novelty and practical 
importance. It has contributed to a sophisticated normative framework for theorizing 
on the political role and responsibilities of MNCs. However, its contribution is limited 
due to conceptual ambiguities, conflations and/or oversights (Whelan, 2012), and a 
narrow research agenda that “postulates normative theory to the exclusion of 
descriptive theory and focuses exclusively on the changes in global governance to the 
exclusion of the traditional domestic political process” (Frynas & Stephens, 2014, p. 3). 
Furthermore, previous research has criticized exemplary cases of political CSR for a lack 
of input (Edward & Willmott, 2011) and output (Moog et al., 2015) legitimacy. While 
critical management scholars have raised concerns about corporations pursuing their 
narrow business interests and thus obstructing the rights of citizens (Banerjee, 2008; 
16 
Barley, 2007; Barley, 2010; Levy & Egan, 2003; Nyberg, Spicer, & Wright, 2013) and 
undermining representative democracy and the public good (Barley, 2007), they have 
seldom been studied empirically in-depth and over time (Frynas & Stephens, 2014; 
Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). In the following I will outline the specific research gaps and 
questions for each study.  
Chapter 2: Study 1 - The role of oil mayors in supporting sustainable peace and 
development in Nigeria: the case of Royal Dutch Shell 
In chapter 2 I address the need for empirical studies of the political role and 
responsibilities in the area of peace and development in Africa. When the first study was 
published in 2010 2 , political CSR scholars had developed a first conception of the 
political aspects of CSR (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007) and research on the preservation of 
peace provided important insights into the role of business in conflict areas ((Bais & 
Huijser, 2005; Banfield & Champain, 2004, p. 5; Bennett, 2002; Gerson, 2001; Haufler, 
2004; Jamali & Mirshak, 2010; Nelson, 2000; Oetzel, Getz, & Ladek, 2007). Yet, there 
had been limited research on the scope, peculiarities, and impact of such engagement 
(Kolk & Lenfant, 2013, p. 43), particularly in African countries with a fragile state and 
weak governance structure (Visser, 2006). Chaper 2 addresses this gap. To gain a first 
insight of the practical side of political CSR in the area of conflict and peace 
management, this case study explores Royal Dutch Shell’s peace building approach in 
Nigeria with regard to the company’s triple bottom line – the economic, social, and 
environmental impact. The research is guided by the exploratory question: What is the 
economic, social and environmental impact of Shell’s CSR policies in supporting 
sustainable peace and development in Nigeria? 
Chapter 3: Study 2 - Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria: Where Do Responsibilities End? 
The findings of chapter 2 and subsequent calls from political CSR scholars (Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2011) revealed the need for a closer examination of the limits of upstreaming 
                                                 
2 The first version was published in Spanish: Hennchen, E. (2010). El papel del sector extractivo en el 
desarrollo sostenible y la paz en Nigeria: el caso de Royal Dutch Shell. In M. Prandi & J. M. Lozano (Eds.), 
La RSE en contextos de conflicto y postconflicto: de la gestión del riesgo a la creación de valor (pp. 135-
149). Barcelona: Escuela de Cultura de Paz (UAB)/ Instituto de Innovación Social (ESADE). 
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responsibility and the conditions of corporate legitimacy based on empirical research. 
In other words, it is not clear where these demands end and how can we define whether 
or not a corporation should deal with an issue (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011, p. 919). With 
regard to the conditions of corporate, political CSR scholars call for a better 
understanding of what makes the company’s political engagement efficient, legitimate 
and more democratic (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, p. 920). The third chapter addresses 
these gaps and poses the overall questions: where do these enlarged responsibilities 
end? What do these political responsibilities entail? What are the conditions for 
corporate legitimacy? 
Chapter 4: Study 3 – A model of organizational response strategies to political CSR 
demands: The case of Royal Dutch Shell 
While the prior chapters and other scholars have highlighted deviations from the 
normative benchmark of political CSR (Banerjee, 2007; Barley, 2007; Bromley & Powell, 
2012; Frynas, 2009; Nyberg et al., 2013), it remains theoretically underdeveloped and 
empirically under-explored to what extent companies can and do conform to external 
institutional pressure to achieve societal outcomes. Notably lacking is a systematic 
response model paying explicit attention to organizational self-interest, active agency 
and underlying power relations (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Oliver, 1991) with a focus 
on the impact of the company’s response on affected stakeholders (Banerjee, 2007; 
Margolis & Walsh, 2003). This third study used an in-depth case study to answer the 
following questions: How do companies respond to political CSR demands? Under which 
conditions are the different response strategies likely to be mobilized? How do 
corporate response strategies affect societal outcomes? 
1.4. Research methods 
This section gives a broad overview of the research methods used in this thesis. Further 
detail is provided in the corresponding chapters. This thesis takes a primarily 
interpretive, qualitative approach to address the previously identified research gaps. In 
the overall process, one important data analysis tool was the co-development of a 
teaching case (Hennchen & Lozano, 2012) as suggested by other qualitative analysis 
(Quinn, 1980) (see Appendix 2). 
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The methods of this PhD thesis is to “study things in their natural settings, attempting 
to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to 
them” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 3). Creswell defines qualitative methods as an inquiry 
process of understanding that explores a social or human problem, in which the 
researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyses words, reports, detailed views of 
informants and conducts the study in a natural setting (Creswell, 1998). According to 
Marshall and Rossman, it enables the researcher to delve into complexities and 
processes in depth, by exploring where and why policy and local knowledge are at odds 
(Marshall & Rossman, 1989). Qualitative research has had a challenging history 
(Boyatzis, 1998; Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013) and there are several shortcomings 
involved in using the case study method. It has been claimed, particularly from a 
positivist approach that case studies are unscientific and biased (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2000). In support of a qualitative approach scholars cite the rich descriptions possible in 
qualitative research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000) and the need for an interpretative 
approach to explore ethics and morality in contrast to the dominant economic paradigm 
of functionalism and rationality (Ghoshal, 2005). Furthermore, case study research is 
appropriate to use in the early stages of research on a topic (Eisenhardt, 1989a) such as 
political CSR. Also, Harrison & Freeman (1999) confirm this by stating “case study 
research is especially critical for the field of business and society, because this field is 
young and therefore no widely accepted integrating framework exists”. In sum, a 
qualitative case study is well suited to support and facilitate comprehension of 
phenomena that is not well understood (Marshall & Rossman, 1995) and to develop 
existing theory “by pointing to gaps and beginning to fill them” (Siggelkow, 2007, p. 21). 
The research strategy of this PhD thesis focuses on understanding the dynamics present 
within a single setting (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Using a single case study was appropriate 
and instrumental since the aim is to identify new concepts and to challenge the existing 
world views (Siggelkow, 2007) and as “a few observations – perhaps even just one – can 
provide an intensity of information that allows inferences even a large dataset might 
not reveal” (Morck & Yeung, 2011). I chose Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria as a case suitable 
to the phenomena under investigation (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 1994).  
The following chapters have approached the research topic in different ways: 
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Chapter 2 uses the case study method to explore the phenomenon under investigation. 
According to Yin (2003), this was appropriate, given that the phenomenon and the 
context do not have clear borders and in order to answer how questions (Yin, 2003). The 
dataset is mainly based on extensive archival data representing the voices of all 
important stakeholder groups on the subject matter. In addition, two in-depth 
interviews with key informants from both civil society (NGO Social Action) and Shell 
(Business Advisor to Executive Director Upstream International) have been conducted 
to increase the credibility and validity of the results.  
Chapter 3 takes a hybrid approach to the case study methodology (Fereday & Muir-
Cochrane, 2006), combining a theoretical framework with inductive theory building 
based on 21 in-depth interviews and secondary documents. Categories that emerged in 
extant theory such as Scherer and Palazzo’s (2011) literature review and Young’s (2006) 
model of structural connectedness served as a deductive framework. Thematic analysis 
(Boyatzis, 1998) was used to analyse the data in an iterative process, moving between 
theory and data to develop categories. Two authors coded the data independently using 
Atlas TI and then discussed categories through several iterations. 
Chapter 4 uses the case study method to build theory inductively based on Strauss and 
Corbin (1998). An inductive approach is necessary here because very little is known, 
theoretically and empirically, about corporate responses to political CSR demands and 
particularly the impact on societal outcomes. In this way, the aim is to generate meaning 
from the data collected (Creswell, 1998). Longitudinal qualitative data were collected 
intermittently over six years (2010-15) coming from multiple sources such as 46 in-depth 
interviews with 37 informants, informal meetings, and more than 250 secondary 
documents. I also used a range of field methods and interviewed informants from 
different professional backgrounds at multiple levels of hierarchy to guarntee a stronger 
substantiation of constructs (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 538) and strengthens confidence in 
the reliability of findings (Barratt, Choi, & Li, 2011; Jick, 1979). The analysis procedure 
used the software program ATLAS TI and consisted of 4 stages, a process that allowed 
to go back and forth between the data and the emerging theoretical arguments (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The analysis process aims to uncover 
corporate responses to institutional demands and for determining why the corporation 
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used the chosen response strategy in line with other qualitative research designs 
(Leonardi, Neeley, & Gerber, 2012; Mair, Marti, & Ventresca, 2012). 
1.5. Structure of the thesis and overview of research studies 
This thesis is a monograph, following a three-article format (see Figure 1). The two first 
studies have been published, while the third has been presented at the 2015 Annual 
Meeting of the Academy of Management. I have approached this empirical endeavor in 
different steps in which the different research questions are addressed. They follow a 
logical (research) flow: each step builds on the previous findings and extends them. 
Hence, this thesis is organized as a compendium of three studies each of which furthers 
our knowledge of the process of making sense of the political roles and responsibilities 
of MNCs in a changing society. In the following I will outline the main points of the 
research studies and complete information with regard to scientific research (e.g. 
theoretical background, methods, contribution), which has been omitted in the 
published version due to the constraints of the respective publication outlet. The main 
issues of these three research studies are summarized in Table 2. To facilitate the 
reading of this thesis, all references are included at the end in Chapter 6. 
 
Figure 1. Overview of research studies 
	
	
Study	1	
Study	2	
Study	3	
“The	role	of	oil	mayors	in	suppor ng	sustainable	peace	and	
development	in	Nigeria:	the	case	of	Royal	Dutch	Shell“	
Hybrid:	case	study	with	teaching	
guidance	
Conceptual:	Longitudinal	in-depth	case	
study	
Exploring	the	‘ p	of	the	iceberg’	
“Royal	Dutch	Shell	in	Nigeria:	Where	do	
responsibili es	end?”		
“A	model	of	organiza onal	response	
strategies	to	poli cal	CSR	demands:	
The	case	of	Royal	Dutch	Shell”		
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1.5.1. Summary of study 1  
Chapter 2 is the initial exploratory study for this research, on which the later chapters 
build. This explorative study examined ‘the tip of the iceberg’ of a then new and 
empirically unexplored phenomenon – the political role and responsibilities of the 
multinational corporation Shell in Nigeria in the area of peace and development. A short 
version focusing on empirical results was published in English in 2011 as a bookchapter 
under the title “The role of oil mayors in supporting sustainable peace and 
development in Nigeria: the case of Royal Dutch Shell” (in M. Prandi & J. M. Lozano 
(Eds.), CSR in conflict and post-conflict environments: from risk management to value 
creation (pp. 133-147). Barcelona: School for a Culture of Peace (UAB)/Institute for 
Social Innovation (ESADE). ISBN 978-84-615-5634-2). This study contributes to both the 
political CSR and the conflict literature by analyzing the scope, peculiarities, and impact 
of Shell’s CSR policies and practices in Nigeria. Before summarizing the main points of 
the study, I provide some additional information on the theoretical background and 
method, which has not been published. 
In recent years, the potential role of MNCs in helping address conflict issues and 
furthering peace and reconciliation as part of their CSR policies has received increasing 
interest (Bais & Huijser, 2005; Bennett, 2002; Gerson, 2001; Haufler, 2004; Jamali & 
Mirshak, 2010; Nelson, 2000; Oetzel et al., 2007). These developments are also 
acknowledged by recent theories on the preservation of peace  (Dunfee & Fort, 2003; 
Fort & Schipani, 2004). For example, Banfield and Champain (2004) claim “by adopting 
a more conflict-sensitive approach in three key areas, foreign businesses can minimize 
harmful impacts and actively contribute to peace building, with bottom-line gains 
incurred for business in the process. These areas are: core business, social investment 
and policy dialogue” (Banfield & Champain, 2004, p. 5). To understand the impact of CSR 
policies, this case study analyses Royal Dutch Shell’s peace building approach in Nigeria 
with regard to the company’s triple bottom line. Thus, the research question asks: What 
is the economic, social and environmental impact of Shell’s political CSR policies in 
supporting sustainable peace and development in Nigeria? 
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This exploratory case study is based on an extensive achival data including official (e.g. 
among others Shell, 1998, 1999, 2010; Shell Nigeria, 2002, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011) 
and leaked company reports and communication (WAC Global Services, 2003), civil 
society organizations (e.g. Amnesty International, 2009a, 2009b; Christian Aid, 2004; 
ECCR, 2010; Friends of the Earth et al., 2003; SOMO, 2010) and international 
organizations (UNDP, 2006, 2009). While these data sources present the voices of all 
important stakeholder groups on the subject matter, two in-depth interviews with key 
informants from both civil society (NGO Social Action) and Shell (Business Advisor to 
Executive Director Upstream International) have been conducted to increase the 
credibility and validity of the results. 
The analysis of the dimensions of the conflict in the Niger Delta and Shell’s peace 
building approach as part of the company’s CSR policies revealed challenges related to 
the negative and positive impact of MNC taking responsibilities beyond the economic 
mandate in a context of a governance void. For the negative side, the analysis has shown 
that corporate practice was pivotal to the dynamics of local violence and the escalation 
of insurgent activity. The engagement at the micro or project level within SPDC’s CSR 
policy has had no real impact on how the core business activities are undertaken nor 
have they ameliorated the negative social and environmental impact of oil production 
on host communities. On the positive side, the case analysis has also shown that Shell 
essentially stepped into a governance vacuum and started to deliver on social and 
economic rights that have been regarded as traditional government activities and 
commit to self-regulation to protect its ‘social license to operate’. Yet, this step into the 
political sphere has not been sufficiently integrated in theory and praxis and led to an 
ambiguity with regard to the company’s role not only for the company itself but also for 
others. As a consequence, Shell’s approach to peace building is not only inconstant but 
also lacks integrity.  
This first exploratory study contributed both the political CSR and the conflict literature. 
In particular, the findings of this study shed light on problems with regard to the 
company’s partnership approach and self-regulation to achieve public ends, which 
questions fundamental legitimacy dimensions of political CSR. In line with the extant 
theory, this study has shown that the company’s partnerships with the Nigerian 
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government and NGOs are not the panacea in tackling conflicts, but can lead instead to 
question the legitimacy and credibility of this engagement (Idemudia & Ite, 2006) by 
creating a culture of dependency and weakening the role of government (Boele & Fabig, 
2001; Ite, 2003). The study has also revealed the problematic nature of the company’s 
dual role as economic and political actor in such a complex and conflict-prone setting. 
Contrary to the assumptions of political CSR scholars, the findings question the 
effectiveness of the company’s politicized role due to Shell’s lack of consistency and 
integrity in approaching sustainable peace and development. 
1.5.2. Summary of study 2 
The second research study “Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria: Where do responsibilities 
end?” applied a case study methodology with the primary goal of analysing in depth 
Shell’s unique approach to CSR and associated challenges with regard to the company’s 
scope of political responsibility and basis for legitimacy in a complex operating 
environment. It was published in 2015 in the Journal of Business Ethics (129(1), 1-25, 
ISSN 0167-4544, DOI 10.1007/s10551-014-2142-7). A first version of this study won the 
OIKOS case competition in 2012 (see Appendix 2). This case study contributes to 
scholarly work in political philosophy (Habermas, 1998b; Habermas, 2001; Young, 2004; 
Young, 2006) as well as subsequent works in political CSR (Palazzo & Scherer, 2008; 
Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; Scherer et al., 2006). Since parts of 
the theoretical background of this article have not been published due to constraints of 
the journal outlet and Scherer and Palazzo (2011) have only broadly elaborated on the 
scope of MNCs’ political responsibility, I include in the following a brief summary of 
Young’s (2006) model of social connectedness and elaborate in more detail on the 
implications. 
Young (2006) took note of the challenges of globally operating MNCs and presented an 
alternative understanding of responsibility – a political responsibility – based on 
structural interconnectedness. ‘Political’ connotes to activities broader than a 
government’s, namely those “in which people organize collectively to regulate or 
transform some aspect of their shared social conditions, along with the communicative 
activities in which they try to persuade one another to join such collective action or 
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decide what direction they wish to take it” (Young, 2004, p. 377). Young (2004, 2006, 
2008) argues that all actors in the global economy bear in fact a specific political 
responsibility for global injustices due to their structural connectedness to cases of 
harm. Young (2006) refers to this as ‘structural injustices’ since it “occurs as a 
consequence of many individuals and institutions acting in pursuit of their particular 
goals and interests, within given institutional rules and accepted norms. All the persons 
who participate by their actions in the ongoing schemes of cooperation that constitute 
these structures are responsible for them, in the sense that they are part of the process 
that causes them. They are not responsible, however, in the sense of having directed 
the process or intended its outcomes” (Young, 2006: 114). As a consequence, many 
persons and institutions in very different social and geographic positions are connected 
to injustices. They share a responsibility for injustices since they act “in pursuit of their 
particular goals and interests, within given institutional rules and accepted norms” 
(Young, 2006, p. 114). For example, anti-sweatshop activists have made claims that 
“consumers and retailers bear responsibility for working conditions in far-away 
factories, often in other countries” (Young, 2006, p. 107). This social connectedness logic 
disrupts the dominating perception of liability logic, which derives responsibility “from 
legal reasoning employed to establish guilt or fault for a harm. Under this liability model, 
one assigns responsibility to a particular agent (or agents) whose actions can be shown 
to be causally connected to the circumstances for which responsibility is sought” (Young, 
2006, p. 116).  
Young (2006) argues that a political responsibility can only be discharged through 
collective action. This interpretation of political responsibilities is derived from social 
connectedness or “from belonging together with others in a system of interdependent 
processes of cooperation and competition” (Young, 2006, p. 119). Since it is not possible 
to isolate those liable in the context of structural injustice, each person is responsible 
for outcomes in a partial way. Responsibility is shared among all actors. Every actor who 
is part of the network that contributes to structural injustices bears a responsibility. As 
a consequence, taking a political responsibility under this social connectedness model 
“involves joining with others to organize collective action to reform unjust structures 
(Young, 2006, p. 123). Collective action includes all actors that have a mediated (social) 
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connection to structural injustices (Young, 2006). More specifically, agents have a high 
(political) responsibility to engage in collective action  (1) the higher the specific degree 
of potential or actual power over processes that produce unjust outcomes, (2) the 
higher the benefit from structural injustices, (3) the higher the interest in structural 
transformation, and (4) the higher the ease to organize collective action (Young, 2006). 
This literature review reveals that scholars have already established a sound normative 
ground for the scope of political responsibilities (Young, 2006) and the base for 
corporate legitimacy (Mena & Palazzo, 2012; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer, Palazzo, 
& Seidl, 2013; Scherer, Baumann-Pauly, & Schneider, 2012) (see Chapter 2.1.). However, 
scholars call for a closer examination of the limits of upstreaming responsibility and the 
conditions of corporate legitimacy based on empirical research (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2011). To address this gap, the following questions are addressed in this study: If indeed, 
MNCs are political actors and should take over governmental responsibilities where 
appropriate, where do these enlarged responsibilities end? What do these political 
responsibilities entail? What are the conditions for corporate legitimacy? To answer the 
research questions, this study draws on multiple data collection methods such as 21 in-
depth interviews and extensive archival data. I used the five dimensions of political CSR 
(Scherer & Palazzo, 2011), Young’s (2006) social connectedness model and Mena and 
Palazzo’s (2012) legitimacy criteria as “a priori” (deductive) theoretical frame for this 
research. 
The analysis of Shell’s CSR policies showed that the company started implementing 
certain political CSR policies into the company’s processes and corporate governance 
structure (e.g. engagement in MSI, reporting). Yet, the findings revealed also important 
gaps between policy and practice with regard to the prevention and remediation of oil 
spills. Taking a ‘social connectedness lens’, the analysis of the scope of Shell’s 
responsibility for social and environmental conditions and the new political 
responsibility to deliver traditional government services can be limited by taking into 
account the possibility to isolate perpetrators, the existence of unjust background 
conditions, forward-looking action, the mediated connection of all actors to structural 
injustices and the ability to engage in collective action. In the same line of reasoning, the 
degree of Shell’s responsibility ranges from a strong (direct) responsibility to a shared 
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political responsibility depending the issue at stake and the company’s power, interest, 
privilege and collective ability to address it. With regard to the conditions of corporate 
legitimacy, the study reveals the precarious basis of Shell’s legitimacy due to a lack of 
adhering to input and output legitimacy criteria. The findings have both theoretical and 
practical implications. 
This case study adds to the normative contribution of scholars in political philosophy 
and the young debate on political CSR by providing insights about the practical side of 
political responsibilities and the basis for corporate legitimacy. Specifically, it provides 
an extension of the political CSR framework with regard to the scope of political 
responsibilities based on Young’s (2006) social connection model and Mena & Palazzo’s 
(2012) conditions for input and output legitimacy. With regard to the former, it takes 
into account the complex structural processes that connect persons and institutions in 
very different social and geographical positions. The experiences of Shell are an 
excellent case in point since attention is drawn to the background conditions of globally 
operating companies, in which the isolation of perpetrators based on causality is not 
realistic. Furthermore, the findings support political CSR’s assumption about the 
politicized role of MNCs in the context of a local and global governance void. 
On the practical side, the case study provides insights for other companies operating in 
complex environments on the crucial role of learning and adaption over time for two 
reasons. In the first place, Shell’s experiences demonstrate that many companies still 
hold an apolitical self-perception, but engage at the same time in activities that have 
been regarded as actual government activities. Yet, this strategic adoption of public 
responsibilities to maintain their social license to operate implies unforeseen challenges 
with regard to the company’s legitimacy and the scope of responsibility. In a complex 
operating environment such as Nigeria it requires continuous efforts from part of the 
company to identify key stakeholder’s interests and to go beyond current one-size-fits-
all best practices. The case also provides key questions for future managers and 
students. The appendix contains more specific questions for students, which can be 
discussed in the classroom. 
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1.5.3. Summary of study 3 
The third research study “A model of organizational response strategies to political CSR 
demands: The case of Royal Dutch Shell” takes the company’s dilemma between 
economic and broader social goals and the lack of research attention to societal impact 
as a starting point for a systematic empirical inquiry of the oil company Royal Dutch 
Shell. A first version of this research study has been presented at the 2015 annual 
conference of the Academy of Management in Vancouver.  
My own prior research (chapter 2 & 3) and other scholars have identified that, despite 
significant progress, we still lack a systematic empirical examination and a systematic 
model of how corporations can and do conform to political CSR demands. Notably 
lacking is the explicit attention to the role of organizational self-interest and agency and 
the impact on outcomes for society (Banerjee, 2007, p. 167; Devinney, 2009, p. 54; 
Margolis & Walsh, 2003) in particular empirical settings (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 519; 
Brunsson, Rasche, & Seidl, 2012; Frynas & Stephens, 2014). To understand the effect of 
a company’s response to institutional norms for political CSR (as the independent 
variable so to speak) on societal outcomes (as the so-called dependent variable). I ask in 
this study: How do companies respond to political CSR demands? Under which 
conditions are the different response strategies likely to be mobilized? How do 
corporate response strategies affect societal outcomes? To answer the research 
questions, I draw on longitudinal qualitative data, which was collected intermittently 
over six years (2010-15). I used a range of field methods such as in-depth interviews, 
informal meetings, and extensive archives and interviewed informants from different 
professional backgrounds (corporate, civil society, academic) at multiple levels of 
hierarchy (e.g. CEO and intermediate managers) to avoid potential bias.  
The emergent model reveals a rather more complex and dynamic picture of MNCs’ 
responses to political CSR demands than that presented in the extant literature and 
sheds new light on the gap between political CSR activities and public ends. Notably, it 
makes two important contributions: (1) it identifies previously unidentified responses 
to normative political CSR demands – namely compromise, internal buffering, defiance 
28 
and manipulation; and (2) it sheds light on the interests and power relations behind the 
company’s response strategy. 
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Table 2 Overview of research studies 
Title Publication/Presentation Methods, Research focus & RQ Findings Contribution 
The role of oil 
mayors in 
supporting 
sustainable 
peace and 
development 
in Nigeria: the 
case of Royal 
Dutch Shell  
 
Published in M. Prandi & 
J. M. Lozano (Eds.), CSR in 
conflict and post-conflict 
environments: from risk 
management to value 
creation (pp. 133-147). 
Barcelona: School for a 
Culture of Peace 
(UAB)/Institute for Social 
Innovation (ESADE). ISBN 
978-84-615-5634-2 
 
Presented at the 
European Academy of 
Business in Society 
(EABIS), Annual 
Colloquium, Sant 
Petersburg, September 
2010. 
Exploratory case study:  
 Addresses the ‘tip of the 
iceberg’ of a then new and 
empirically unexplored 
phenomenon  
 A first exploration of the 
practical side of the political 
aspects of CSR in the area of 
conflict and peace 
management and its 
economic, social, and 
environmental impact  
 
RQ: What is the economic, 
social and environmental 
impact of Shell’s political CSR 
policies in supporting 
sustainable peace and 
development in Nigeria? 
Study revealed challenges related to the 
negative and positive impact of MNCs taking 
responsibilities beyond the economic 
mandate in a context of a governance void 
Negative:  
 Corporate practice escalated the 
dynamics of local violence and insurgent 
activity 
 No amelioration of the negative social 
and environmental impact of oil 
production on host communities 
Positive:  
 Shell filled a governance vacuum and 
started to deliver on social and economic 
rights that have been regarded as 
traditional government activities and 
commit to self-regulation  
 This step into the political sphere has not 
been sufficiently integrated in theory and 
praxis and led to an ambiguity with 
regard to the company’s role not only for 
the company itself but also for others 
Methodological: First empirical insights into a 
then new and empirically unexplored 
phenomenon – the political role and 
responsibilities of the multinational corporation 
Shell in Nigeria  
 
Theoretical: study contributed to both the 
political CSR and the conflict literature by 
depicting the scope, peculiarities, and impact of 
CSR policies and practices in the area of peace 
and development and in the context of a 
governance void  
The findings question fundamental legitimacy 
dimensions of political CSR as they reveal 
shortcomings with regard to the company’s 
partnership approach and self-regulation to 
achieve public ends 
 The findings also question the effectiveness 
of the company’s dual role as a political and 
economic actor due to Shell’s lack of 
consistency and integrity in approaching 
peace and development  
Royal Dutch 
Shell in 
Nigeria: 
Where do 
responsibilities 
end? 
Published in the Journal 
of Business Ethics, 129(1), 
1-25 
 
Presented at the 
European Business Ethics 
Network (EBEN), Lille, 
September 2013 
Hybrid approach to case study 
methodology:  
 Addresses the call for a 
closer examination of the 
limits of upstreaming 
responsibility and the 
conditions of corporate 
legitimacy based on 
empirical research 
The findings reveal that 
 Shell’s engagement in traditional 
government responsibilities and global 
MSI has offset the strict division of labor 
between private business and nation 
state governance  
 the scope of Shell’s responsibility for 
social and environmental conditions is 
limited taking into account the possibility 
Study advances scholarly work in political 
philosophy (Habermas, 1998b; Habermas, 2001; 
Young, 2004; Young, 2006) as well as 
subsequent works in political CSR (Palazzo & 
Scherer, 2008; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer 
& Palazzo, 2007; Scherer et al., 2006) 
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 Includes teaching guidance 
for students 
 
RQ: where do these enlarged 
responsibilities end? What do 
these political responsibilities 
entail? What are the conditions 
for corporate legitimacy? 
to isolate perpetrators, the existence of 
unjust background conditions, forward-
looking action, the mediated connection 
of all actors to structural injustices and 
the ability to engage in collective action 
 the degree of Shell’s responsibility ranges 
from a strong (direct) responsibility to a 
shared political responsibility depending 
the issue at stake and the company’s 
power, interest, privilege and collective 
ability to address it 
 the precarious conditions of Shell’s 
legitimacy due to a lack of implementing 
input and output legitimacy criteria 
On the theoretical side, the study  
 supports political CSR’s assumption about 
the politicized role of MNCs in the context 
of a local and global governance void 
 provides an extension of the political CSR 
framework with regard to the scope of 
political responsibilities based on Young’s 
(2006) social connection model and Mena & 
Palazzo’s (2012) conditions for input and 
output legitimacy 
 
On the practical side, the case study provides  
 insights for other companies operating in 
complex environments on the crucial role of 
learning and adaption over time 
 key questions for future managers and 
students 
A model of 
organizational 
response 
strategies to 
political CSR 
demands: The 
case of Royal 
Dutch Shell 
Presented at the 
Academy of Management 
(AOM), Annual 
Conference, Vancouver, 
August 2015. Symposium 
Presentation 
Inductive longitudinal case 
study: 
Model of corporate response 
strategies and determinants to 
institutional demands for 
political CSR 
 
RQ: How do companies respond 
to political CSR demands? 
Under which conditions are the 
different response strategies 
likely to be mobilized? How do 
corporate response strategies 
affect societal outcomes? 
The study reveals  
 dynamic responses to normative political 
CSR demands ranging from compromise, 
internal buffering, defiance to 
manipulation 
 Response determinants such as the 
company’s rationales and power 
relations  
 The predominantly negative societal 
impact 
 
The emergent model reveals a rather more 
complex and dynamic picture of MNCs’ 
responses to political CSR demands than that 
presented in the extant literature and sheds 
new light on the gap between political CSR 
activities and public ends 
 it identifies previously unidentified 
responses to normative political CSR 
demands – namely compromise, internal 
buffering, defiance and manipulation 
 it sheds light on the interests and power 
relations behind the company’s response 
strategy 
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1.6. Overall contribution: A new perspective on political CSR 
Through the researching and writing of this PhD thesis and the article, book chapter, and 
teaching case which resulted from it, I have been able to provide empirical and 
conceptual arguments for a perspective on political CSR that has previously not been 
promoted. Since the political CSR field is dominated by institutional theory and 
stakeholder theory (Frynas & Stephens, 2014) the critical findings depicted here also 
contribute to future theory development in this body of literature. 
First, I provide empirical insights into the predominantly normative debate on the 
political role and responsibilities with regard to public goods issues such as peace, 
transparency and community development in Africa. In particular, Chapter 2 contributes 
to the literature addressing the potential role of MNCs in helping address conflict issues 
as part of their CSR policies (Bais & Huijser, 2005; Bennett, 2002; Gerson, 2001; Haufler, 
2004; Jamali & Mirshak, 2010; Nelson, 2000; Oetzel et al., 2007) and theories on the 
preservation of peace (Dunfee & Fort, 2003; Fort & Schipani, 2004). Notably, the in-
depth and longitudinal study of the company Shell has shed light on the ‘dark side’ not 
only of the company’s (mal)practices, but also regarding the weaknesses of the broader 
system of business and society, i.e. the democratic control over a powerful MNCs in a 
global and local context with a non-existent or weak regulatory authority. In this sense, 
the findings of this PhD thesis challenge the predominantly positivist assumptions and 
the ‘bright side’ bias of exemplary cases of political CSR (e.g. Forest Stewardship 
Council).  
Second, this PhD thesis sheds light on the limits of upstreaming responsibilities and the 
basis for corporate legitimacy in a context of a governance void. In particular chapter 3 
highlights the global interconnectedness of the oil industry. It thus makes an interesting 
case in point with regard to the background conditions of globally operating companies, 
in which the isolation of perpetrators based on causality is not realistic. The PhD thesis 
also reveals the particular legitimacy challenges, which MNCs face in the context of 
increasing demands to take on public responsibilities while respecting their economic 
mandate. Accordingly, I advance scholarly work in political philosophy (Habermas, 
1998b; Habermas, 2001; Young, 2004; Young, 2006) as well as subsequent works in 
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political CSR (Palazzo & Scherer, 2008; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; 
Scherer et al., 2006). 
Third, this PhD thesis introduces the role of organizational self-interest, active agency 
and power in organizational responses to political CSR demands. Building on insights 
from chapter 2 and 3, chapter 4 conceptualizes a response model to institutional 
demands for political CSR, which identifies previously unidentified responses and 
reveals the interests and power relations behind the company’s response strategy. The 
PhD thesis thus follows a call from critical management scholars to shed light on 
motivations and interests (Barley, 2007; Whelan, 2012) and the underlying power 
relations (Banerjee, 2007; Levy & Scully, 2007), which can obstruct the rights of citizens 
(Nyberg et al., 2013) and undermine representative democracy and the public good 
(Barley, 2007).  
The findings thus challenge predominant assumptions in the political CSR literature and 
in institutional theory. They assume that MNCs passively acquiescence to institutional 
demands for political CSR and that any deviation of corporate policies or practices from 
institutional demands is considered unintended and a transitory (Boxenbaum & 
Jonsson, 2008; Bromley & Powell, 2012; Haack, Schoeneborn, & Wickert, 2012; Matten 
& Moon, 2008; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Waddock, 2008) as it does not provide general 
legitimacy benefits (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 516) and thus may not be a viable long-
term option for adopters of CSR-related practices (Haack et al., 2012). Contrary to these 
predominant assumptions, chapter 4 in particular reveals a complex and dynamic 
process of corporate responses, which is extended over time, and somewhat 
indeterminate and with predominantly negative consequences for public ends. The PhD 
thesis thus supports recent work on means-end decoupling (Bromley & Powell, 2012; 
Wijen, 2014) and active contestation (Levy, 2008; Levy, Reinecke, & Manning, 2015) and 
as new, and potentially more consequential forms of deviation from institutional 
demands such as the normative benchmark of political CSR. 
The three studies in the following chapters thus constitute the body of this PhD thesis. 
Each of them appears in its original publishing format. A final section of synthesized 
discussion and conclusions ensues after the three studies. The outcomes of my thesis 
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have been interpreted with an eye towards guiding scholars, corporate managers and 
policy makers that work directly on the phenomenon of MNC’s political role and 
responsibilities, as well as on other inter-disciplinary emerging phenomena where 
similar dynamics might be present. 
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Chapter 2: Study 1 – The role of oil mayors in supporting 
sustainable peace and development in Nigeria: the case 
of Royal Dutch Shell  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published in 2011 in M. Prandi & J. M. Lozano, CSR in conflict and post-conflict 
environments: from risk management to value creation (pp. 133-147). Barcelona: School 
for a Culture of Peace, UAB/Institute for Social Innovation, ESADE 
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2.1. Introduction 
In recent years, growing awareness of social and environmental injustice caused by 
irresponsible business behavior (Epstein, 1987; Matthews, Goodpaster, & Nash, 1985) 
has led to a declining legitimacy and trust (Lodge & Wilson, 2006) in corporations. Also, 
due to the historical role of oil in distorting Nigeria’s political development and 
perpetuating its conflict, the involvement of the same companies in contributing to 
development and peace building is often viewed with cynicism.  
Yet, in the light of global expansion and increased power of multinational corporations 
(MNCs), companies are also increasingly expected to (pro-) actively play a role as ‘agents 
of world benefit’ (Maak, 2009, p. 361). Analyses of managerial practice as well as of 
theoretical cross-disciplinary discourse reveal that business firms have already begun to 
become part of the solution. In this respect, business firms engage in private-public 
policy networks to contribute to the regulation of global issues (e.g.,(Reinicke et al., 
2000); play an important role in global governance (Risse, 2002; Wolf, 2005) and the 
production of global goods (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; Kaul, Conceição, Le Goulven, 
& Mendoza, 2003); take on activities that have been regarded as traditional government 
activities (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Matten & Crane, 2005) or even assume a stake-like 
role to protect, enable and implement citizenship rights (Marshall, 1965); and commit 
to self-regulation and the definition of and adherence to ethical codes (Cragg, 2005) to 
fill gaps in legal regulation and moral orientation (Scherer & Smid, 2000). These 
developments are also acknowledged by recent theories on the preservation of peace  
(Dunfee & Fort, 2003; Fort & Schipani, 2004). For example, Banfield and Champain 
(2004) claim “by adopting a more conflict-sensitive approach in three key areas, foreign 
businesses can minimize harmful impacts and actively contribute to peace building, with 
bottom-line gains incurred for business in the process. These areas are: core business, 
social investment and policy dialogue” (Banfield & Champain, 2004, p. 5). 
In order to shed light on current corporate practice in this area, this paper will develop 
its case study by reviewing findings from the an extensive literature available on this 
topic and interviews with key representatives from civil society (NGO Social Action) and 
Royal Dutch Shell (senior employee) as they relate to these questions. 
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We proceed as follows. In the next chapter we briefly flesh out the dimensions of the 
conflict in the Niger Delta and the role MNCs such as Shell play. In the third chapter we 
focus on Shell’s peace building approach within its CSR program and crystallize the 
concrete proposals for the different dimensions of the conflict. The last chapter 
concludes. 
2.2. Conflict in Nigeria: setting the scene 
To grasp the transformation of the Niger delta into a space of insurgency Watts (2008) 
identifies a key number of processes. First, ethno-nationalism is a central force in a 
region of sixty or more ethnic groups and a powerful set of institutions of customary 
rule. This was central for example to both the Ogoni movement in the 1990s and to the 
Ijaw – the largest ethnic minorities in the Delta – since the establishment of the Ijaw 
Youth Congress in 1998. The exclusion from the oil wealth while suffering all the social 
and environmental costs of oil operations became central to the emergence of a new 
sort of youth politics in which a new generation of youth leaders took up the struggle.  
The second dimension is the unwillingness and inability of the Nigerian state in its 
military and civilian guises to address this political mobilization in the Delta without 
resorting to state-imposed violence by an undisciplined military, police and security 
forces. In this sense the failure of the non-violent politics of the Ogoni movement left 
behind a generation of militants whose frustrations were further propelled by 
undisciplined violence of state security forces to secure ‘national oil assets’ even after 
return to civilian rule in 1999. Thus, the political mobilization of the youth turned from 
a sort of peaceful civic nationalism towards militancy. 
Third, the militant groups and the rise of youth politics began to challenge both 
customary forms of chiefly power, and the corruption of the petro-state. While many 
militias draw substance from grievances due to exclusion and marginalization and 
unmet goals of peaceful struggle, others paradoxically got their start by being bankrolled 
by the state and politicians. For example, “the NDF and NPDVF were both fuelled by 
machine politicians during the notoriously corrupt 1999 and 2003 elections” (Watts, 
2008, p. 15).  
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And fourth, the existence and proliferation of oil theft or ‘oil bunkering’ provides a 
financial mechanism through which militants can finance their operations and attract 
recruits. The organization of the oil theft trade involves high ranking military, 
government official and merchants, draws upon the local militia to organize and protect 
the tapping of pipelines and the movement of barges through the creeks and ultimately 
offshore to large tankers.  
Fifth, corporate practice also contributes to an environment in which military activity 
was in effect encouraged and facilitated. Watts (2008) names for example the funding 
of youth groups as security forces, the willingness to use military and security forces 
against protestors and militants alike, and the corrupt practices of distributing rents to 
local community elites and the use of violent youth groups to ‘protect’ their facilities 
(Watts, 2008, p. 16). This short description of the key processes allows fleshing out some 
key actors involved in the Niger Delta conflict (see Table 3 below). 
 
Table 3 Overview of key actors in the Niger Delta 
Armed groups 
Non-violent 
movements and civil 
society associations 
Government Oil companies 
Movement for the 
Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND) 
 
Niger Delta Vigilante 
 
Niger Delta People’s 
Volunteer Force 
 
Gangs and self-defense 
militias or ‘Cults’ 
Movement for the 
Supervival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP) 
 
Ijaw Youth Council 
(IYC) 
Joint Task Force 
 
Political Parties and 
local state governors 
Private security 
companies 
 
‘Surveillance’ contracts 
with local militias 
Source: own elaboration based on Stakeholder Democracy Network 
The analysis of the dimensions of the conflict in the Niger Delta has shown that 
corporate practice was essential to the dynamics of local violence and the escalation of 
insurgent activity. This has been acknowledged not only by several researchers, but also 
by a consultancy hired by Shell. A report (which leaked in December 2003) concluded 
that the company itself “ is part of the conflict dynamics […] and corporate practices can 
lead to conflict” (WAC Global Services, 2003). The report stated furthermore that the oil 
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companies’ “social license to operate is significantly eroding” (ibid.). The Nigeria case 
highlights how the operations of oil can be generative not simply of conflict and violence 
but also of conditions in which human rights violations can occur. 
Yet, in recent years, growing awareness of the general public and companies alike has 
led to an increasing engagement of MNCs in peace building and conflict prevention 
amongst others. Shell has been a forerunner in this field and started to implement an 
ambitious CSR program when faced with mounting community protest and violence and 
international pressure particularly after the Ogoni events in the Niger Delta in the mid 
1990s. 
2.3. Role of oil major Shell in peacebuilding in Nigeria 
Shell has been active in Nigeria since 1936. When the company faced a reputational dent 
in 1995 over the Ogoni and the Brent Spar incidents, Shell has undertaken a serious 
review of its attitude and activities in the region and has carried out internal and external 
consultations about its practices in the region in line with the company’s statement of 
General Business Principles, which it adopted in 1997. The principles focused on five 
major areas of responsibility to shareholders, customers, employees, business partners, 
and the society (the host communities) and on its economic, social and environmental 
responsibilities. In line with Shell’s formulation of its three strategic areas – economic, 
social and environmental – we analyze in the next sections its impact on conflict 
prevention and peace building. 
2.3.1. Profit: economic impact  
Shell Petroleum Development Company’s (SPDC) economic impact is important for both 
the company and the Nigerian government. In 2009, SPDC’s operations contributed 
around 9% of Shell’s global oil and gas production (Royal Dutch Shell, 2009a, p. 22). As 
the leader of the petroleum industry in Nigeria SPDC has the largest acreage in the 
country from which it produces some 39 per cent of the nation's oil and contributed 
about $36 billion in taxes and royalties to the Nigerian government in the period 
between 2005 and 2009 (Shell Nigeria, 2010a, p. 1). Furthermore, SPDC’s operations 
have an important impact on the wider economy, employing around 6,000 staff and 
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contractors from which about 95% of them are Nigerian, and approximately 20,000 
indirect third party contractor staff. Additionally, 90% of the total number of contracts 
awarded by Shell companies in Nigeria (worth more than $900 million) went to Nigerian 
companies (Shell Nigeria, 2010a).  
Yet the oil industry has limited linkage (employment) effects. The oil sector usually 
accounts only between one and two percent of the workforce. Müller (2010) states that  
“this produces a ‘labor aristocracy’ and underemployment among the unskilled 
workforce” (Müller, 2010, p. 10) which is abundant in the Niger Delta. For example, the 
Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan informs that adult literacy status of the 
Niger Delta States is around 78% (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2006, p. 87). 
Consequently, workers are ‘imported’ from both abroad or non-‘host’ communities 
often belonging to another ethnic group, which is especially critical with regard to 
enhancing existing inter-community and -ethnic tensions. Also, expatriate workers of 
various sorts and host-country nationals are said to create an ‘apartheid’-like working 
and living environment prone to conflict (UNRISD, 2002) (Vitalis, 2002). Furthermore, 
Watts (2004) finds that “in other cases, the growth of boomtowns around oil 
compounds has produced the massive proliferation of prostitution and the sex trade 
which the oil industry has done nothing to regulate or control” (Watts, 2004, p. 18). 
Also following the rise of armed and unemployed youth gangs in the Niger Delta, Shell 
has adopted a policy of appeasement that involves hiring youths to protect their 
pipelines and other facilities from attacks. The same applies to contracts for cleaning up 
oil spills. While the company sees this as a compliance with their stakeholder 
engagement and promise to provide employment to host communities, these 
‘surveillance’ contracts essentially perpetuates the cycle of violence for two reasons. 
First, contracts are awarded to the youth groups to ‘protect’ the facilities from other 
youth gangs, which creates competition (and eventually conflict) over contracts among 
the different groups. Second, in a context of extreme poverty this system provides the 
wrong incentives in that it encourages the communities to ‘create’ work (i.e. incentivizes 
sabotage). Thus, the system has not only become a method of pay-offs for illegal action 
of vandalism or theft through a legitimized contract system, but also a ‘monetary’ 
mechanism for empowerment of some Shell-selected community members. This has 
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essentially distorted established traditional power structures and contest over the new 
social and financial status of ‘contracted personnel’ (Social Action, interview 
21.04.2010).  
Shell’s economic impact has not impacted on poverty or inequality levels. With a present 
average per capita income of US$1160 (World Bank), it is one of the poorest countries 
in the world. In 1970 just before the oil boom, 19 million Nigerians lived below the 
poverty line. Nearly $400 billion oil earnings later, 90 million or more Nigerians live in 
poverty (Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2003, p. 4). The rate of poverty ($1 a day) 
expanded from 28 percent in 1980 to 71 percent in 1999. Similarly, income inequality 
has risen and income disparities are quite high by international standards (Akanji, 2000). 
As poverty and conflict are often closely interconnected this is an important case in 
point. 
Contrary to Shell’s intentions to contribute economic development and conflict 
prevention, disputes over recognition and reward systems have resulted in civil unrest 
and increasing violence to an extent that the company’s “social license to operate is 
significantly eroding” (WAC Global Services, 2003). The company has already 
acknowledged that these “cash payments – made to chiefs, politicians, youth groups – 
to secure the flow of oil (and hopefully some degree of stability) were to be abandoned” 
(Watts, 2004, p. 25). Yet, the accomplishment of this proposition and the impact of the 
company’s economic activity on local economic opportunities remain to be seen. In 
complex environment such as the Niger Delta the success will depend also on other 
issues such as corruption and state induced violence.  Thus, an enabling environment is 
crucial to an effective approach to peace building. 
2.3.2. People: social outcome  
The most important contribution Shell companies in Nigeria make to society is through 
the monies they pay to the federal government – approximately $36 billion in taxes and 
royalties from 2005-2008. In addition to these payments, in 2008 Shell companies and 
their partners administered over $158.2 million (Shell share $56.8 million) to the Niger 
Delta Development Commission (NDDC) as required by law. In the same year, the 
operations run by the SPDC contributed a further $84 million (Shell share $25.2 million) 
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to community development (CD) projects focusing on a range of activities. These 
promote and support small businesses, agriculture, skills training, education, 
healthcare, micro lending and capacity building (Royal Dutch Shell, 2009a, p. 22). As a 
direct effort to peace-building Shell like other oil companies are paying a monthly 
contribution to the amnesty program run by the government. 
While in the past SPDC negotiated individual projects village by village, SPDC has 
recently introduced a new way of engaging with local people and built a significant CD 
team employing more developing specialists than the Nigerian government (Hertz, 
2001, p. 174). The new model is based on agreements with groups of communities called 
Global Memoranda of Understanding, which are negotiated with the help of 
intermediaries or Community Liaison Officers (CLOs). CLOs also respond to community 
grievances, identify needs in a participatory process with the community and transmit 
community assistance proposals for the CD program to the company.  
In a context of government marginalization and the fact that SPDC’s presence in the 
Niger Delta precedes the formation of the nation-state, it is not surprising that the 
communities in the Niger Delta perceive SPDC as a proxy for government. To dispel 
community perceptions and to increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of their CD 
program, Shell increasingly started to partner with the government, international 
organizations and NGOs. With the government SPDC not only built a partnership with 
the NDDC but also provided further non-mandatory support in the provision of 
development infrastructure in the Niger Delta, developed technical and managerial 
capacity of NDDC’s key staff, organized workshops for leaders at state and local 
government levels about governance and community development and aligned its 
community development plans with other oil companies (Jacoba Schouten, 2010, p. 
221). As the potential of bringing benefits to all parties depends on transparency among 
other factors (Ite, 2006), Shell has embarked on another cooperation with the 
government: the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI).  
Shell in 1997 became the first among the oil multinationals to declare publicly its support 
for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and the company has addressed this 
issue in subsequent years in its report on the company’s financial, social and 
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environmental duties (Pegg, 1999, pp. 474-475). With regard to human rights and 
security, the 2010 SPDC report asserts that SPDC prioritizes the safety of its staff and 
supports the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Therefore, Shell and SPDC have 
implemented the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPs) in the 
operations in the Delta and also engage various government agencies (including the 
National Human Rights Commission), security authorities and other organizations on 
how the company can contribute to better implementing VPs in the country (Shell 
Nigeria, 2010c, p. 2). 
In the area of conflict resolution and human rights, SPDC has also provided training to 
field-based contracted security personnel and supernumerary police assigned by the 
Nigeria Police Force to SPDC since 2007. The training’s objective is to raise awareness of 
the Voluntary Principles and the obligations they establish, and to provide practical help 
in applying them. This program is run by the CLEEN Foundation, and endorsed by the 
Danish Institute for Human Rights. As of December 2009, 472 people have been trained. 
And in the period 2005-2009 around 3,300 SPDC staff and contractors had received 
similar training (Shell Nigeria, 2010c, p. 2). 
Yet, Shell’s CSR engagement has clearly come after the fact. With the event of Saro-
Wiwa’s execution, the plight of the Ogoni people was brought to the attention of the 
international community and contributed to spurring interest in the cause by many civil 
society organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Greenpeace, the Body Shop, and the 
UK’s Channel 4 television (Zell, p.4 quoted in McLaren, 2000, p. 18). The 
internationalization of the Niger Delta crisis has forced the major key players – the 
Nigerian state and the MNCs – to review their attitudes towards the region’s plight. 
Their response has been two-fold: both soft and hard. And both with essential 
shortcomings involved. 
As outlined above, the soft-response involved the creation of a CSR agenda addressing 
developmental needs through agencies like the NDDC and direct intervention efforts in 
community development and social responsibility. Also dialogue has been established 
as an important strategy of community engagement. As described above, dialogue with 
communities takes place with local elders, youth groups and others that hold authority 
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at the village level with the help of intermediaries or CLOs. CLOs are placed through their 
role in a powerful position, which has been misused not infrequently for personal gain. 
Furthermore, community members who have been excluded from this role have also 
heavily contested the CLOs new social and financial status (Social Action, interview 
21.04.2010).  
Yet, these efforts are often perceived as paltry when viewed against the backdrop of the 
economic benefits taken out of the region and the persisting poverty and violence. For 
example, in a memorandum presented by Shell to the Commission of Inquiry on the 
Warri crisis, the company stated that it has made modest efforts to address some of the 
demands of the Niger Delta people. Also, Ojakorotu informs that Shell’s Corporate 
External Relations manager, Mr. Precious Omuku, stated that Shell’s contribution 
towards social services and infrastructure in the region’s development could be likened 
to drops in the Ocean when the needs of the local people are juxtaposed with what the 
company makes out of the region in term of profits. He also confirmed that the 
company’s community development interventions were concentrated in the municipal 
cities of Warri, Ughelli, Port Harcourt, Aba, Owerri and Bonny while the more remote 
swampy areas remained unchanged and untouched (Ojakorotu, 2008, p. 110).  
On the hard side, both MNC and the government “have continued, overtly and covertly, 
their militarization of the region under the guise of security, thus inflicting more violence 
on the Niger Delta people” (Ojakorotu, 2008, p. 115). Pegg (1999) reveals that the 
company has been implicated in a number of human rights violations in the Niger Delta 
since the 1997 declaration. For example, the author states that the company has not 
only been involved in incidents in which security forces attacked local communities in 
the Niger Delta but also in the purchase of weapons and the maintenance of its own 
police – known as the ‘Shell-police’ – in the region (Pegg, 1999: 475).  
The current partnership approach is said to have had limited contribution to sustainable 
development to transforming the Niger Delta from an enclave at war to one at peace. 
First, Idemudia’s analysis suggests that the positive impact on host communities is 
essentially constrained by fact that “CD programs neither has had any real impact on 
how the core business activities of oil MNCs are undertaken or have they ameliorated 
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the negative social and environmental impact of oil production on host communities” 
(Idemudia, 2007, p. 2). This is because stakeholder engagement seems to be rather 
motivated by risk management at the community level and the concern to be a good 
corporate citizen or philanthropy at the government level (and to ensure their social and 
economic license respectively) than to change its core practices and reduce its harmful 
externalities in the first place. Second, Shola Omotola (2007) indicates that NDDC’s 
underperforms essentially due to “the character of the Nigerian state, which remains 
predatory, rent-seeking, and above all, lacking in autonomy” (Shola Omotola, 2007). 
Also International Alert finds that Shell’s “fundamental aim of building a good reputation 
distorted both its meaningful engagement with peace and development issues and the 
quality of its engagement with stakeholders. Peace building and sustainable 
development processes cannot be micro-managed” (Banfield & Champain, 2004, p. 20). 
2.3.3. Planet: environmental impact  
Shell companies in Nigeria are officially committed to reduce any negative impact of 
their operations on the environment. SPDC has invested in projects to end flaring, to 
reduce spills from operational failures and has also taken action to protect biodiversity 
in the Niger Delta (Shell Nigeria, 2010b). 
However, Friends of the Earth estimates that the amount of oil spilled by Shell in Nigeria 
in the past 50 years is almost five times the amount leaked by British Petroleum in the 
Gulf Coast so far (Real World Radio). Also, a study carried out by international and 
Nigerian environmental experts in 2006 stated that the Niger Delta is “one of the world’s 
most severely petroleum-impacted ecosystems” (Nigerian Conservation Foundation, 
WWF UK, International Union for Conservation of Nature, Commission on 
Environmental, & Environment, 2006). These facts are not new. The Niger Delta 
Environment Survey, already found in the 1990s, but never published, that: 
“ [A]nalysis done in this study has shown the significant impact of oil production 
activities on the landscape of the Niger Delta. Many land use categories that 
were not there in 1960 increasingly gained prominence […] e.g., dredged canals, 
flare sites, burrow pits, pipelines […] The significant environmental impact of oil 
production activities is also highlighted by the emergence on the landscape of 
such land use categories as saltwater impacted forest, submerged mangrove, 
dredge spoil and open bare surfaces.”  
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Jonathan Amakiri, Executive Director, Niger Delta Environment Survey in 
(Amnesty International, 2009b, p. 20) 
It has also been investigated that “the damage from oil operations is chronic and 
cumulative, and has acted synergistically with other sources of environmental stress to 
result in a severely impaired coastal ecosystem and compromised the livelihoods and 
health of the region’s impoverished residents” (Nigerian Conservation Foundation et al., 
2006). Likewise the UNDP 2006 report asserts that “for many people, this loss has been 
a direct route into poverty, as natural resources have traditionally been primary sources 
of sustenance” (UNDP, 2006).  
However, responsibilities are very much disputed. While Shell claims to have reduced 
significantly its oil spills and attributes the majority of current oil spills to sabotage, many 
civil society organizations criticize corroded infrastructure and failure to clean up 
subsequent oil spills. Also, as previously mentioned, Shell has created an incentive 
mechanism encouraging sabotage, vandalism or theft through ‘surveillance’ or clean-up 
contract system. 
Further controversy causes Shell’s neglect to disclose information that would contribute 
important information on oil leaks from its oil pipelines in the Niger Delta; even in a legal 
framework. Milieudefensie says that “the company’s behavior shows that it is 
concealing information to avoid having to clean up its pollution and begin compensating 
the local communities” (Friends of the Earth Netherlands in (Real World Radio). Since 
1958, when the first oil well was drilled at Oloibiri, many environmental problems 
related to oil operations have been reported. UNDP states in its 2006 report (UNDP, 
2006) that the main problems are: 
 Canalization destroying freshwater ecological systems 
 Oil spills occurring accidentally or through sabotage by local people 
 Gas leaks and flares producing hydrocarbons that effect the water organisms, 
biodiversity and is being emitted into the atmosphere (acid rain, global 
warming) 
 Land subsidence 
 Depletion of forest resources and biodiversity, canalization, and land 
subsidence are causing erosion 
The environmental predicament also contributes to social and economic deprivation 
and is eventually a touchstone for grievances leading to conflict. “The issues at stake 
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include rapid and uncontrolled urbanization, occupational changes, the loss of fishing 
grounds, the disappearance of livelihoods and land shortages, among others” (UNDP, 
2006, pp. 80-81). Thus, environmental management issues are highly germane not only 
to development and to any poverty reduction strategy for the Niger Delta region but 
also to peace-management efforts, where nearly 60 per cent of the population depends 
on the natural environment living and non-living for their livelihoods (UNDP, 2006, p. 
74).  
2.4. Conclusion 
In our case analysis we have outlined that the engagement at the micro or project level 
within SPDC’s CD program has had no real impact on how the core business activities 
are undertaken nor have they ameliorated the negative social and environmental 
impact of oil production on host communities. Also International Alert finds that Shell’s 
“fundamental aim of building a good reputation distorted both its meaningful 
engagement with peace and development issues and the quality of its engagement with 
stakeholders” (Banfield & Champain, 2004, p. 20). Thus, the environmental predicament 
is eventually a touchstone for grievances leading to conflict. 
Persisting economic and social deprivation due to a lack of employment possibilities 
with oil companies and a loss of their livelihoods has important implications for conflict 
at the local and global level. Especially in the Niger Delta a deadly dynamic that surged 
from anger and fury about the exclusion from oil benefits is morphing into a huge 
international criminal enterprise challenging not only local governments but also global 
governance institutions in such areas as petroleum smuggling, illicit drugs trafficking, 
commercial fraud and identity theft. At the local level, the relatively small percentage of 
local people hired by oil companies in comparison to expatriates is perceived as unfair. 
Also, in a context of severe poverty the illegal trade of oil ‘bunkering’ and violence 
around governorship elections represent a new source of income and eventually a new 
step on the descent into generalized violence.  
Our case analysis has also shown that Shell essentially stepped into a governance 
vacuum and started to deliver on social and economic rights that have been regarded 
as traditional government activities and commit to self-regulation to protect their ‘social 
47 
license to operate’. Yet, this step into the political sphere has not been sufficiently 
integrated in theory and praxis and led to an ambiguity with regard to the company’s 
role not only for the company itself but also for others. For example, in 1996, Philip 
Watts (chief executive of Shell in Nigeria from 1991-94) described Shell’s identity as 
follows: “Shell companies are not just economic actors; nor can they be social activists 
however. Their role lies somewhere in between, as responsible, efficient and acceptable 
organizations acting on the changing world stage” (Mitchell, 1998). As a consequence, 
the company’s attempt to balance between these two types of organization – economic 
and political – Shell’s approach to peace building based on its triple bottom line is not 
only inconstant but also lacks integrity. With regard to communities, this ambiguity and 
lack of consistency has contributed essentially to conflict for two reasons. First, by 
delivering social and economic rights roles and responsibilities of the public and the 
private sector become fluid to the extent that communities perceive the oil companies 
as “the only government they know” (Chandler, 2000, pp. 7-8) with the consequence 
that communities started to target their demands directly to Shell. Yet, Shell’s unilateral 
approach was problematic for several reasons: it further undermined government 
authority (Chandler, 2000, p. 16); the community development program was not 
effective due to Shell’s insufficient expertise in development programs; Shell lacked 
legitimacy as it is formally only accountable to its shareholders; for Shell its politicized 
nature presented a significant business risk as community perceptions may become 
unmanageable and a dependency relationship may develop; and eventually unfulfilled 
promises and expectations only increased existing tensions and conflict. To address 
these inefficiencies, SPDC has signed partnerships with the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), USAID, and Africare amongst others. Notwithstanding, while the 
partnering approach served to pool complementary assets and ultimately enhanced the 
efficacy and legitimacy of Shell’s CSR agenda, the Niger Delta paradox remains; “In fact, 
it is worse” (Social Action, interview 21.04.2010). 
In sum, important changes will be required if there is to be lasting peace. Some of needs 
we have discussed - large- scale training programs and mass employment schemes, 
major infrastructure projects, and environmental rehabilitation – will require long-term 
commitment. The conflict around resource control – not as a matter of money but as a 
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legal, constitutional and political project - will need to address issues such as corruption, 
the reform of the electoral commission, and transparency. “The oil companies must 
radically rethink by the same token what passes as responsible business practice” 
(Watts, 2008, p. 19) and more effectively approach their dual role as economic and 
political actor in such a complex and conflict-prone setting. 
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Chapter 3: Study 2 – Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria: Where 
do responsibilities end?  
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3.1. Abstract 
This case study discusses the scope of responsibilities and the basis of legitimacy of 
multinational corporations (MNC) in a complex operating environment. In January 2013 
a precedent was set when Shell was held liable in The Hague for oil pollution in the Niger 
Delta. The landmark ruling climaxed the ongoing dispute over the scope of Shell’s 
responsibilities for both the company’s positive and negative impact. Shell’s was 
considered a forerunner in corporate social responsibility (CSR) and had even assumed 
public responsibilities in a context of a public responsibility void. However, the company 
remained a regular target of civil society activism and legal proceedings concerned with 
malpractice. The court case attracted international attention for its novelty and 
increasing media and civil society pressure required immediate action. How can Shell 
respond to this negative publicity to keep its license to operate? What is the scope of 
the company’s responsibilities in such a controversial human rights context? Students 
are expected to discuss these questions going beyond a simple moralistic or liability 
thinking. They are encouraged to take into account the complex structural processes 
that connect persons and institutions in very different social and geographical positions. 
The experiences of Shell are an excellent case in point since attention is drawn to the 
background conditions of globally operating companies, in which the isolation of 
perpetrators based on causality is not realistic. The case also reveals the particular 
challenges, which MNCs face in the context of increasing demands to take on public 
responsibilities while respecting their economic mandate. 
3.2. Introduction 
“The biggest change […] for an international corporation is this extension of 
responsibility […] beyond just paying your taxes and beyond just relating effectively to 
communities around your factory fence” (Valente & Crane, 2010, p. 62). 
In a landmark ruling on January 30th in 2013, Shell was held liable in The Hague for oil 
pollution in the Niger Delta. The district court found Shell’s subsidiary Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) guilty of neglecting its duty of care in that the 
company failed to take reasonable steps to stop a foreseeable sabotage from occurring 
on their crude oil wellhead (Standard, 2013). A precedent was set. It was the first time 
that a company established in the European Union was held responsible in its own 
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country for abuses committed elsewhere (ibid). The case was of considerable 
international significance since it stirred up a hot controversy over the scope of 
responsibilities of Multinational Corporations (MNC) operating in a controversial human 
rights context and a public responsibility void for both their negative and positive 
impact. Paradoxically, today, MNC are not just considered the ‘bad guys’, causing social 
and environmental harm. They are at the same time considered the solution of global 
regulation and public goods problems at both, the global level and the local level where 
public institutions are neither able nor willing to administer citizenship rights or 
contribute to the public good.  
It was true that the court case eclipsed prior accusations over the Shell’s operations in 
the Niger Delta. Shell had an inconvenient past in Nigeria. In 2009 Shell agreed to pay 
US$15.5 million to settle a lawsuit it was facing in the US for alleged human rights abuses 
in the Ken Saro-Wiwa case. In 2011, the company had to accept, in the first case of this 
kind, legal liability in the UK for two massive oil leaks in 2008/2009 as a result of 
equipment failure. Also, a scientific assessment by the United Nations Environment 
Program in 2011 criticized Shell over its inadequate oilfield infrastructure and clean-up 
of oil spills, a practice which did not meet local regulatory requirements, SPDC’s own 
procedures or international best practices.  
However, it was also true that Shell operated in an extremely complex environment. 
Heavily-armed militant groups involved in large-scale oil theft and sabotage were 
responsible for most of the oil spills and pollution. And the Nigerian Government was 
neither able to establish the rule of law nor to satisfy the basic socio-economic needs of 
its poor population. What is more, Royal Dutch Shell had to step in this public 
responsibility deficit and assume traditional government responsibilities that went 
beyond legal requirements and traditional corporate social responsibility (CSR)  
programs. What is the scope of Shell’s responsibilities in such a complex operating 
environment? Is it making things too easy when blaming and shaming Shell alone when 
a multiplicity of actors are connected to the social and environmental injustices in the 
Niger Delta? Does Shell have a higher degree of responsibility given the company’s 
privileged position, power, interest, and collective ability? Does the company even have 
a political responsibility? If so, what does this responsibility entail? 
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Shell was put in a spotlight for a novel challenge facing many MNCs operating in a 
complex environment. No benchmark was set, but increasing global media and civil 
society pressure required immediate attention. How can the company revise its CSR 
strategies in line with the increasing demand for responsibilities while respecting its 
economic mandate? How can Shell respond to this negative publicity to keep its license 
to operate? Should Shell even stop operating in the Niger Delta and give up its assumed 
public responsibilities? If so, on which legal and ethical grounds?  
3.3. Royal Dutch Shell: A company overview 
3.3.1. The multinational corporation 
Royal Dutch Shell (RDS) was created in 1907 after the merger of British-based Shell 
Transport Trading Company with and the Netherlands-based Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Company. Both parent companies traced their origins back to the Far East in the 1890s 
when they seized the opportunity to supply kerosene from the newly developing 
Russian oilfields to markets in the Far East and China, thus satisfying the growing 
demand for oil for the automobile industry and oil-fuelled ships. In 2005, RDS became 
the single parent company for the two former public parent companies. The company 
was headquartered in The Hague (Netherlands) and registered in England and Wales. In 
2012 Shell was Europe’s largest oil producer and the most profitable company 
worldwide in terms of revenue (US$484 billion) (CNN Money, 2012). The company also 
employed over 101,000 people and operated in over 90 countries. 
RDS and the companies in which it indirectly or directly owns investments were distinct 
and separate entities from a legal perspective (Shell Nigeria, 2012b). Yet, RDS acted as 
the financial and strategic centers for the company as a whole and applied a single 
overall control framework (see Appendix 1) to all wholly-owned Shell companies and to 
those ventures and other firms in which the company had a controlling interest. The aim 
was to manage the risk of failure to achieve its business objectives (Shell, 2010).  
3.3.2. Nigeria: a cornerstone of Shell’s operations 
Shell commenced oil production in Nigeria in 1958. In 2009 SPDC contributed around 
9% of Shell’s global oil and gas production (Royal Dutch Shell, 2009a, p. 22). The wholly-
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owned Shell company was Nigeria’s largest onshore producer controlling around 39% of 
the nation’s oil production. SPDC operated oil and gas production on behalf of the 
partners in an unincorporated joint venture between the government-owned Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) (55%), Shell (30%), Elf Petroleum Nigeria Ltd 
(10%), and Agip (5%) (Royal Dutch Shell, 2012a). Through NNPC, the Nigerian 
government was the major shareholder with a controlling stake and power over changes 
in production policy. The company’s mission included being committed to ensuring 
“strong economic performance to every aspect of sustainable development” (Shell 
Nigeria, 2012a).  
Shell-owned companies also dominated gas production in the country. In 2011, the 
company produced 707 million cubic feet per day (MMcf/d) of gas (US Energy 
Information Administration, 2012). Shell Nigeria Gas Ltd (SNG) was set up in 1998 and 
operated a gas transmission and distribution pipeline network. The Nigeria Liquefied 
Natural Gas Company (NLNG), was set up in 1989 and ran one of the world’s largest 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants. Shell held a 25.6% share in NLNG, together with 
NNPC, Total LNG Nigeria Ltd and Eni. A fourth company, Shell Nigeria Exploration and 
Production Company Ltd (SNEPCO), was created in 1993 to develop Nigeria's offshore 
energy resources.  
3.3.3. CSR and Nigeria: Key parts of Shell’s overall governance structure 
Shell’s overall control framework included CSR policies such as the Health, Safety, 
Security, Environment and Social Performance Executive (HSSE & SP), the company’s 
Statement of General Business Principles and Code of Conduct (see Appendix 1). 
Corporate responsibility governance structures were located at the Board of RDS. The 
overall accountability for sustainable development within Shell lay with the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and the Executive Committee. They set priorities and standards 
in sustainable development, which defined standards and accountabilities at each level 
of the organization. Thus, CSR policies were cascaded down from headquarters to the 
business units and the supply chain. Yet, the accountability for running Shell’s projects 
and facilities responsibly lay with the company’s business managers and each business 
unit level decided on the individual scope and funding of CSR projects. The Board also 
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monitored compliance. The Corporate and Social Responsibility Committee assists the 
Board of Directors in reviewing policies and performance, visiting facilities and meeting 
with government officials, community representatives and local non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) (Royal Dutch Shell, 2012c, p. 5). 
Due to the importance of Nigeria for Shell in terms of complexity of the local operating 
environment and the volume of oil production, a permanent Nigeria team was installed 
at headquarter level. The team existed of four people with either local knowledge and 
networks due to their previous (senior) positions within SPDC in external affairs and/or 
community relations or European background and networks within the international 
society. The team was responsible for partnerships management and external 
engagement with local and international stakeholders such as Nigerian (local) 
government institutions, academics, United Nations, NGOs etc. The team also initiated 
and coordinated international initiatives such as EITI (Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative) with the Nigerian government and engaged with academics on human rights 
issues related to their business on international conferences (Jacoba Schouten, 2010, p. 
223). 
3.4. Shell’s CSR activities 
Shell was a front-running company in the CSR area and became the first among oil 
multinationals in 1997 to publicly declare its support for the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. The Canadian magazine, Corporate Knights, ranked RDS the world’s 20th 
most sustainable corporation in 2010 due to its proactive management of 
environmental, social and governance issues (Corporate Knights, 2010) and in 2011 the 
company was awarded the British-American Business Channing Corporate Citizenship 
Award. Also, the company’s community development projects in Nigeria were 
presented as a positive case study of CSR by the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development, and SPDC was voted “Best Company in most Innovative CSR” in 2011 at 
the Nigerian Social Enterprise Report and Awards. Corporate Affairs Officer, Tony Attah, 
commented that “the award is a strong acknowledgement of the work we’re doing in 
the Niger Delta, positively touching lives and helping to develop communities. And we 
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are encouraged to do more” (Shell Nigeria, 2012c). Shell’s summarized its approach 
towards sustainability as follows: 
“The world needs to produce enough energy to keep economies growing, while 
reducing the impact of energy use on a planet threatened by climate change. 
Shell works to help meet rising energy demand in a responsible way. That means 
operating safely, minimizing our impact on the environment and building trust 
with the communities who are our neighbors. If we fall short of the standards 
society expects of us, we learn from our experiences to improve the way we 
operate” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2012c, p. 2). 
3.4.1. The Ogoni Case: The origin of Shell’s CSR agenda 
On May 22nd, 1994, the Nigerian military arrested all of the MOSOP’s (Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni People) leaders, including Saro-Wiwa. The latter led a 
nonviolent campaign against the environmental degradation of Ogoniland’s land and 
water by the multinational petroleum industry, especially RDS. The activists were hastily 
tried and found guilty on all charges by a special military tribunal, ordering that they be 
hung in 1995. Their trial and execution were widely seen as having been politically 
motivated and completely unfounded.  
The case provoked a global outcry with Shell in the spotlight. One the one hand, the 
company was accused of collaborating with the military government to capture and 
hang the Ogoni men. In 1996 the families of the ‘Ogoni Nine’ even initiated a lawsuit in 
a federal court in New York, which “was one of the first cases to charge a multinational 
corporation with human rights violations” (Pilkington, 2009). Court documents from this 
Wiwa v. Shell case also alleged that RDS, acting through its subsidiary SPDC, supported 
the Nigerian military as it attacked villages from August to October 1993, killing over 
1,000 people, displacing over 20,000 more, and destroying property using planes, boats 
and weapons paid for by the company (Evans, Merchant, Fain, & Roberts) 2013).  
On the other hand, Shell was also accused of shirking its responsibilities to speak out 
against the trial of the Ogoni men given the company’s undisputed position of power in 
the country. Shell persisted on the apolitical nature of the company. SPDC stated in a 
press release that it would be “dangerous and wrong” for Shell to “intervene and use its 
perceived ‘influence’ to have the judgment overturned” ((Human Rights Watch, 1999). 
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Furthermore, the company insisted that it was wrong for “a commercial organization 
like Shell […] to interfere with the legal processes of any sovereign state” (ibid.). 
However, the way Shell handled the situation created for many the impression that the 
company was conspiring with a corrupt government. As a consequence, Shell faced 
increasing pressure from all sides: consumer boycotts in Europe and North America, 
shareholder activism through formal resolutions in Europe, increasing levels of 
community disruption in the Niger Delta, falling share prices and haemorrhaging staff 
(Pendleton, McClenaghan, Melamed, Bunn, & Graymore, 2004). 
3.4.2. Shell’s response: engaging in enlarged (political) responsibilities 
Shell executives realized that the company had grown out of touch with societal 
expectations. Mark Moody-Stuart, then Managing Director, stated that “[in this 
situation] we had to take a good look at ourselves and say ‘Have we got it right?’” 
(Guyon, 1997, pp. 121-125). Secret documents that came to light during the Wiwa vs. 
Shell lawsuit described the company's "crisis management strategy and plan" (Lubbers 
& Rowell, 2010) in the wake of Saro-Wiwa’s death. Shell considered leaving the country, 
but eventually decided in favor of “milking the cow” (ibid) and embarked on a 
comprehensive review of its attitude and activities at different levels. 
3.4.2.1. Revising corporate values and processes 
In March 1997, Shell rewrote its 1976 Statement of General Business Principles into the 
statement of General Business Principles based on the core values honesty, integrity and 
respect for people (see Appendix 1). The eight principles integrated economic, 
environmental and social considerations into business decision-making and described 
five inseparable areas of responsibility to shareholders, customers, employees, business 
partners and society (Royal Dutch Shell, 2012b). These Principles committed the 
company to adopt an apolitical role and stated that Shell “companies should endeavor 
always to act commercially, operating within existing national laws in a socially 
responsible manner and avoid involvement in politics” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2010a). Shell 
also developed Human Rights Compliance Assessment (HRCA) tools, which provided a 
step-by-step approach to assess all potential risks of human rights violations. Shell 
offered training to its employees on the company’s Business Principles and Code of 
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Conduct and a special course for managers to understand their responsibilities and take 
action to support human rights (Jacoba Schouten, 2010).  
3.4.2.2. Partnering with governmental and non-governmental organizations 
At the local level in Nigeria, Shell increased its community development budget of the 
early 1990s from US$300,000-US$400,000 per year to US$25 million per year in 1996 
(Pendleton et al., 2004). Stakeholder engagement via dialogue and partnering became 
a cornerstone of Shell’s strategy “of being a good neighbor”. In 2000, Shell set up the 
Shell Foundation, an independent charity focused on poverty and environmental 
charities. Community development projects were channeled indirectly through the 
Foundation and directly through national programs. SPDC’s Managing Director 
Sunmonu disclosed that the company spent in 2010 about US$56.8 million on 
community development projects in Niger Delta, which “is one of the biggest corporate 
social responsibility portfolios operated by a private company in Sub-Saharan Africa” 
(Shell Nigeria, 2011). Sunmonu explained,  
“We also do a lot for our host communities in the area of education, health, and 
employment generation. For example, we have at least 17,000 students on a 
Shell scholarship every year. We have a number of economic empowerment 
schemes aimed at improving the lives of the people in Niger Delta. SPDC 
currently supports 27 health facilities in Niger Delta. Another important benefit 
relates to the indirect employment we create through contracts” (SPDC, 2011). 
The company also cooperated with national development programs. In 2010, SPDC and 
SNEPCO gave more than US$161 million (Shell’s share was US$59.80 million) to the 
Niger Delta Development Commission (as required by Law). Sunmonu stated that the 
company’s “largest contribution is through the taxes and royalties we pay to 
government. In general terms, 95% of our revenue after tax goes back to government” 
(SPDC, 2011). SPDC’s community development initiatives underwent significant change 
from ad hoc ‘assistance’ to developmental partnerships with government agencies and 
NGOs. In 1998, SPDC shifted from unilaterally providing Community Assistance (CA) 
Programs to a Community Development Approach (CD), grounded in community 
participation as well as partnering with the public sector and civil society organizations. 
In 2004, SPDC launched its Sustainable Community Development (SCD) program with an 
increased focus on partnering as a mechanism to provide CD projects and coordinate 
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with the government’s strategic development plans and objectives. In 2006, SPDC 
introduced a new way of working with communities called the Global Memorandum of 
Understanding (GMoU). This GMoU represented an important shift in the company’s 
approach, placing emphasis on more transparent and accountable processes, regular 
communication with grassroots organizations and greater sustainability and conflict 
prevention (Shell, 2012). Sunmonu explained that this community development 
program, “managed through a Community Interface Model, is providing social 
infrastructure, promoting public health and connecting communities to electricity for 
the first time” (ECCR, 2010, p. 59).  
3.4.2.3. Joining global governance initiatives  
At the global level, the company initiated a crusade on transparency and business 
integrity. In October 1996, Shell awarded Shandwick Interactive a contract to develop 
the www.shell.com Website (Pendleton et al., 2004). In 1998, Shell presented its first 
sustainability report that outlined a Road Map of how the company planned to integrate 
sustainable development into its business and published reports in accordance with the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and in line with the International Petroleum Industry 
Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) guidelines. To ensure the credibility of 
its reports, the company established both internal controls such as audit trails and 
statistical checks and external controls with the help of an external review committee 
and well-established auditing firms such as KPMG (Royal Dutch Shell, 2009b). The 
company also incorporated a commitment to business integrity and transparency in its 
General Business Principles and Code of Conduct in 2006. Furthermore, Shell supported 
EITI and international human rights initiatives such as the Global Compact, the United 
Nation Special Representative on business and human rights, John Ruggie, and the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VP). With regard to the latter, Shell 
introduced a clause based on these principles to all new and renewed security contracts 
and expected these contractors to apply it by 2012 (Royal Dutch Shell, 2009b). In 2002, 
Shell joined the Global Business Coalition on Health to work in partnerships to help 
combat the AIDS epidemic in the societies where the company operates. The company 
also signed the 2002 World Bank-initiated Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership 
(GGFR), it joined the Environmental Defense’s Partnership for Climate Action and 
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committed itself to reduce emissions to 1990 levels by 2010. Shell and BP were the only 
companies listed in KLD Research and Analytics’ Global Climate 100 Index, the first 
investor index comprised of companies focusing on solutions to global warming (Utting 
& Ives, 2006, p. 19). The company also provided information to the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Indexes, FTSE4Good, and the Carbon Disclosure Project throughout the 
year.  
3.4.2.4. Incorporating CSR into corporate governance structures 
At the corporate level, Shell made the first significant corporate governance 
restructuring efforts after a broad inquiry of stakeholder perceptions of Shell’s 
reputation and trust from 1995 to 1996. It primarily involved a shift from a 
geographically-based to a business sector-based structure. The central feature was the 
dismantling of the three-way matrix and the strengthening of the executive authority of 
the Committee of Managing Directors by providing a clearer line of authority to both 
the business organizations and the operating companies (Grant, 2002, p. 10). Also, a 
permanent Nigeria team was installed at headquarter level to defend the company’s 
position in Nigeria and in July 1996 the company took on four new inhouse senior PR 
executives (Pendleton et al., 2004). In May 1996, the company employed Shandwick, 
one of the world’s largest PR firms, to repair both its public image and its ability to lobby 
effectively. In 1999, Shell introduced in a second corporate governance restructuring 
effort a new Sustainable Development Management Framework which made 
sustainable development an integral part of the company’s daily business. The 
framework was implemented at the Group level and in key areas of the businesses. 
Senior chief executives from each of our five core businesses and the heads of the 
corporate centre directorates formed a Sustainable Development Council to monitor 
progress across the Group (Shell, 1999, p. 20). The latest corporate governance reform 
in 2009 sought to embed more sustainability related roles at the core of the company’s 
operations to improve its sustainable development performance and engage earlier 
with stakeholders. Thus, on behalf of the Board of RDS a Corporate and Social 
Responsibility Committee assesses Shell’s policies and performance with respect to the 
Business Principles, Code of Conduct, HSSE & SP standards and major issues of public 
concern (Royal Dutch Shell, 2009a, p. 6).  
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3.5. Nigeria: A complex operating environment  
Nigeria had come to exemplify the ‘resource curse’. Five decades of oil extraction in the 
country had resulted in failed development, poverty, corruption, environmental 
degradation, ethnic and gang violence, kidnappings, and the like. The World Bank 
ranked Nigeria only 147th (out of 189 economies) among the best places for doing 
business for 2014. And in 2013 Nigeria was ranked 16th (out of 177 countries) in the 
Failed States Index. Nine of the twelve indicators have worsened since 2008, with the 
most significant in refugees/internally displaced persons, economic decline, and human 
rights (Messner et al., 2013) (see Appendix 2). 
3.5.1. A paradox of want in the midst of plenty: Oil wealth, poverty and violence  
In 2011, Nigeria had the second largest oil reserve in Africa and was the continent’s 
primary oil producer. Crude oil production averaged close to 2.13 million barrels per day 
(bbl/d), and total oil production in Nigeria was slightly over 2.53 million bbl/d. In the 
wake of the discovery of high quality oil in the Niger Delta and the prospect of ever-
increasing oil prices, the oil industry became central to Nigeria’s economy. In 2010, the 
oil sector accounted for approximately 25% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), 95% of its export earnings and 80% of the government’s revenue (Center for 
Global Development). Also, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows were heavily 
focused on the oil industry. For example, the United Nations Commission on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) reported that US$16 billion of the US$26 billion increase in FDI 
investments to the West African region from 2007 to 2008 were exclusively the result 
of an increase in new projects in Nigeria’s oil industry (UNCTAD, 2009, p. 44). Also, FDI 
investments in Nigeria increased from US$2.484 billion in 2002 to US$4.659 billion in 
2008 (World Bank, 2010).  
Oil wealth also had a dark side. The government’s dependence on oil broke the link 
between authority and territoriality, leading to neo-patrimonial governance and 
corruption. Nigeria became a synonym of a ‘rentier state’ in which state revenues 
accrued from taxes or ‘rent’ on production rather than from productive activity. As a 
consequence, the government failed to establish a robust tax system and did not thus 
develop a system of formal accountability to secure domestic legitimacy. Instead, the 
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government focused its efforts on controlling these resource rents by resorting to state-
imposed violence through an undisciplined military, police and security forces and 
securing elite compliance with instrumental benefits including public goods and 
services, employment opportunities, and lucrative government contracts, among 
others. This patronage system was essentially established along ethnic and religious 
lines and thus marginalized and excluded mostly southern groups and non-Muslim 
northern minorities (Khan, 1994, p. 8).  
As a consequence, corruption was rife in Nigeria. Independent corruption indexes 
corroborated its pervasiveness in Nigeria. For example, Transparency International 
ranked Nigeria as low as 143rd (out of 183 countries) with a score of 2.4 (out of 10) in 
its 2011 corruption perception index.  Nigeria's Anticorruption Chief claimed, for 
instance, that 70% of the country's wealth was stolen or wasted in 2003 (Carbonnier, 
Brugger, & Krause, 2011). Also, Shell’s former Senior Vice President, Ann Pickard, voiced 
her concern to US Ambassador Robin R. Sanders, indicating that,  
“Corruption in the oil sector was worsening by the day. […] Nigerian entities 
control the lifting of many oil cargoes and there are some "very interesting" 
people lifting oil (People, she said that were not even in the industry). As an 
example she said that oil buyers would pay NNPC General Managing Director 
Yar'Adua, […] Chief Economic Advisor Yakubu, and the First Lady Turai Yar'Adua 
large bribes, millions of dollars per tanker, to lift oil” (U.S. Embassy Abuja, 2009a).  
The distribution of oil revenue and the lack of economic and social development in the 
oil producing communities was one of the main issues driving political tension, theft, 
and sabotage in the Niger Delta. While most of the revenue went directly to the federal 
government’s accounts,  the host communities suffered all the social and environmental 
costs of oil operations. In 2011, even more people lived in poverty than before oil was 
found, and the rural and oil producing communities were the most affected (Ikein & 
Briggs-Anigboh, 1998). The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) reported in 2010 that, even at peak production, 92% of the 
Nigerian population survived on less than US$2 a day. Moreover, in 2007 Nigeria’s 
Human Development Index (HDI) was as low as 0.511, ranking the country 158th out of 
182 countries and rendering it unlikely to achieve any of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) by 2015. Similarly, Nigeria suffered from a high adult illiteracy rate, poor 
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quality of education and serious health challenges. Malaria was considered the most 
significant public health problem, and the country was the second most affected by the 
global HIV/AIDS health crisis. In addition, the International Energy Agency informed that 
over 49% and 65% of the population in 2009 continued to live without access to 
electricity and clean cooking facilities, respectively (International Energy Agency, 2011, 
p. 472). 
The grievances due to exclusion and marginalization and unmet goals of peaceful 
struggle (i.e., the Ogoni movement’s non-violent protests) became central to the 
emergence of a new sort of youth politics and militant groups in which a new generation 
of young leaders took up the struggle for regional resource sovereignty. Their 
frustrations were further propelled by undisciplined violence among state security 
forces to protect ‘national oil assets’ even after the return to civilian rule in 1999 (Watts, 
2008). As a consequence, a kind of Robin Hood scenario emerged to take back profits 
from foreign oil companies and an unresponsive government: initially, oil theft was used 
by local militant groups as a mechanism to redistribute wealth into the hands of the 
poor in the Niger Delta. Yet, in recent years, oil theft or ‘oil bunkering’ proliferated in 
scale and violence. The sophistication of the theft has led analysts to charge that senior 
members of the armed forces and high ranking politicians were complicit. They drew 
upon the local militia to organize and protect the tapping of pipelines and move barges 
along creeks and rivers and ultimately offshore to large tankers (Watts, 2008). NNPC 
reported, that pipeline vandalism in 2011 increased by 224% over the previous year 
(NNPC, 2012, p. 7). According to the Nigerian National Oil Spill Detection and Response 
Agency (NOSDRA), approximately 2,400 oil spills were reported between 2006 and 2010 
that resulted from sabotage, bunkering, and poor infrastructures (US Energy 
Information Administration, 2012) (see Appendix 2). Shell was hit the hardest by this 
instability since a large portion of its production was still onshore. In 2011, the company 
estimated that 6% of the country's total production, on average, was lost to oil 
bunkering and spills.  
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3.5.2. Oil sector reform: hope in sight? 
In more recent years, the Nigerian government started to demonstrate a commitment 
to inculcate a culture of honesty and transparency in the public and private sectors 
through the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000 and the 
incorporation of EITI into national law in 2007. These initiatives helped shape the quality 
of reforms and significantly increased the oil sector’s awareness and transparency. Also, 
Nigeria made efforts to increase revenue transparency, and was judged to be compliant 
with EITI in March 2011. However, EITI also received its fair share of criticism from an 
interviewee from the Revenue Watch Institute for it did not actually drive reforms but 
instead piggy-backed on other existing initiatives. Furthermore, a 2005 audit report 
released in 2009 highlighted unprecedented financial discrepancies, unpaid taxes, and 
system inefficiencies.  
In September 2007, the Oil and Gas Reform Implementation Committee (OGIC) 
proposed the most comprehensive review of the legal framework for the oil and gas 
sector in Nigeria since the industry began commercial operations in the 1960s. This 
Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) was designed to reform the entire hydrocarbon sector to 
increase the government’s share of revenue, increase natural gas production, 
streamline the decision-making process by dividing up the NNPC’s different roles, 
including the creation of a profit-driven company, privatize NNPC’s downstream 
activities, and promote local content. The Bill would also provide a greater share of oil 
revenues to the producing communities and expand the use of natural gas for domestic 
electricity generation. Parts of this Bill were recently approved as standalone laws such 
as the Nigerian Content Development Bill in 2010). However, differing versions of the 
PIB were still being debated, especially more contentious points such as the 
renegotiation of contracts with international oil companies, the changes in tax and 
royalty structures and clauses to ensure that companies used or risked losing their assets 
as penalties. The multinationals’ primary point of dissent appeared to be the new fiscal 
terms which they described as “harsh enough to stall investments” (US Embassy, 2009). 
A recently leaked US embassy cable revealed, the international oil companies “are quite 
concerned about the ‘very flawed’ new petroleum sector energy bill [and] that Shell had 
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more exposure to the loss of acreage than any other company” (US Embassy, 2009). 
“We could lose 80 percent of our acreage,” Ann Pickard said (ibid). 
3.5.3. Oil dependence, corporate power and interests 
The government heavily depended on oil revenues and international oil companies 
dominated all aspects of exploration, production, and marketing (Graf, 1988, p. 219). 
“The whole economy is driven by oil exploration. That is the key thing. As a result of this 
Shell has a lot of political influence. Politics cannot move without money.” This 
statement of a community relation officer, who is implementing Shell’s GMoU 
approach, depicts how the discovery of oil transformed the political economy and power 
relations in Nigeria. A Senior Program Advisor for the Africa Governance Monitoring and 
Advocacy Project claimed that oil companies have the political power to “actively 
pressure the government regarding such things as tax laws” (Manby, 1999, p. 283). For 
example, the PIB seemed to grant more favorable terms to Shell and its rivals than 
originally imagined after much internal ‘lobbying’. A lawmaker who was a member of 
the three committees in the Senate handling the Bill told a Daily Trust reporter that they 
were put under intense pressure by the Presidency to accommodate some of the 
demands of the oil majors. “Our intention was to pass the bill as sent to us by the late 
President Umaru Musa Yar’adua, but these companies put us under intense pressure, 
they even got the American government to intervene on their behalf. Shortly after his 
return from the United States early this year when he was Acting President, Jonathan 
requested that the provisions of the bill be reviewed after which he asked the leadership 
of the two chambers to look at the issue of tax and reduce it to allow for ‘investment’ in 
the sector,” he said (Hassan, 2010). An academic researcher working at the Revenue 
Watch Institute in Abuja added that Shell intervened by “bribing parliament members 
and paying them trips to conferences to Ghana and the US,” in which the new regulatory 
framework governing investment (Petroleum Industry Bill) in Nigeria was discussed, 
excluding any participation from civil society actors. In the same line of thought an 
activist from the NGO Social Action, claimed in an interview,  
“[…] and the officers, they would rather take their mother to court than confront 
Shell. With the bribes, they will give judgments in favor. So there is […] the 
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ordinary people. The voiceless people. […] Shell is the big oil company, the 
company that has so much influence on the government […].”  
The political power the oil industry enjoyed in Nigeria was also documented by recent 
Wikileaks revelations. In a confidential memo from the US embassy in Abuja dated 
October 20th, 2009, Ann Pickard, Shell's then Vice President for Sub-Saharan Africa, was 
quoted as telling US diplomats that Shell had seconded people to all the relevant 
ministries and that Shell consequently had access to everything that was being done in 
those government offices (U.S. Embassy Abuja, 2009b). Many civil society actors 
criticized these tangled links between the oil firm and politicians. Ben Amunwa of the 
London-based oil watchdog, Platform, stated, “Shell claims to have nothing to do with 
Nigerian politics,” he said. “In reality, Shell works deep inside the system, and has long 
exploited political channels in Nigeria to its own advantage” (Smith, 2010). Likewise, an 
activist from Social Action Nigeria claimed in an interview,  
“Shell and the government of Nigeria are two sides of the same coin. […] Shell is 
everywhere. They have an eye and an ear in every ministry of Nigeria. They have 
people on the payroll in every community, which is why they get away with 
everything. They are more powerful than the Nigerian government.”  
 
3.5.4. Shell is the only government we know 
The nature of the corrupt and irresponsive Nigerian government had also inverted 
traditional roles and responsibilities. Particularly, in the poor areas of the Niger Delta 
Shell’s direct presence forced the company to engage in traditional public 
responsibilities. A community relation officer from NIDPRODEV described Shell’s 
politicized role in an interview  
“The Government is far away. Communities make direct claims to Shell to 
provide for their needs. Shell is the Government for them. […] Now there are a 
lot of conflicting interests. Shell wants to go on with its business and has to take 
into account the changing and very complex environment it is operating now.”  
A community relation officer who was working with an NGO implementing Shell’s GMoU 
approach bewailed the lack of active government participation and effective 
cooperation. He stated “the Government should enter the social contract with the 
communities and be more responsive to communities needs. Now it is confusing to work 
with the Government because there no clear structures and contact partners.” With 
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regard to the government’s role, the community relation officer furthermore stated “it 
is funny, because the Government is not delivering its public responsibilities and now it 
only monitors what Shell spends on CSR. […] They just control as they fund it within the 
Joint Venture Partnership.” In this public responsibility void, civil society is aware of 
Shell’s positive contribution despite the sometimes-negative impact of its operations. A 
member from the NGO NIDPRODEV stated in this line of thought 
“many communities also have a higher awareness of these issues and want Shell 
to operate so that they can survive. […] Communities cannot survive without 
Shell’s provision of socio-economic services, because the Government is not 
doing anything and thus they ask Shell to stay or come back”. 
 
3.6. Shell’s scope of responsibilities in Nigeria in the spotlight 
Already in 2005 Shell’s practices in Nigeria were put in the spotlight despite the 
formulation and formalization of the company’s CSR agenda. The nomination for the 
Public Eye People’s Award revealed increasing public concern and awareness of the 
company’s adverse impacts of its operations on local communities, their livelihoods and 
the environment. While the company has since then denied responsibility over these 
accusations, more recent scientific investigations, leaked US embassy and company 
reports and legal proceedings revealed a gap between the company’s formal CSR 
agenda and its practices on the ground. “The evidence of Shell's bad practice in the Niger 
Delta is mounting,” said Patrick Naagbanton, Coordinator of the local oil watch group, 
Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (Vidal, 2012). Shell’s scope of 
responsibility was disputed again for issues such as environmental degradation and 
human rights violations. Also, the current lack of dialogue and transparency put the 
company’s legitimacy in question.  
3.6.1. Stakeholder engagement: Integrity or hypocrisy? 
Interviews with representative civil society actors in 2011 revealed that Shell’s 
engagement with stakeholders was perceived as rhetorical manipulation that did not 
transcend the company’s self-interested position. In this line of thought, one 
interviewee from Environmental Rights Action claimed, “they ride on the wings of CSR 
to gain access to oil.” In his academic research on Shell’s GMoU approach he found that 
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the company focused only on highly visible and salient projects that were consistent 
with social expectations while leaving the essential machinery of the company’s core 
business (with its negative environmental impact) intact. He criticized also that the 
company had no direct contact with communities. Shell worked only via NGOs or 
community officials. Another interviewee from academia explained that this was 
problematic as “Shell involves NGOs as contractors and not as development 
organizations. They represent Shell’s interests and are only accountable to Shell.” 
Similarly, Nnimmo Bassey from Environmental Rights Action insisted in an interview,  
“Extractive industries such as oil and gas companies must learn to listen to the 
complaints of the local people in whose territories they carry out their business. 
[…] The Ogoni, the Ilaje, and their fellow protesters chose the best route out of 
the mire that the Niger Delta has become: through nonviolent dialogue. This is 
what was demanded ten years ago. This demand still remains to be answered” 
(The Oil Industry and Human Rights in the Niger Delta, 2008). 
 
In addition, a community relation officer from one NGO that was implementing Shell’s 
GMoU approach bewailed in an interview in 2013 the little access to information. 
“Communities don’t have right now enough access to relevant information and facts. So 
it is not transparent enough. Information is power. Shell could create more power.” 
3.6.2. Corruption or business as usual? 
Revelations published by Global Witness in 2012 revealed how in 2011 Shell and the 
Italian company Eni agreed to make a payment of US$1.1 billion to acquire an oil 
concession from the Nigerian government, which landed in the hands of a former 
Nigerian oil minister and convicted money launderer. Details of this opaque payment 
only came to light by chance through a court case in New York that focused on a different 
aspect of the oil deal. Since the court judgment and subsequent statements by the 
Nigerian Attorney General suggested that Shell and Eni must have been aware that the 
money would ultimately be transferred to the company controlled by the former oil 
minister, the case is now the subject of a UK criminal investigation, and also being 
pursued by the House of Representatives in Nigeria.  
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Furthermore, in an interview in 2013, the senior specialist in the field of anti-corruption 
of the NGO Global Witness accused Shell of hypocrisy. Global Witness revealed that 
while Shell publicly advocates (voluntary) EITI standards to fight corruption, the 
company was supporting a lawsuit that if successful would destroy U.S. legislation 
designed to strengthen the EITI standard. The legal action was directed against Section 
1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which required U.S.-listed extractive companies to publish 
the payments they make to governments on a project-by-project basis in each country 
they invest. It also encouraged all oil, gas and mining companies listed in the US to 
publish their social payments (i.e. to CSR projects) voluntarily. Dominic Eagleton from 
Global Witness emphasized  
“Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act forces companies to publish the kind of 
payments made by Shell and Eni in Nigeria. Without this 'sunshine' on natural 
resource deals, business will continue to be conducted in an opaque 
environment that enables payments to end up in the wrong hands” (Eagleton, 
2013).  
3.6.3. Complicity in human rights violations or providing security? 
In 2009 Shell agreed to pay US$15.5 million to settle a lawsuit in the US for alleged 
human rights abuses. This lawsuit alleged that the Nigerian military government and 
security forces committed human rights violations, including torture and summary 
execution of MOSOP members, to suppress MOSOP’s activities and that Shell was 
complicit in the commission of these abuses. The company maintained that it “was 
falsely alleged to have been complicit in the men’s death” and agreed to a settlement 
because they felt “it was time to draw a line under the past and assist the process of 
reconciliation” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2009a, p. 25). However, civil society interpreted the 
payment as an admission of guilt of the company’s past and ongoing practices of human 
rights violations. 
Indeed, leaked US embassy cables dating from 2003 to 2006 alleged that Shell continued 
to pay substantial amounts of money to the Nigerian army, navy and Mobile Police Force 
on a regular basis and provided transportation and accommodation for soldiers 
notorious for their record of human rights abuses (Consul General Brian L. Browne, 
2006; Embassy Abuja, 2003a, 2003b; US Consulate Lagos, 2003). Also in 2012, the NGO 
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Platform claimed that “Shell, the largest operator in the region, continues to depend on 
military protection much like it did in the 1990s” (Platform, 2012a). For example, the 
NGO alleged that Shell’s conduct in the town of Rumuekpe led to “the killing and 
displacement of thousands of local people” in ethnic and communal conflicts between 
summer 2005 and November 2008 (ibid.). 
Moreover, interviews with members from different NGOs in 2011 affirmed that Shell 
continued to award controversial ‘surveillance’ contracts or one-off payments to violent 
youth groups to ‘protect’ their facilities. A member from the NGO Social Action 
explained that these contracting practices created competition (and eventually conflict) 
over contracts among the different groups. As a consequence, the system became a 
method of pay-offs for vandalism or theft through a legitimized contract system and also 
a ‘monetary’ mechanism to empower some Shell-selected community members. This 
essentially distorted established traditional power structures and raised questions 
about the new social and financial status of ‘contracted personnel’. A Shell manager in 
Nigeria admitted in an interview with the NGO Platform that these one-off contracts 
were “just something to keep the youths busy during the Christmas period so that they 
[would] not be wanting to create jobs for themselves by vandalizing Shell or Elf facilities” 
(Platform, 2012b). However, Managing Director Sunmonu, saw the hiring of youths as a 
means to comply with their stakeholder engagement and promise to provide 
employment to host communities. For example, he responded to questions about the 
incidents in Rumuekpe as follows: “We are not directly involved in killings in the areas. 
We focused on education, we promote skill acquisition [and] create jobs for 
communities” (Platform, 2012b).  
3.6.4. Oil spills: rust or sabotage? 
In August 2011 a scientific assessment of the United Nations Environment Program 
criticized the company for its continuing failure to operate fully in accordance with local 
regulatory requirements, SPDC’s own procedures and international best practices. In 
detail the study concluded with regard to Shell’s practices that 1) control, maintenance 
and decommissioning of oilfield infrastructure in Ogoniland were inadequate and 
created public safety issues. 2) Remediation by enhanced natural attenuation (RENA) 
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was not effective. Furthermore, SPDC applied this technique on the land surface layer 
only, while UNEP data showed that contamination could often penetrate deeper than 5 
m and had already reached the groundwater in many locations. 3) Ten out of the 15 
investigated sites which SPDC records showed as having completed remediation, still 
had pollution exceeding the SPDC (and government) remediation closure values. 4) 
Shell’s new Remediation Management System from 2010 still did not meet the local 
regulatory requirements or international best practices (UNEP, 2011, p.12). 
While for many Niger Delta activists the UNEP report affirmed Shell’s direct 
responsibilities for oil pollution, Managing Director Sunmonu emphasized the 
government’s responsibility to “take concerted action to curb the illegal activities, in 
particular oil theft and refining, that are exacerbating so many of the environmental and 
social issues” (SPDC, 2011b). Furthermore, he called upon more concerted efforts by all 
stakeholders working together to drive real change in Ogoniland and the wider Niger 
Delta. Here again, he drew on the state government’s responsibility to “take the lead to 
co-ordinate the activities of the many stakeholders involved” (ibid).  
In August 2011 Shell’s admission of liability for two oil spills in Ogoniland in 2008 and 
2009 created a media storm. This was first case of this kind in which Shell had to accept 
legal liability for two massive oil leaks as a result of equipment failure. Also, it was the 
first time Royal Dutch Shell plc (RDS) and its subsidiary Shell Petroleum Development 
Company (Nigeria) ltd (SPDC) faced claims in the UK for damage resulting from an oil 
spill from its operations in Nigeria (Standard, 2011). In an interview with the Guardian 
the coordinator for the Centre of Environment and Human Rights in Port Harcourt 
welcomed the court ruling. However, he also voiced concern over the persisting (unjust) 
background conditions that still need to be reformed: 
“Shell's admission of liability for two massive oil spills in 2008-09 in my village of 
Bodo in the Niger Delta is a step forward in the long struggle for corporate 
accountability. An impoverished village that yesterday lay in ruins has today felt 
a welcome glimmer of hope and justice. We are happy with the news that Shell 
could be forced to clean up the environmental devastation it has caused and to 
pay more than $400m in compensation. But our jubilation is overshadowed by 
more than five decades of environmental and social injustice yet to be 
addressed” (Naagbanton, 2011). 
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The coordinator Patrick Naagbanton also adverted further litigations in that the “courts 
may now be inundated with legitimate complaints” (ibid.). Also, a 2012 report by the 
University of Essex on the changing legal landscape for the Multinational Oil Industry 
alluded “recent allegations that Shell‘s spending on security to government forces and 
community groups, where there was a significant risk that these payments would fuel 
human rights abuses, could lead to further litigation” (Leader et al., 2012). 
Indeed, legal pressure was mounting. Accusations over Shell’s operations climaxed on 
January 30th in 2013 when the district court in The Hague held Shell liable in one case 
for oil pollution in the Niger Delta. The district court found Shell Nigeria guilty of 
breaching its duty of care and committing the tort of negligence as the company failed 
to take sufficient measures to prevent sabotage from occurring. It was the first time that 
a company established in the European Union was held responsible in its own country 
for abuses committed elsewhere. The lawsuit was part of five separate lawsuits by four 
Nigerian farmers and fishermen, along with the NGO Milieudefensie, against four Shell 
entities and their parent company. The claimants demanded compensation for oil 
pollution damage allegedly caused by poor maintenance of the aging facilities and 
corroding network of pipes. The Hague court dismissed the other four claims after 
finding that the oil contamination was caused by sabotage by third persons with no 
evidence of Shell’s negligence in those cases. Importantly, the court also dismissed all 
claims against Shell Nigeria’s parent company RDS, referring to the general rule of 
Nigerian law according to which a parent company is not obligated to prevent foreign 
subsidiaries from injuring third parties abroad. 
Shell welcomed the court’s decision. Managing Director Sunmonu acclaimed "the 
court's ruling that all spill cases were caused by criminal activity" (Okonedo, 2013) and 
pointed to the government’s responsibility to establish the rule of law in the Delta to 
prevent further spills. Sunmonu added  
“oil pollution is a problem in Nigeria, affecting the daily lives of people in the 
Niger Delta. However, the vast majority of oil pollution is caused by oil thieves 
and illegal refiners. This causes major environmental and economic damage, and 
is the real tragedy of the Niger Delta. SPDC has made great efforts to raise 
awareness of the issue with the government of Nigeria, international bodies like 
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the UN, the media and NGOs. We will continue to be at the forefront of 
discussions to find solutions” (Okonedo, 2013).  
Also, Royal Dutch Shell's vice president for environment, Allard Castelain, said in an 
interview with the Spiegel “It's clear that both the parent company, Royal Dutch Shell, 
as well as the local venture ... has been proven right. […] The complexity lies in the fact 
that the theft and the sabotage is part of an organized crime” (Der Spiegel, 2013). Shell 
Netherlands President, Peter de Wit, added “Shell is doing a good job often under 
difficult circumstances.” He insisted that the company applied “global standards” to its 
operations around the world (Nwachukwu, 2011). In 2011 the company also launched 
an external oil spills website to demonstrate that the majority of current oil spills are 
due to sabotage and theft for which they refused any responsibility (Royal Dutch Shell, 
2010b, p. 18).  
Civil society organizations also celebrated the court ruling. Ken Henshaw, a Niger Delta 
activist from campaign group Social Action, who has closely followed the case 
commented "a precedent has been set, it has been made known that Shell can be liable 
for damages and loss of livelihood“ (Harvey & Hirsch, 2013). In the same line of thought, 
Martyn Day, the lawyer who is representing the Nigerian Bodo community, said 
“Over many years Shell has denied any responsibility for these types of spills 
resulting from ‘bunkering’ or sabotage. The Dutch decision in relation to Mr 
Akpan is therefore a major step forward as it makes Shell aware in no uncertain 
terms that they have a responsibility to ensure that all steps are taken to ensure 
the illegal sabotage does not occur” (Standard, 2013). 
Furthermore, in May 2013 the NGO Milieudefensie appealed the court’s decision, which 
absolved Shell Headquarters in The Hague from any liability. For Milieudefensie it is clear 
that the headquarters “is directly responsible: it manages the pipeline network” and 
“Shell Headquarters in The Hague for all intents and purposes directly manages its 
foreign subsidiaries” (Milieudefensie, 2013). The NGO “wants Dutch companies to 
behave the same abroad as they would in their own country and to take responsibility 
for what happens there” (ibid). 
Many Niger Delta activists felt reassured in their claims. According to activists from 
several NGOs, Shell uses sabotage as an excuse to evade responsibilities for the state of 
its facilities and negligence to protect its pipelines. One activist stated with regard to the 
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latter that even if sabotage contributed to the spills “You can’t leave 7,000 kilometers 
of pipeline unguarded” in a poor country like Nigeria (Temper, 2013). Also, unpublished 
independent reports seen by the Guardian newspaper and interviews conducted by 
Friends of the Earth Nigeria suggested that ‘Shell must take the blame’ for a sabotage 
incident in August 2011 on the Bonny pipeline (Vidal, 2011). The company withdrew 
contracts to monitor and protect the pipeline, which provided the wrong incentives in a 
context of extreme poverty in that it encouraged ‘creating’ work (i.e., it incentivized 
sabotage). Livingstone J. Berebo, secretary of the Ikarama Youths group, explained 
“The oil spills in Ikarama are caused by Shell. The youths of Ikarama were pushing 
for an upward review of the wages paid [by Shell] to surveillance guards and the 
employment of more persons in the community for the security of the pipelines. 
[But] we suddenly heard that Shell has stopped the surveillance contract. This is 
the main reason behind the series of spills experienced in the community 
recently” (ibid). 
The ongoing criticism did not only cause bad publicity for Shell. The NGO Friends of the 
Earth International also launched an international online campaign targeting Shell. 
Furthermore, local discontent was increasing and immediately threatened the 
company’s license to operate. Particularly, the Ogoni called for collective action in face 
of the recent assignments of corporate guilt and the failure to implement the 
recommendations of the UNEP report. In December 2013 media reported, “Ogoni 
protests escalated” (Kane, 203). In a Radio Interview Celestine AkpoBari from the Ogoni 
Solidarity Forum adverted  
“There is no going back on the 90 day deadline ultimatum delivered to the 
Nigerian Government and oil companies to implement the UNEP report on oil 
pollution in Ogoniland. We are mobilizing for a series of non-violent direct 
actions that will cripple economic activity. […] And it is just the start. In 1993, the 
Ogoni people stood up to Shell and kicked the company off their land. Shell 
hasn’t been able to extract oil there since but it doesn’t stop their land being 
continually polluted by pipelines crisscrossing the area carrying oil for export. 
[Celestine emphasized] Once the Ogonis start, nobody can stop us!” (ibid.). 
 
3.7. Shell to blame? An inconvenient past – an uncertain future 
The landmark ruling in The Hague in 2013 climaxed the ongoing dispute over the scope 
of Shell’s responsibilities for both the company’s positive and negative impact in a 
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complex operating environment. Shell’s was considered a forerunner in CSR and had 
assumed public responsibilities that went beyond traditional philanthropy or CSR 
programs. However, the company remained a regular target of civil society activism and 
legal proceedings concerned with malpractice. What is more, a precedent was set. Shell 
was blamed for environmental damage caused abroad.  
History seemed to repeat itself. Again, the relevant question was ‘Have we got it right’? 
If Shell wanted to maintain its license to operate, the company would have to address 
its public responsibilities more effectively than it has done since the 1990s. But how can 
Shell redefine its CSR strategy in the realm of public responsibilities while balancing 
related challenges to its economic and political role? And what is the scope of the 
company’s responsibilities in such a complex operating environment? In which way is 
the company connected to social and environmental issues in the Niger Delta? Does 
Shell have more responsibility than other actors given the company’s privileged 
position, power, interest and ability for collective action? Can Shell be held responsible 
for something it did not do or did not support? How can Shell respond to this negative 
publicity to keep its license to operate? Should Shell even stop operating in the Niger 
Delta and give up its assumed public responsibilities?  
 
3.8. Appendices 
3.8.1. Appendix 1: Information about Shell  
Shell General Business Principles  
OUR VALUES 
Shell employees share a set of core values – honesty, integrity and respect for people. 
We also firmly believe in the fundamental importance of trust, openness, teamwork and 
professionalism, and pride in what we do. 
 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
As part of the Business Principles, we commit to contribute to sustainable development. 
This requires balancing short- and long-term interests, integrating economic, 
environmental and social considerations into business decision-making. 
 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
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Shell companies recognize five areas of responsibility. It is the duty of management 
continuously to assess the priorities and discharge these inseparable responsibilities on 
the basis of that assessment. 
 
Area of 
responsibility 
Scope of responsibility 
Shareholders Protect shareholders’ investment, and provide a long-term return competitive with 
those of other leading companies in the industry 
Customers Win and maintain customers by developing and providing products and services which 
offer value in terms of price, quality, safety and environmental impact, which are 
supported by the requisite technological, environmental and commercial expertise 
Employees Respect the human rights of our employees and to provide them with good and safe 
working conditions, and competitive terms and conditions of employment. To 
promote the development and best use of the talents of our employees; to create an 
inclusive work environment where every employee has an equal opportunity to 
develop his or her skills and talents. To encourage the involvement of employees in 
the planning and direction of their work; to provide them with channels to report 
concerns. We recognize that commercial success depends on the full commitment of 
all employees 
Those with 
whom we do 
business 
Seek mutually beneficial relationships with contractors, suppliers and in joint ventures 
and to promote the application of these Shell General Business Principles or 
equivalent principles in such relationships. The ability to promote these principles 
effectively will be an important factor in the decision to enter into or remain in such 
relationships. 
Society Conduct business as responsible corporate members of society, to comply with 
applicable laws and regulations, to support fundamental human rights in line with the 
legitimate role of business, and to give proper regard to health, safety, security and 
the environment 
Source: adapted (Royal Dutch Shell, 2012b) 
 
PRINCIPLES 
Principle Content 
Economic Long-term profitability is essential to achieving our business goals and to our continued 
growth. It is a measure both of efficiency and of the value that customers place on Shell 
products and services. It supplies the necessary corporate resources for the continuing 
investment that is required to develop and produce future energy supplies to meet 
customer needs. Without profits and a strong financial foundation, it would not be 
possible to fulfill our responsibilities. Criteria for investment and divestment decisions 
include sustainable development considerations (economic, social and environmental) 
and an appraisal of the risks of the investment. 
Competition Shell companies support free enterprise. We seek to compete fairly and ethically and 
within the framework of applicable competition laws; we will not prevent others from 
competing freely with us. 
Business Integrity Shell companies insist on honesty, integrity and fairness in all aspects of our business 
and expect the same in our relationships with all those with whom we do business. The 
direct or indirect offer, payment, soliciting or acceptance of bribes in any form is 
unacceptable. Facilitation payments are also bribes and must not be made. Employees 
must avoid conflicts of interest between their private activities and their part in the 
conduct of company business. Employees must also declare to their employing 
company potential conflicts of interest. All business transactions on behalf of a Shell 
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company must be reflected accurately and fairly in the accounts of the company in 
accordance with established procedures and are subject to audit and disclosure. 
Political activities a. Of companies: Shell companies act in a socially responsible manner within the laws 
of the countries in which we operate in pursuit of our legitimate commercial objectives. 
Shell companies do not make payments to political parties, organizations or their 
representatives. Shell companies do not take part in party politics. However, when 
dealing with governments, Shell companies have the right and the responsibility to 
make our position known on any matters, which affect us, our employees, our 
customers, our shareholders or local communities in a manner, which is in accordance 
with our values and the Business Principles. 
b. Of employees: Where individuals wish to engage in activities in the community, 
including standing for election to public office, they will be given the opportunity to do 
so where this is appropriate in the light of local circumstances. 
Health, Safety, 
Security and the 
Environment 
Shell companies have a systematic approach to health, safety, security and 
environmental management in order to achieve continuous performance 
improvement. To this end, Shell companies manage these matters as critical business 
activities, set standards and targets for improvement, and measure, appraise and report 
performance externally. We continually look for ways to reduce the environmental 
impact of our operations, products and services. 
Local 
Communities 
Shell companies aim to be good neighbors by continuously improving the ways in which 
we contribute directly or indirectly to the general wellbeing of the communities within 
which we work. We manage the social impacts of our business activities carefully and 
work with others to enhance the benefits to local communities, and to mitigate any 
negative impacts from our activities. In addition, Shell companies take a constructive 
interest in societal matters, directly or indirectly related to our business. 
Communication 
and Engagement 
Shell companies recognize that regular dialogue and engagement with our stakeholders 
is essential. We are committed to reporting of our performance by providing full 
relevant information to legitimately interested parties, subject to any overriding 
considerations of business confidentiality. In our interactions with employees, business 
partners and local communities, we seek to listen and respond to them honestly and 
responsibly. 
Compliance We comply with all applicable laws and regulations of the countries in which we 
operate. 
Source: adapted (Royal Dutch Shell, 2012b) 
Shell’s Control Framework 
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Note: “Foundations” comprise the objectives, principles and rules that underpin and establish boundaries 
for Shell’s activities. “Organization” sets out how the various legal entities relate to each other and how 
their business activities are organized and managed. “Processes” refer to the more material processes, 
including how authority is delegated, how strategy, planning and appraisal are used to improve 
performance, how compliance is managed and how assurance is provided. All control activities relate to 
one or more of these components. 
Source: (Shell, 2010) 
 
Overview of Shell’s sustainable development and governance structure  
  
Source: Shell Sustainability Report (2009) 
3.8.2. Appendix 2: Information about Nigeria 
Dimensions of the resource curse: Nigeria in comparison with other African countries 
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 Source:  Magrin, G., and Van Vliet, G. (2009, p.119) 
 
Oil spills due to rupture and vandalism between 2006 and 2010 
  
Source: own elaboration based on data from (NNPC, 2012, p. 70)  
3.8.3. Appendix 3: Methodology 
Case selection 
The company RDS is especially suitable for this research due to its distinctive company 
characteristics, its operational setting and high-quality access to data. Shell is a front-
running company in the area of CSR and has moved into the political sphere through its 
engagement in achieving public goals at the global and local level. Yet, the company is 
facing continuing allegations of corporate malpractice. Furthermore, the inherent social 
and environmental risks related to operations of the core business poses serious 
questions in relation to the sustainability of its very core operations and the legitimacy 
of its involvement in the support or supplement of public services related to its non-core 
operations. While, the company’s experiences in the Ogoni and Brent Spar cases are 
often seen to have catalyzed international thinking about CSR, its current challenges 
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with regard to its new political role and associated public responsibility strategies also 
make an important case in point for theory and praxis. The case of Shell is an extreme 
case which can “offer lessons for all organizations as they face an increasingly turbulent 
world” (Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 573). Moreover, the company’s complex operating 
environment, Nigeria, is an insightful research site for examining the increasing interest 
in theory and praxis in the quasi-governmental role of private enterprises which moves 
away from the assumption in much of the CSR literature that the ‘rules of the game’ are 
set through effective government policy and regulation. This context also sheds light on 
the global interconnectedness of the oil industry and thus makes in interesting case in 
point with regard to the concept of enlarged responsibilities (Young, 2006). Here, 
responsibility is essentially shared among various actors contributing to the structures 
of social and environmental injustice in the Niger Delta. 
Data sources 
The author applied a case study methodology with the primary goal of describing Shell’s 
unique approach to CSR and associated challenges with regard to the company’s scope 
of responsibility and basis for legitimacy in a complex operating environment. The 
sources of evidence used in this case study come from primary and secondary sources. 
They are based on multiple data collection methods such as in-depth interviews and 
archival sources. The triangulation made possible by this process allowed for a stronger 
substantiation of constructs and propositions (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 538) and thus 
increases the reliability of data (Barratt et al., 2011). Moreover, since the overall 
methodology employed ensured that relevant stakeholders of corporate and civil 
society Nigeria were taken into account, the concerns from all parties became evident.  
Documentary analysis 
The author undertook extensive documentary analysis, searching annual reports, press 
releases, newspaper articles, secret documents (Wikileaks, leaked company reports) 
and other memoranda and documentary information. Press releases from the company 
are a device to communicate key messages; especially during a period of crisis where 
there is a need for managers to provide real-time information to key stakeholders. 
Together with the company’s reports, they formed the basis for the company’s voice for 
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the narrative of this story. These documents were searched several times. Initially the 
author took field notes to construct the case story, which formed the foundation to 
interview questions. The author used subsequent searches to validate interviews as well 
as antecedent material from secondary sources. 
Interviews 
In 2011, the author undertook a two-week field visit to Abuja (Nigeria) and a one day 
visit to Shell’s head office in Den Haag. The aim of the visits was to find out details on 
how civil society organizations perceive and confront Shell’s actions, and on how the 
company reacts to this pressure and evaluates its role in this complex operating 
environment. Prior to the interviews an advance E-Mail was sent to selected 
respondents outlining the important issues of the study. Questions were semi-
structured. Interviews lasted between 60 and 180 minutes. 
In total, there were 21 in-depth interviews. 19 were tape-recorded and subsequently 
analyzed. The research visit to Nigeria formed an important basis for the data collection. 
During this time, 16 face-to-face interviews were conducted. From July to October 2013 
the author conducted a second round of interviews via Skype with NGOs cooperating 
with Shell in the implementation of the company’s approach to CSR (GMoU) (Initiative 
for Community Development, NIDPRODEV and the Environmental Health and Safety 
Network), a senior expert of the Africa Center for Corporate Responsibility and a senior 
specialist in the field of anti-corruption of Global Witness UK. 
Respondents were mainly high profile individuals, including present and former 
directors of NGOs, renowned academics, corporate governance consultants, community 
relations officer, as well as senior officials of RDS and SPDC. Notably these are key 
stakeholders in the Nigerian extractive industry. Certain degrees of overall 
representation were achieved with participants drawn from different backgrounds and 
functions, so as to harness a mix of different perspectives (see Table 4 for an overview). 
Given their positions, this research benefited from their insider views on the research 
topic. While interviews with Shell’s senior officials and CSR experts guided the 
investigation, the interviewees’ statements were eventually not included in this 
manuscript due to reasons of confidentiality. All participants were promised 
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confidentiality to encourage uninhibited responses. Therefore, only the name of the 
organization is mentioned in the case study. 
The author has well-established contacts to civil society members in Nigeria and is in 
close contact with key SPDC and RDS employees in Abuja, Den Haag and London. This 
helped to alleviate some of the challenges relating to access to data and respondents. 
The snow-balling technique, as well as third party informants such as academic and civil 
society colleagues also proved very helpful to gain access to these high-caliber 
respondent(s) until data saturation was reached.  
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Table 4 Overview of interviews (Study 2) 
Interview Group No. of 
interviews 
Organization 
Civil Society 7  Publish What You Pay (PWYP), Nigeria  
 Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC), 
Abuja/Nigeria 
 Environmental Rights Action (ERA), Nigeria  
 African Network for Environment and Economic Justice African 
Center for Leadership, Strategy and Development (LSD), 
Abuja/Nigeria 
 Social Action, Ogoni Solidarity Forum (OSF) 
 Bayelsa NGO Forum (BANGOF), Bayelsa/Nigeria 
 Global Witness UK2 
Academic 2  West Africa Civil Society Forum, Abuja/Nigeria  
 Integrated Ecosystem Management Project - Nigeria-Niger 
Joint Commission for Cooperation 
Civil Society and 
Academic 
4  Africa Center for Corporate Responsibility (ACCR), 
Warri/Nigeria2 
 Heinrich Böll Foundation (HBS), Nigeria 
 Revenue Watch Institute (RWI), Nigeria 
 Centre for Democracy and Development (Abuja, Lagos, 
Manchester) 
NGO 
implementing 
Shell’s current 
approach to CSR 
(GMoU)  
4  Initiative for Community Development1/2 
 NIDPRODEV2 
 Environmental Health and Safety Network2 
Corporate 4  SPDC, Abuja 
 Shell International, Den Haag 
 
Data analysis  
In a first step, an overall chronology of events dating from Shell’s formalization of its CSR 
program in the mid 1990s was developed. This chronology visualized “who did what, 
when” and thus gave a first overall picture of the stakeholders involved and the 
evolution of Shell’s CSR agenda (particularly the drivers and trigger events). In a second 
step, the author used the computer program ATLAS to explore the data for evidence 
related to the effectiveness of Shell’s CSR program, the political role of the company and 
associated challenges. Here, categories that emerged in extant theory served as a 
deductive framework. Scherer and Palazzo’s (2011) literature review depicts five 
dimensions, a political approach to CSR has to deal with: 1) From national to global 
governance; (2) From hard law to soft law; (3) From liability to social connectedness; (4) 
From cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy to moral legitimacy; and (5) From liberal 
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democracy to deliberative democracy (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). The authors’ politicized 
concept of CSR is based on moral legitimacy, which is “socially and argumentatively 
constructed by means of considering reasons to justify certain actions, practices, or 
institutions and is thus present in discourses between the corporation and its relevant 
publics” (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011, p. 916). As a new way for companies of keeping 
their licenses to operate they have to take into account criteria for input and output 
legitimacy (Mena & Palazzo, 2012, p. 539). For the scope of responsibility, political CSR 
takes a prospective perspective based on the actor’s structural connectedness to an 
issue and depending on the actor’s power, interest, privilege and ability for collective 
action (Young, 2006).  
Using a method similar to that of other qualitative studies (e.g. Jarzabkowski, 2008), the 
author then checked the reliability of the coding framework using a coanalyst. A doctoral 
student was trained in the coding framework (Miles & Huberman, 1994) and rechecked 
those categorizations. Interrater agreement was 98 percent, and we resolved remaining 
discrepancies via discussion and reaching consensus. The coding was then applied to the 
data again to revise, refine and collapse categories to the point that maximizes mutual 
exclusivity.  
3.8.4. Appendix 4: Teaching Guidance 
Suggested questions and brief answers 
1. Do a stakeholder analysis. The key question for students is to think about how Shell 
should react to increasing allegations over the company’s practices. The company is 
operating in a very complex environment with many actors having a stake in the status 
quo. Which stakeholders should Shell address to keep its license to operate and why? 
In which way are the different stakeholders related to the problems in the Niger Delta? 
What is their stake? 
I recommend using the stakeholder analysis tool to acquire in a first step a reasonable 
overview of the interests and responsibilities of all parties involved. In a second step 
students could be asked to assess each stakeholder’s importance in terms of legitimacy, 
power and urgency. While Shell identifies as its key business stakeholders employees, 
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clients/customers, business partners, and society at large, I recommend including more 
actors that have a mediated connection to the social and environmental issues in the 
Niger Delta. Thinking about which actors affect or are affected by the company’s 
operations helps students to grasp the complexity of making decisions when a company 
is faced with a dilemma between its economic and political role. The table below 
provides some suggestions for guiding the discussion: 
Stakeholder Interest 
Shell/SPDC 
Management 
 Keeping their partners happy 
 Creating economic value and realizing ROI for shareholders 
 Should have an interest in satisfying customers 
 Brand reputation 
Nigerian government As JV Partner & mayor shareholder: profit maximization  
Home government  Access to justice: provide human rights victims an opportunity to seek 
redress and to hold corporations which operate in the country to account 
for violations committed in other countries 
e.g. US court case (ongoing): Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum case: The 
company is suit under the Alien Tort Claims Act for alleged complicity in 
the torture and killing of environmentalists in Nigeria  
 Energy security: global governance of extractive resources has largely been 
shaped by the energy-security agenda of industrialized countries and are 
geared toward the specific needs of consumer or producer countries 
(rather than human rights issues) 
Shareholder Execution of profitable business deals to increase shareholder value 
Host communities  Sustainable livelihoods 
 Environmental justice 
 Access to energy 
 Keep Shell since social performance standards are unlikely to be met by 
local oil or Asian oil companies 
Civil society 
(e.g. Friends of the 
Earth, Amnesty 
International) 
 Be the public voice of minority groups or victims of human rights violations 
 Secure human rights & environmental justice  
Militants Seek a share of the oil wealth: attack oil infrastructure, kidnap staff or engage 
in oil theft, commonly referred to as "bunkering 
Employees  Job security & continued employment: interest in the company performing 
well 
 Physical security: protection from kidnapping, attacks 
 Company’s reputation: interest to work for a company complying with 
corporate, national and international human rights standards 
International 
organizations (UNEP) 
 Monitor and report compliance with international standards  
 Help nations work together & be a centre for harmonizing the actions of 
nations to achieve their goals: some issues such as global warming, global 
energy security and powerful geo-ethnic criminal networks from the Niger 
Delta involved in petroleum smuggling, illicit drugs trafficking, commercial 
fraud and identity theft cut across the territorial boundaries of states and 
pose a problem of global concern 
International media Having a story 
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Competitors  Fierce competition among local & international oil companies over 
revenues: keen to win business 
 Local Nigerian & Asian Companies: Little interest in CSR 
Consumer 
(international 
 Access to cheap energy & derivate products from oil 
 Social and environmental justice (consumer power?) 
 
2. Shell’s politicized role: Going beyond pure economic responsibilities? What role 
does Shell play? Does Shell have even assumed a state-like role in the Nigeria? 
These questions take note of the growing literature on the political role of companies 
which refers to activities aimed at filling in for government absence (Valente & Crane, 
2010, p. 55) and is closely related to concepts such as ‘political CSR’ (Palazzo & Scherer, 
2006; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; Scherer & Palazzo, 2008) or 
‘extended corporate citizenship’ (Matten & Crane, 2005). Here, MNCs are considered 
quasi-public actors. These scholars acknowledge that many MNCs have started to 
engage in activities that have traditionally been regarded as actual government activities 
(Kobrin, 2008; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Matten & Crane, 2005) at both, the global level 
where neither nation-states nor international institutions alone are able to regulate the 
global economy or provide global public goods (Kaul et al., 2003) or in countries where 
the state system fails (Matten & Crane, 2005; Valente & Crane, 2009; Valente & Crane, 
2010). This engagement in public responsibilities has led to a blurring of the private and 
public sphere. The enlarged conceptualization of CSR stands in contrast with 
mainstream theorizing which is mainly confined to the economic theory of the firm 
(Garriga & Melé, 2004; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007) and broadly 
agrees on business occasionally ‘doing’ political activities. Thus, the political nature of 
the firm - in the sense of actually ‘being’ a political actor in itself - is highly contested. 
This economic view of CSR is based on four premises:  
(1) The nation-state has the containment power to regulate business activities, 
to provide public goods, and to compensate or avoid externalities 
(Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004, pp. 354-355);  
(2) Corporations have to focus on profit maximization and managers on their 
fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders (Friedman, 1970; Sundaram & 
Inkpen, 2004);  
(3) Societal responsibilities can only be assumed if they are instrumental for 
the long-term value of the firm (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2002; McWilliams 
& Siegel, 2001; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004); and  
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(4) A strict separation of private and public domains (Friedman, 1962; Jensen, 
2002).  
 
The aim of this task is to understand how the company is positioned not only as an 
economic but also as a political actor. Also, students should become aware that the 
driving force of political CSR is the global expansion of corporations and the consequent 
erosion of (primarily national) institutions and processes of governance. Eventually, 
students will be able to appreciate that Shell’s engagement in global governance, self-
regulation policies and public responsibilities in Nigeria has offset the strict division of 
labor between private business and nation state governance on which the dominant 
economic paradigm and many conceptions of CSR are built. For the Shell, this implies a 
conflict between the company’s economic objectives and responsibilities (i.e. making 
profit for its shareholders) and its political role and responsibilities (i.e. providing social 
services to poor host communities). This exercise can lead to an interesting discussion, 
in which many students involved in the management of organizations might disagree 
with the politicized role of corporations.  
3. What is the scope of Shell’s responsibility for the social and environmental 
conditions in the Niger Delta?  
The teaching case focuses on the moment when Shell’s scope of responsibility is put in 
the spotlight for the company’s legal liabilities for oil pollution. A dominating form of 
attributing responsibility derives from the legal context in which fault for harm is 
established based on causality, retrospective argumentation, absolution of others, and 
static background conditions. Yet today, attributing direct guilt for globally operating 
MNCs is more difficult. Particularly in the globalized political economy of oil, problems 
cannot be reduced to a specific actor(s), cause(s) or geographical location(s). Thus, the 
scope of responsibilities is not clear-cut. Also, Shell has assumed public responsibilities 
that go beyond traditional CSR programs and faces unforeseen challenges to navigate a 
new set of political responsibilities. Thus, the questions are: What is the scope of Shell’s 
responsibilities in such a complex operating environment? Does Shell have a political 
responsibility? If so, what does this entail? Is it making things too easy when blaming 
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and shaming Shell alone in a context of a local and global public responsibility void and 
the global interconnectedness of the oil industry? 
Young (2006) took note of these challenges and presented an alternative understanding 
of responsibility – a political responsibility – based on structural interconnectedness. 
‘Political’ connotes according to Young to activities broader than a government’s, 
namely those “in which people organize collectively to regulate or transform some 
aspect of their shared social conditions, along with the communicative activities in which 
they try to persuade one another to join such collective action or decide what direction 
they wish to take it” (Young, 2004, p. 377). It also relates to responsibilities beyond the 
corporations direct social and environmental externalities (Young, 2006). Thus, “all 
agents who contribute by their actions to the structural processes that produce injustice 
have responsibilities to work and remedy these injustices” (Young, 2006, pp. 102-103). 
To analyze what this enlarged or political responsibility might entail, students could 
discuss the following based on Young’s (Young, 2006, p. 116) social connectedness 
model: 
1) Not isolating perpetrators 
The case study makes clear that social and environmental justice in the Niger Delta 
results from the participation of millions of people. Shell is operating in an extremely 
complex environment characterized by organized crime and violence around the issue 
of oil bunkering and a public responsibility deficit. Thus, isolating Shell for its 
environmental damage does not absolve those sabotaging pipelines, or an irresponsive 
government not establishing the rule of law or delivering socio-economic services 
amongst others.  
2) Judging background conditions 
Accepted norms and institutional practices that constitute the background conditions 
for social and environmental injustice in the Niger Delta are morally not acceptable. 
Rather than considering the process that brought the harm as a break-away from normal 
and that punishment or compensation will restore normality, students should question 
the background conditions that set normality. For example, Shell has an economic 
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responsibility to its shareholders to be a profitable company and stay within the rules of 
the game. Thus, the managers devote more attention to keeping operational costs low 
and increase shareholder value than to minimizing the negative externalities of the 
company’s core operations (oil spills due to poor maintenance of the pipelines, not 
paying compensation for oils spills caused by sabotage as required by Nigerian law). 
Shell is also expected to provide employment to local host communities and protect its 
pipelines from sabotage. Yet, the company’s spending on security to government forces 
and community groups is alleged to fuel human rights abuses.  
3) Forward-looking 
Shell’s liability for oil pollution was established in two cases (UK and The Hague court 
ruling in 2011 and 2012 respectively). While retrospective condemnation is important 
to prevent impunity, forward-looking action must be undertaken to stop ongoing harm. 
Here students can identify weak points in the institutional system that allow or 
encourage harm such as corruption. Even if Shell is punished or would even be forced 
to pull out, but the system of incentives and organizational priorities is not reformed, 
then it is likely that the oil company that replaces Shell simply adopts the same 
(mal)practices.  
4) Shared responsibility  
Shell’s operations extend beyond nation-state boundaries and include globally 
dispersed persons as the stakeholder analysis revealed. All those actors have a mediated 
connection to the structural injustices in the Niger Delta and are thus responsible in a 
partial way. For example, consumers demanding cheap energy access reinforce the 
status quo as the company is under pressure to reduce operational costs. Also, 
governance structures imply a shared responsibility. While from a legal perspective Shell 
Headquarters could not be held liable for the failures of SPDC (they are considered 
legally separate entities), SPDC is closely connected to its headquarters in The Hague 
within the overall corporate governance structure. For example, the NGO Friends of the 
Earth Netherlands (Milieudefensie) submitted in May 2013 an appeal to The Hague 
court, as it is clear for them that Shell’s headquarter shares responsibility for the massive 
environmental damage in Nigeria. Also, the Nigerian government holds a controlling 
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stake and power over SPDC’s operations being its major shareholder (the government-
owned NNPC holds 55% of SPDC). 
5) Collective action  
Since many actors contribute by their actions in particular institutional contexts to the 
processes that produce unjust outcomes, these structural processes can be altered only 
if many actors in diverse social positions work together to intervene in these processes. 
Students can appreciate that Shell has already engaged in partnerships at different 
levels – in local CSR initiatives such as the GMoU and in global governance initiatives. In 
1998, Shell shifted from a unilateral to a partnering approach to provide socio-economic 
services to host communities in a more effective way. Yet, the case study reveals that 
collective action needs to be improved substantially.  
4. Does Shell have a higher degree responsibility than other actors due to the 
company’s privileged position, power, interest, and collective ability? Should Shell 
turn into a human welfare organization or adopt a quasi-governmental role? Or should 
the company create only value for its shareholders? 
Students should discuss the degree of Shell’s responsibility using Young’s (2006) 
parameters for reasoning: power, interest, privilege, and collective ability. Given Shell’s 
position within the structural processes, the scope of Shell’s responsibilities can range 
from a strong (direct) responsibility (e.g. the case of oil spills) to a shared political 
responsibility based on structural connectedness. The latter implicates a turn from the 
economic, utility-driven, and output-oriented view on CSR to a political, communication-
driven, and input oriented concept of organizational responsibility. Thus, Shell could 
even be held responsible for things they themselves have not done. Since the company 
faced already in the 1990’s worldwide condemnation for shirking its (political) 
responsibilities to speak out against the execution of the ‘Ogoni Nine’, Shell should re-
evaluate its current scope of responsibilities with special care. Yet, students should not 
expect corporations to turn into human welfare organizations or replace a government 
agency. They should do what they are best at: providing life- conducive goods and 
services and creating value for a multiplicity of stakeholders. Based on the stakeholder 
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analysis, students can also infer responsibilities of other actors, which are socially 
connected to the structural injustices occurring in the Niger Delta. 
5. What are the conditions for corporate legitimacy? The key question of the case is 
how should Shell adapt its CSR agenda to these increasing demands to take on public 
responsibilities and allegations of corporate malpractice. 
Students will probably propose two opposing options: 1) leave the country or go 
offshore or 2) to continue business as usual given the company’s much-praised CSR 
agenda. Yet, from a financial point of view both options are not viable since Nigeria is a 
cornerstone of Shell’s business and doing nothing would affect the company’s 
reputation and by extension its profits. Also, from an ethical point of view, Shell has 
certain (political) responsibilities to stay and proactively engage in CSR, which can be 
discussed depending on the ethical theories and concepts covered in the course.  
While Shell has already engaged in activities that are regarded as traditional government 
responsibilities to provide public services to poor host communities, the company is 
facing continuous allegations of malpractice. This growing positive and negative impact 
challenges the company’s legitimacy and consequently its license to operate for two 
reasons. First, the company (involuntarily) assumes a political role with associated public 
responsibilities that go beyond traditional philanthropy or CSR programs. Second, the 
company has no democratic mandate for its engagement, and there is no regulatory 
influence over powerful corporations such as Shell at the local and the global level. The 
question is: What should Shell do, when, and how to keep its license to operate? How 
could Shell employ sustainability-related activities and practices to meet its public 
legitimacy requirements? 
Depending on the theories discussed in the course, students can evaluate Shell’s options 
using Mena and Palazzo’s (2012) conceptualization of input and output legitimacy as a 
basis for a legitimate transfer of regulatory power from traditional democratic nation-
state processes to private regulatory schemes. Input legitimacy is determined by 1) 
stakeholder inclusion; 2) procedural fairness; 3) consensual orientation, and 4) 
transparency (Mena & Palazzo, 2012, p. 538). Output legitimacy refers to the capacity 
of regulatory regimes to effectively take a regulatory role by ensuring 1) coverage; 2) 
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efficacy, and 3) rule enforcement and monitoring (Mena & Palazzo, 2012, p. 539). The 
case study makes clear that Shell’s current approach to CSR in Nigeria (GMoU) suffers 
from both input and output legitimacy. In the course of the discussion, students should 
develop a concern about the precarious legitimacy of globally active corporations in 
general and in developing countries with a public responsibility deficit in particular. Also, 
students can go a step further and discuss the basis of legitimacy of companies 
belonging to the so-called controversial industry sector. Students should ask themselves 
if it is possible for an organization to be sustainable when its core operations inherently 
entail persistent environmental and social issues? How can these organizations employ 
their CSR-related practices and policies better to meet their public legitimacy 
requirements?  
When addressing these questions students should realize that there remains 
considerable controversy as to the answers. Business can provide an important 
contribution to public sector resource deficits and inefficiencies. Yet, companies can 
face a whole host of problems if their strategies backfire and unsustainable outcomes 
can be (are) a reality where sustainability concepts are co-opted and formalized in a CSR 
agenda, but not implemented in praxis.  
Teaching the case 
Courses 
The interdisciplinary character, innovative stance and the global context of the case is 
especially interesting for students studying subjects such as the global context of 
management, the role of business in society, business ethics, business challenges in 
complex environments such as developing countries. It can be used in undergraduate 
classes, though due to its complexity, it is especially recommended for graduate, 
Master’s and MBA students.  
Contribution of the case 
The case is a vehicle for discussion and insight on the crucial role of learning and 
adaption over time for two reasons. In the first place, Shell’s experiences demonstrate 
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that many companies still hold an apolitical self-perception, but engage at the same time 
in activities that have been regarded as actual government activities. Yet, this strategic 
adoption of public responsibilities to maintain their social license to operate implies 
unforeseen challenges with regard to the company’s legitimacy and the scope of 
responsibility. In a complex operating environment such as Nigeria it requires 
continuous efforts from part of the company to identify key stakeholder’s interests and 
to go beyond current one-size-fits-all best practices. Even though Shell is considered a 
forerunner in CSR, the case points to problems of sustainability with regard to the 
application of ‘double standards’ and the sometimes bad consequences of much-praised 
practices. Thus this provides input for students that allow them to think through the 
scope of feasible and sustainable action if they happen to find themselves confronted 
with such practices. In this sense, this case thus also challenges in a way the ‘bright side’ 
bias of the far more numerous ‘best-practice’ cases in the area of CSR and sustainability. 
Case objectives 
 Analyze and understand the economic and political role of MNCs like Shell in a 
context of a public responsibility void at the local and global level 
 Become aware of the challenges for the scope of corporate responsibilities and 
the basis for corporate legitimacy that a politicized role entails 
 Familiarize students with Young’s social connectedness model  
 Find out and reason on the scope of corporate responsibilities and legitimacy 
beyond a narrow liability model 
 
Teaching plan / Timing 
Depending on how comprehensively the instructor wishes to discuss the case, and how 
extensive and lengthy is the discussion or role-play, this case can run from a single 90-
minute session to two such sessions. To discuss the main questions, the instructor can 
divide the discussion into two groups so that one group can focus on one dimension - 
corporate responsibility and legitimacy. As an alternative the instructor can set up an 
interchange between different case actors in form of a role play to foster greater 
empathy with the case protagonists and increase class attentiveness. Depending on the 
class size, roles can be assigned to individual or groups of students during class or prior 
to the session. We recommend splitting the class into different roles such as the 
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company Shell, civil society, the Nigerian government etc. discussing all dimensions with 
regard to their respective role. In a later exercise these different perspectives can be 
contrasted with each other. Apart from the information in the case study, the instructor 
should provide stimulating inputs and questions (see below) for each group discussion 
and students could search for updated facts and figures in real time. 
 
94 
Chapter 4: Study 3 – A model of organizational response 
strategies to political CSR demands: The case of Royal 
Dutch Shell  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unpublished research study. Presented at the Academy of Management (AOM), Annual 
Conference, Vancouver, August 2015. Symposium Presentation 
  
95 
4.1. Abstract 
Multinational corporations are facing increasing pressure for addressing public goods 
problems and regulation, even as economic theory instructs managers to focus on 
maximizing their shareholders’ wealth. Organizational scholars and corporate managers 
find themselves in the clutches of an antinomy, which revive still unresolved questions: 
How should companies respond? How can affected stakeholders ensure that MNCs 
involvement in public good issues is done in the best interest of the public? While prior 
work contributed to a sophisticated normative account of the adoption of political 
responsibilities and role (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007), and 
highlighted deviations from this normative benchmark (Banerjee, 2007; Barley, 2007; 
Bromley & Powell, 2012; Frynas, 2009; Nyberg et al., 2013) it remains theoretically 
underdeveloped and empirically under-explored to what extent companies can and do 
conform to external institutional pressure to achieve societal outcomes. Notably lacking 
is a systematic response model paying explicit attention to organizational self-interest, 
active agency and underlying power relations (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Oliver, 1991) 
with a focus on the impact of the company’s response on affected stakeholders 
(Banerjee, 2007; Margolis & Walsh, 2003). This research embraces the company’s 
dilemma between economic and broader social objectives and the lack of attention to 
societal outcomes as a starting point for a systematic in-depth empirical inquiry of the 
oil mayor Royal Dutch Shell. The emergent model reveals a rather more complex and 
dynamic picture of MNCs’ responses to political CSR demands than that presented in 
the extant literature and sheds new light on the gap between political CSR activities and 
public ends. Notably, it makes two important contributions: (1) it identifies previously 
unidentified responses to normative political CSR demands – namely compromise, 
internal buffering, defiance and manipulation; and (2) it sheds light on the interests and 
power relations behind the company’s response strategy. 
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4.2. Introduction 
“The social responsibility of business is to increase its profit” (Friedman, 1970) 
“Business firms operate as social entrepreneurs and directly serve the public interest by 
their resources (money, assets, know-how, etc.) and their creativity” (Scherer, Palazzo, 
& Matten, 2009) 
Today, particularly multinational corporations (MNCs) are facing increasing pressure for 
addressing public goods problems and regulation, even as economic theory instructs 
managers to focus on maximizing their shareholders’ wealth. Organizational scholars 
and corporate managers find themselves in the clutches of an antinomy, which revive 
still unresolved questions posed by Merton five decades ago: How should companies 
respond? Does the successful business try first to profit or to serve? (Merton, 1976, p. 
88).  
In recent years, a lively scholarly debate has evolved about the political roles and 
responsibilities of corporations. The debate has spanned across a range of disciplines 
including political science (e.g. Cutler et al., 1999), legal studies (e.g. Clapham, 2006), 
philosophy (e.g. Young, 2006), management studies (e.g. Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994), 
and sociology (e.g. Burris, 2001). Within the business ethics and business and society 
literatures, ‘political CSR’ (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011) has become the new normative 
societal frame of reference for theorizing MNCs’ engagement in global regulation and 
public goods problems within their corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies. Based 
upon conceptual ideas of the Habermasian concept of deliberative democracy 
(Habermas, 1996b; Habermas, 1998a; Habermas, 2001), and (normative) stakeholder 
theory (Donaldson & Preston, 1995, p. 71), Scherer and Palazzo define political CSR as 
an “extended model of governance with business firms contributing to global regulation 
and providing public goods” (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, p. 901). The authors claim that 
MNCs should, and already do, engage in traditional government activities of political 
and social regulation even in areas not directly related to their business (Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2007) and operate as new providers of citizenship rights and public goods 
(Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer et al., 2009). In other words, 
business firms’ interaction with the political sphere should be in the name of the public 
interest (Scherer et al., 2009, p. 577) which blurs the traditional boundaries between 
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the political and economic spheres of society (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, p. 905). The 
authors claim that this new political conception of CSR aims at producing a paradigm 
shift in CSR studies (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011) as it challenges the traditional economic 
conception of the business firm and the related instrumental conception of CSR (e.g. 
Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2002; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Porter & Kramer, 2011; 
Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). In line with institutional theory, political CSR is concerned 
with corporate legitimacy in a ‘post-national constellation’ (Habermas, 2001) and 
formally prescribes adopter behavior and specifies intended goals.  
The new political role of MNC is inherently paradoxical and highly contested for its 
unclear relationship to outcomes by both the public and corporations. The skills, 
resources, and expectations of stakeholders related to profitability goals are often at 
odds with those for social and environmental goals. Interestingly, while institutional 
scholars highlighted the paradox of compliant adopters not achieving the desired public 
ends (Bromley & Powell, 2012) and critical scholars raised concerns about corporations 
pursuing their narrow business interests and undermining the public good (Banerjee, 
2008; Barley, 2007; Fooks, Gilmore, Collin, Holden, & Lee, 2012; Levy, 2008; Mamudu, 
Hammond, & Glantz, 2008; Nyberg et al., 2013), existing research makes no systematic 
empirical enquiry about the extent and boundary conditions of companies’ ability and 
will to conform to political CSR demands to achieve societal outcomes. Notably lacking 
is a framework paying explicit attention to organizational self-interest, active agency and 
underlying power relations (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Oliver, 1991) with a focus on 
the impact of the company’s response on affected stakeholders (Banerjee, 2007; 
Margolis & Walsh, 2003) which have been recognized in earlier studies. The goal of this 
paper is to address this gap with the following research questions: How and under which 
conditions do companies respond to political CSR demands? 
In this paper I embrace the company’s dilemma between economic and broader social 
objectives and the lack of attention to societal outcomes as a starting point for a 
systematic in-depth empirical inquiry of the oil mayor Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria. The 
in-depth analysis of Shell is salient for developing new theoretical insights for its distinct 
company characteristics, its complex operating environment and the author’s privileged 
access to affected stakeholders. Shell was one of the first MNCs that had been 
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confronted with political CSR demands in the 1990s (Wheeler, Fabig, & Boele, 2002), 
which changed Shell's self-understanding from being an apolitical to a politicized actor 
(Hollender & Fenichell, 2004 in Scherer et al., 2006, p. 518) and started to implement 
normative elements of political CSR into core governance structures and processes 
(Jacoba Schouten, 2010). However, while being praised by academics and practitioners 
alike as a leader for its proactive management of environmental, social and governance 
issues (AccountAbility, 2005; Channing Corporate Citizenship Award, 2011; Corporate 
Knights, 2010; Crane & Matten, 2004; Fortune, 2008; Innovest, 2006; Jacoba Schouten, 
2010; Lawrence, 2002; Management & Excellence, 2006 ; Scherer et al., 2006; Schouten 
& Remm, 2006; VBDO, 2006; World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 
2015), Shell faces at the same time continues allegations of corporate malpractice, 
which raise questions with regard to the company’s underlying motivation and (power) 
position to address public goods issues. Taking into account that political CSR involves 
global and local issue arenas such as transparency and community development 
respectively, this study focuses on Shell’s headquarters and its Nigerian subsidiary, the 
Shell Development Company (SPDC) to shed light on this paradox. Nigeria is a case in 
point as the country has become synonymous with the paradox of want in the midst of 
plenty. After decades of CSR investment, even more people lived in poverty than before 
oil was found, and the rural and oil producing communities were the most affected 
(Ikein & Briggs-Anigboh, 1998). To answer the research questions I examine Shell’s 
response to political CSR demands and its impact on societal ends. I then analyze the 
boundary conditions, which determine the company’s response to institutional pressure 
and develop an empirically grounded response model. This forms the basis of the 
theoretical contribution. I conclude by discussing the contributions and limitations of 
the proposed model. 
The emergent theoretical model reveals a rather more complex and dynamic picture of 
MNCs’ responses to political CSR demands than that presented in the literature above 
and sheds new light on the gap between political CSR activities and public ends. Notably, 
it makes two important contributions to the literature: (1) it identifies previously 
unidentified responses to normative political CSR demands – namely compromise, 
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internal buffering, defiance and manipulation; and (2) it sheds light on the interests and 
power relations behind the company’s response strategy. 
4.3. Theoretical background 
Recently, ‘political CSR’ (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007) has become 
the normative benchmark for theorizing the political role and responsibilities of MNCs. 
This extended concept of governance emphasizes the ‘priority of democracy to 
philosophy’ (Rorty, 1991) and builds on the Habermasian concept of deliberative 
democracy (Habermas, 1996a; Habermas, 1998b; Habermas, 2001) and on (normative) 
stakeholder theory to identify “moral or philosophical guidelines for the operation and 
management of corporations” (Donaldson & Preston, 1995, p. 71). This normative 
societal frame of reference extents a body of work that positively describes and explains, 
the political duties and activities of MNCs as ‘extended corporate citizenship’ (Matten & 
Crane, 2005), and ‘corporations as government’ (Crane, Matten, & Moon, 2008). Scherer 
and Palazzo define political CSR as an “extended model of governance with business 
firms contributing to global regulation and providing public goods” (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2011, p. 901). The authors claim that MNCs should, and already do, engage in traditional 
government activities of political and social regulation even in areas not directly related 
to their business (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007) and operate as new providers of citizenship 
rights and public goods (Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer et al., 
2009). In other words, business firms’ interaction with the political sphere should be in 
the name of the public interest (Scherer et al., 2009, p. 577). The authors assert that this 
new political conception of CSR aims at producing a paradigm shift in CSR studies 
(Scherer & Palazzo, 2011) as it challenges the traditional economic conception of the 
business firm and the related instrumental conception of CSR (e.g. Friedman, 1970; 
Jensen, 2002; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Porter & Kramer, 2011; Sundaram & Inkpen, 
2004).  
In line with institutional theory, political CSR is concerned with corporate legitimacy and 
formally prescribes adopter behavior and specifies intended goals. A political3 role of 
                                                 
3 The political aspect is here that companies get involved in the political process associated with solving 
societal problems (Santoro, 2010)  
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MNC is seen by Scherer and Palazzo (2011) to be legitimate4 within a new societal frame 
of reference of five interrelated dimensions: global governance initiatives, self-
regulation, social connectedness logic, moral legitimacy, and deliberative democracy. In 
more detail, Mena and Palazzo (2012) have identified input (inclusion, procedural 
fairness, consensual orientation, and transparency) and output (rule coverage, efficacy, 
and enforcement) criteria to evaluate the legitimacy of such (political) engagement 
(Mena & Palazzo, 2012). With this normative benchmark, the “legitimacy of corporate 
activities can be normatively accessed when no universal criteria of ethical behavior are 
available in a post-modern and post-national world” (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, p. 906). 
Political CSR demands have become institutionalized in the emerging CSR infrastructure 
(for an overview see Waddock, 2008) and are considered here as an institution as they 
constitute the rules of the game serving to define social practices, assign roles, and guide 
interactions (Young, 1994). 
Political CSR scholars also assume that corporations become subjects of new forms of 
democratic processes of control by engaging in the processes of self-regulation and 
multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSI) (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). The authors claim that 
these normative means encourage processes of ‘communication’ and ‘deliberation’ with 
multiple stakeholders contributing to organizational learning and democratization 
rather than mere bargaining along the lines of participants’ pre-defined institutional 
interests and power differences (Dryzek, 2005; Risse, 2004; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; 
Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). In this sense, multi-stakeholder deliberation is understood as 
a ‘school of democracy’ where power differences are neutralized by the democratic 
design of the arena (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011) following input and output legitimacy 
criteria (Mena & Palazzo, 2012). In other words, political CSR’s normative yardstick is a 
power-free discourse (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011) based on the ‘forceless force of the 
better argument’ (Habermas, 1990, p. 185; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011).  
Altogether, the concept of political CSR advances a ‘deliberative turn’ in the political 
engagement of MNCs in the delivery of public goods with the following features. Firstly, 
it is weaker than in the traditional understanding, since it refers to processes of self-
                                                 
4 According to Dryzek (2010) for outcomes to be legitimate, they must be socially accepted, morally right, 
freely granted, competent, and legal (Dryzek, 2010) 
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regulation and production of transnational ‘soft law’ instead of national hard law and 
because it refers to the discourses of a globalizing civil society as the source of legitimacy 
instead of a nationally defined community. Secondly, it is broader because it includes 
non-state actors as objects of legitimacy claims and expands the understanding of 
responsibility beyond the common liability concept of responsibility and a shift of 
corporate attention and money to societal challenges beyond immediate stakeholder 
pressure (Scherer et al., 2007, p. 1115). Thirdly, it is an input related and discursive 
concept of legitimacy in that it involves organizations in processes of active justification 
vis-à-vis society rather than simply responding to the demands of powerful groups 
(Palazzo & Scherer, 2006, p. 71).  
However, the political role and engagement of MNCs in public responsibilities are highly 
contested for its unclear relationship to outcomes by both the public and corporations. 
For companies, there is an unclear relationship to financial performance which stands 
in direct contrast with is economic mandate to focus on maximizing the company’s 
shareholders wealth (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, 2011). 5  Furthermore, the 
normative pressure to provide goods and services not related to the core business 
competencies might even present inherent business risks since an all-inclusive social 
responsibility of a whole community might overburden companies (Mäkinen & Kasanen, 
2014, p. 3) and they risk to lose its license to operate when not delivering these political 
responsibilities effectively. For the public, it is not assured that the company makes 
public welfare choices in the best interest of the public and effectively addresses social 
and environmental injustices. The company has no democratic mandate for its 
engagement in public responsibility strategies and cannot be held accountable by a civic 
polity. 
Recently, institutional scholars have taken note of these significant changes in 
organizations’ external environments and contributed to a development of a richer 
conception of the gap between practices and outcomes as it relates to the 
                                                 
5 The ‘cost’ of CSR is not clear. While many scholars have found little evidence that CSR adoption brings 
tangible economic benefits (Margolis & Walsh, 2003), a recent meta-analysis suggests a positive 
relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP) 
(Orlitzky, 2011). 
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contemporary world. Bromley and Powell (2012) powerfully argue that companies 
actually increasingly acquiesce to institutional demands due to the rationalization of the 
institutional environment (Boli, 2006; Zucker, 1987; Frank & Meyer, 2002 in Bromley & 
Powell, 2012, p. 485), but may not achieve the intended results (Bromley & Powell, 
2012). In this so-called means-end decoupling “organizations pursue many activities 
despite the lack of a clear connection to outcomes (for the community and the 
company) and despite a clear integration with core goals” (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 
506). An uncertain means-end relationship is particularly prevalent in the realm of public 
or social good production as companies “adopt new ends that are not directly related 
to core goals“ (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 497), and “face the challenge of developing 
meaningful metrics of accomplishment and clearly establishing the causal efficacy of 
particular programs or activities” (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 500). While this new form 
of decoupling sheds light on the paradox of compliant adopters not achieving the 
desired public ends, it does not account for organizational self-interest and active 
agency with a particular focus on “instances when decoupling will not be the response 
to institutional pressures” (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 509). In other words, scholars in 
this line of thought assume passive compliance with institutional norms due to a 
governance void (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; Scherer et al., 2006), 
increasingly rationalizing pressures to increase transparency and accountability 
(Bromley & Powell, 2012) and an increased homogenization of CSR across borders 
through cognitive, normative and regulative pressures (Matten & Moon, 2008; 
Waddock, 2008). The emerging institutional CSR infrastructure is even predicted to 
facilitate the adaption of hard law (Rivoli & Waddock, 2011). Notably, the authors 
assume that desired outcomes are not achieved due to environmental opacity (Bromley 
& Powell, 2012) such as causal complexity, practice multiplicity, and behavioral 
invisibility (Wijen, 2014). As a result, adopters face attention and knowledge problems, 
which thwart the ability to comply through experimental learning, imitating the ‘right’ 
practices (Wijen, 2014) or to measure the effects of actions (Bromley & Powell, 2012). 
Hence, any deviation of corporate policies or practices from institutional demands is 
considered unintended and a transitory phenomenon (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; 
Bromley & Powell, 2012; Haack et al., 2012) as it does not provide general legitimacy 
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benefits (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 516) and thus may not be a viable long-term option 
for adopters of CSR-related practices (Haack et al., 2012). 
Organizational scholars have long recognized the role of organizational self-interest and 
active agency in organizational responses to institutional demands (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006, p. 215; Oliver, 1991) and argue that “not only that deviations from the 
normative prescripts occur in successful organizations, but that they may even be a 
major promoter of success” (Brunsson, 1993). For instance, integrating institutional 
theory with resource dependence arguments, Oliver (1991) demonstrates how 
organizational responses to institutional pressures may vary from passive conformity to 
active resistance, depending on the context and nature of the pressures themselves. 
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) conception of ‘institutional work’ extends these insights 
by re-introducing strategy and power into neo-institutional explanations (Eisenstadt, 
1980; DiMaggio 1988 in Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 217) among others. For the 
authors, institutional work involves “the purposive action of individuals and 
organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006, p. 215). Although these authors point to alternative response strategies, 
their work lacks predictive power when discussing responses in a particular empirical 
setting and they remain silent about “the conditions under which specific responses are 
mobilized” (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 457). In other words, they merely suggest “that 
organizations find it difficult to acquiesce to what is expected from them and, thus, are 
highly likely to resort to more resistant strategies, such as compromise, avoidance, 
defiance, or manipulation” (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 456).  
The phenomenon of MNC’s self-interested and active agency and its negative impact on 
the public good is also increasingly attracting attention from critical scholars (Banerjee, 
2008; Barley, 2007). To cast new light on CSR debates, critical management scholars 
have drawn on Gramscian theory to consider the nature of power and ideology in 
structures of international governance. They point to the dynamic process of 
contestation and accommodation (Levy, 2008) and identify corporate practices of 
campaigning and exemplifying to incorporate citizenship activities in order to benefit 
corporate agendas (Nyberg et al., 2013). Likewise, other studies suggest that companies 
adopt symbolically to CSR standards to preempt strong and legally enforceable 
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regulation (e.g. tobacco industry Fooks et al., 2012; Mamudu et al., 2008). Even 
exemplary cases of political CSR are criticized for co-opting and capturing the more 
radical impulses of various environmental groups (e.g. Forest Stewardship Council, 
Edward & Willmott, 2011), for undermining peoples’ political autonomy (see historical 
cases of company towns, Miller, 2007; Montgomery, 1998), and for environmental 
degradation and alleged human rights abuses (Hennchen, 2015). While critical scholars 
have highlighted the negative consequences of MNC’s engagement in public 
responsibility strategies, they have selectively focused on cases when corporations do 
not implement or even manipulate institutional demands without proposing a more 
systematic and complete model of corporate response strategies and determinants. 
Overall, despite significant progress, we still lack a systematic empirical examination and 
a systematic model of how corporations can and do conform to political CSR demands. 
Notably lacking is the explicit attention to the role of organizational self-interest and 
agency and the impact on outcomes for society (Banerjee, 2007, p. 167; Devinney, 2009, 
p. 54; Margolis & Walsh, 2003) in particular empirical settings (Bromley & Powell, 2012, 
p. 519; Brunsson et al., 2012; Frynas & Stephens, 2014). To understand the effect of a 
company’s response to institutional norms for political CSR (IV) on societal outcomes 
(DV), this paper used a case study to answer the following questions: 
1. How do companies respond to political CSR demands? 
2. Under which conditions are the different response strategies likely to be 
mobilized? 
3. How do corporate response strategies affect societal outcomes? 
4.4. Methodology 
In this paper I embrace the company’s dilemma between economic and broader social 
objectives and the lack of attention to the impact of corporate responses on affected 
stakeholders as a starting point for a systematic in-depth empirical inquiry (Banerjee, 
2007; Margolis & Walsh, 2003). Using a single case study (Eisenhardt, 1989a) was 
appropriate and instrumental for several reasons. Given the predominantly normative 
focus on theorizing on the political role and responsibilities of MNCs (Matten & Crane, 
2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007), authors call for an empirical 
105 
investigation of how companies respond to legitimacy challenges in complex and 
heterogeneous environments (Scherer et al., 2013). Notably, there is a lack of research 
attention for Africa (Egri & Ralston, 2008; Kolk & Van Tulder, 2010) where there is 
“relatively little on-the-ground corporate responsibility research in countries where the 
need for corporate responsibility is most pressing due to greater poverty, environmental 
degradation, and institutional governance issues” (Egri & Ralston, 2008, p. 325). Hence, 
a qualitative case study is well suited to support and facilitate comprehension of 
phenomena that is not well understood (Marshall & Rossman, 1995) and to develop 
existing theory “by pointing to gaps and beginning to fill them” (Siggelkow, 2007, p. 21). 
More importantly, the single case is sufficient since the aim is to identify new concepts 
and to challenge the existing world views (Siggelkow, 2007) and as “a few observations 
– perhaps even just one – can provide an intensity of information that allows inferences 
even a large dataset might not reveal” (Morck & Yeung, 2011).  
4.4.1. Case selection 
I chose a case suitable to the phenomena under investigation (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 
1994): Royal Dutch Shell, a powerful top Fortune 500 company – the number No. 1 and 
No. 2 on the Fortune 500 in the years 2012/2013 and 2014 respectively (Fortune, 2015) 
– has increasingly acquiescenced to normative political CSR demands (see inhouse 
analysis by Jacoba Schouten, 2010). Shell is a front-running company in CSR and was one 
the first to issue CSR annual reports, set up social and environmental management 
departments, and explicitly commit to human rights (in 1997) such as the international 
declarations and standards developed to foster human rights, including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948), the International Labor Organization’s 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998), the United Nations 
Global Compact (2000) and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
(2001) (Schouten & Remm, 2006). Furthermore, Shell has been widely recognized by 
academics and practitioners alike as a leader for its proactive management of 
environmental, social and governance issues (AccountAbility, 2005; Channing Corporate 
Citizenship Award, 2011; Corporate Knights, 2010; Crane & Matten, 2004; Fortune, 
2008; Innovest, 2006; Jacoba Schouten, 2010; Lawrence, 2002; Management & 
Excellence, 2006 ; Scherer et al., 2006; Schouten & Remm, 2006; VBDO, 2006; World 
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Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2015). The implementation of political 
CSR demands into the company’s governance structure and processes involved a total 
reformation of the existing relationships, corporate governance structure and CSR 
policies. In 2009 Shell implemented a new Health, Safety, Security, the Environment 
(HSSE) and Social Performance (SP) control framework and located CSR issues at the 
Board level. The overall accountability for sustainable development within Shell lies with 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Executive Committee. They set priorities and 
standards in sustainable development, which define standards and accountabilities at 
each level of the organization. The Corporate and Social Responsibility Committee 
assists the Board of Directors in reviewing policies and performance, visiting facilities 
and meeting with government officials, community representatives and local non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) (Royal Dutch Shell, 2012c, p. 5). The ‘Social 
Performance Management Unit’ (SPMU) gives expert support to Shell subsidiaries 
and/or joint ventures with regard to managing their impact on local people such as 
resettlement of communities, air emissions, or operational activities on traditional lands 
(Schouten & Remm, 2006). An integral part of Shell’s control framework are the Shell 
General Business Principles and the Code of Conduct. The eight business principles 
govern how Shell companies conduct its affairs with regard to its main areas of 
responsibility – shareholders, customers, employees, business partners, and society, 
based on the core values of honesty, integrity and respect for people (Royal Dutch Shell, 
1976). In line with the overall control framework, policies were developed for special 
focus areas. In line with the research objective of this paper, I have selected three focus 
areas: community engagement and development, security and transparency. In all 
areas, Shell favors MSI and dialogue to achieve practical and effective solutions, which 
are beneficial to all parties involved (Royal Dutch Shell, 2015c, p. 4). Table 5 gives an 
abbreviated overview of Shell’s implementation of political CSR policies in the three 
focus areas. 
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Table 5 Overview of Shell's implementation of political CSR policies 
Focus 
area 
Community engagement & development Transparency & anti-corruption Security & Peace 
Mission 
“Community engagement is fundamental to our approach to 
sustainability. It helps us to find better solutions, build people’s 
trust and is the basis for operating responsibly” (Royal Dutch 
Shell, 2014b, p. 18) 
Shell aims to engage in close dialogue with communities to 
understand their concerns and decide how to best address 
them. This includes on the one side the negative impacts of the 
company’s operations such as gas flaring and operational oils 
spills, and on the other side the benefits it can bring to 
communities via social investment, employment and 
contractor opportunities, training and ecosystem restoration 
(Royal Dutch Shell, 2014b) 
“Shell is committed to transparency” and  
“We do not tolerate the direct or indirect offer, 
payment, solicitation or acceptance of bribes in 
any form. Also, we have been publishing 
payments to governments voluntarily, because 
for Shell paying taxes in the countries where we 
operate is more than complying with the law; it 
is about showing that extraction of natural 
resources leads to the opportunity of 
government revenue, economic growth and 
social development” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2015b) 
“We only allow armed security when 
required by law or when other ways to 
manage security risks have been 
considered. All armed guards must 
meet our standards based on UN 
guidelines and conventions on the use 
of force and the Voluntary Principles 
on Security and Human Rights. Shell’s 
security personnel receive mandatory 
training under the requirements of the 
principles“ (Royal Dutch Shell, 2015a) 
Policy 
1) Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) 
 Since 2006: inclusive and accountable approach to 
community development (Shell, 2012) 
 written statement between SPDC & community group/cluster 
 decision-making committee called the Cluster Development 
Board is main supervisory and administrative organ, ensuring 
implementation of projects and setting out plans and 
programs (incl. representatives from communities, state and 
local governments, SPDC and non-profit organizations (Shell 
Nigeria, 2013)) 
 SPDC provides secure funding for five years & access to 
development experts (Shell Nigeria, 2013) 
 executed in partnership with facilitating non-profit 
organizations such as the Initiative for community 
development (ICDNGO), The Niger Delta Professionals for 
Development (NIPRODEV): they handle sensitization, 
communication, capacity building and ensure quality delivery 
of GMoU projects and programs (Shell Nigeria, 2013) 
1) Voluntary reporting on socio-economic 
performance in line with external guidelines:  
 Global Reporting Initiative G3.1  
 International Petroleum Industry 
Environmental Conservation Association 
 UN Global Compact & human rights, labor, 
environment and anti-corruption principles 
2) Reporting to leading indices that assess 
companies’ economic, environmental and 
social performance on behalf of investors: 
 KLD Research and Analytics’ Global Climate 
100 Index (Utting & Ives, 2006, p. 19)) 
 Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes 
 FTSE4Good 
 Carbon Disclosure Project 
 Goldman Sachs SUSTAIN ESG (environmental, 
social & governance) (Shell, 2015) 
 
 Signed up to the Voluntary Principles 
on Security and Human Rights  
 Contracts with private and public 
security forces include the principles  
 Company-wide security manuals set 
requirements for how we keep our 
people and facilities safe, and respect 
human rights  
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2) Joint Investigation Visit (JIV) 
 Stakeholder engagement to assess the cause and extent of oil 
spills (Royal Dutch Shell, 2014b) 
 The joint investigation team includes representatives of 
regulatory agencies, the oil company, the affected 
community and the security forces 
 The JIV is the basis for deciding whether communities receive 
compensation for damage to their homes, fields and fisheries. 
The data also affects how much compensation they receive 
and may affect the extent and quality of clean up 
3) Other multi-stakeholder partnerships: 
 The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) & 
Nigerian Environmental Study Action Team  
 The Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR)  
 Nigerian Government & Niger Delta Development 
Commission since 2003 
3) Voluntary reporting of oil spill data in Nigeria 
since 2010 (Ten Kate, 2010) 
4) Zero tolerance policy on corruption & bribery 
 Shell sits on Transparency International‘s 
Steering Committee for the Business 
Principles for Countering Bribery 
 Includes principle 10 of UN Global Compact  
 Shell’s Code of Conduct includes specific 
instructions to staff and mandatory training 
 Shell General Business Principles have an anti-
bribery commitment 
 A Global Helpline to seek advice and report 
violations 
Impact 
on 
public 
good 
Amount spent on voluntary social investment: 
 2014: $160 million  
 2014: $112 million direct contribution from SPDC and SNEPCo 
to social investment projects (Royal Dutch Shell, 2014b, p. 37) 
GMoU performance in 2012: 
 Agreements with 33 GMoU clusters, covering 349 
communities or 35% of the local communities 
 723 projects were successfully completed through GMoUs 
(including specific project-GMoUs).  
 cumulative total funding for GMoU projects and programs is 
over $117 million (with over $30 million in 2012 alone) 
 9 of 33 CDB have grown to become registered foundations 
now receiving third party funding 
 2014: 267 Code of Conduct violations 
reported to global telephone helpline and 
dedicated website, and through internal 
channels (Royal Dutch Shell, 2014b, p. 53) 
Personal safety:  
 2014: lowest ever number of injuries 
per million working hours* 
 lowest ever level of injuries*  
 five people lost their lives (Royal 
Dutch Shell, 2014b, p. 45) 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Royal Dutch Shell (2014b; 2015a; 2015b), Shell (2012; 2015), TenKate (2010), Utting & Ives (2006)  
Notes: *Information with regard to Shell’s performance in Nigeria on safety in the community is classified as confidential 
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Despite these efforts, the company remains a regular target of civil society activism and 
litigation concerning malpractice. The catalogue of proven and alleged malpractices is 
substantial: environmental degradation, complicity in Human Rights abuses, corruption, 
and inducing intra- and inter-community conflict among others (J. D. G. Frynas, 2000; 
Frynas, 2004; Frynas, 1998; J. G. Frynas, 2000; Frynas, 2003, 2005; Hennchen, 2015). 
Shell’s involvement in these traditional government responsibilities has two critical 
dilemmas. First, the company is facing conflicting demands to address public good issues 
in the context of a governance void at the global level and in developing countries such 
as Nigeria. The goal to achieve public ends stands in direct contrast with the company’s 
instrumental goals to maximize their shareholders’ wealth and an all-encompassing 
responsibility of a whole community might even jeopardize the company’s long-term 
survival (Mäkinen & Kasanen, 2014, p. 3; Steinmann, 2007). Second, Shell operates in a 
highly decentralized field at the global and local level with several democratic 
shortcomings (Hassel, 2008), which lacks both a principal constituent whose authority 
is formalized and institutional processes to monitor and enforce compliance. Thus, for 
many civil society actors, there is an important concern about the implications on the 
democratic control of powerful corporations and that corporate responses are made in 
the best interest of the public. In sum, crucial questions remain: How does companies 
respond to increasing pressure for addressing public goods problems and regulation? 
Does the successful business try first to profit or to serve (Merton, 1976, p. 88)? What 
do corporations may want in return (van Oosterhout, 2005, p. 680)? This paper focuses 
on this dilemma and sheds light on the different strategic responses that a MNC such as 
Shell enacts as a result of the institutional pressures toward conformity with political 
CSR demands and the conditions under which organizations will resist 
institutionalization.  
Since political CSR involves global and local issue arenas, different levels of analysis are 
necessary. The first research level is the local country context as the engagement 
(partnerships and dialogue) with local communities and social investment have become 
a cornerstone of the company’s CSR policies (Royal Dutch Shell, 2014b). Out over the 
140 and more operating countries, I have selected Nigeria and Shell’s 100% owned 
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subsidiary SPDC for several reasons. First, Shell’s experiences in Nigeria invite 
formulating generalizable insights since the company’s reputational backlash with 
regard to the Ogoni issue in the mid 1990’s not only triggered the formalization of a 
company-wide CSR agenda in line with political CSR elements (see for a more detailed 
description of the transformation process within Shell Mirvis, 2000), but also “put the 
social responsibility and the legitimacy of the oil companies on the top of the public 
agenda” (Tangen, Rudsar, & Bergesen, 2000). Shell’s experiences epitomize the changes 
of other companies following Shell’s lead and the emergence of a new CSR industry to 
support their efforts (Schouten & Remm, 2006; Tangen et al., 2000). 
Second, the country context draws attention to the background conditions of globally 
operating companies in heterogeneous and complex environments and the lack of 
impact on societal ends. Nigeria has become the synonym of the ‘paradox of want in the 
midst of plenty’. Despite an estimated US$600 billion of oil revenues since the 1960s 
(Wurthmann, 2006) more oil-producing community members are living in poverty now 
than before oil was found. As an activist bewailed in an interview, “Oil was taken from 
my community for 25 years. There is not one community in Ogoni that has a pipeline for 
water. There is no community that has a school, there is no community that has 
electricity. Is that not a lack?” (Social Action, interview 21.04.2010). In the same line of 
thought a fisherman from Bodo complained, “When Shell came in 1958, we thought 
they would bring change and change the status of the people. We expected them to 
bring infrastructure and water and jobs. […] Now poverty is everywhere” (Amnesty 
International, 2011, p. 42). Independent figures corroborate these statements. The 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization reported in 2010 that, 
even at peak production, 92% of the Nigerian population survived on less than US$2 a 
day. Moreover, in 2007 Nigeria’s Human Development Index was as low as 0.511, 
ranking the country 158th out of 182 countries and rendering it unlikely to achieve any 
of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Similarly, Nigeria suffered from a high 
adult illiteracy rate, poor quality of education and serious health challenges. Malaria was 
considered the most significant public health problem, and the country was the second 
most affected by the global HIV/AIDS health crisis. In addition, the International Energy 
Agency informed that over 49% and 65% of the population in 2009 continued to live 
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without access to electricity and clean cooking facilities, respectively (International 
Energy Agency, 2011, p. 472).  
Third, I have chosen to focus the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) out of 
the four Shell companies in Nigeria as the subsidiary has largely implemented political 
CSR principles to address public good problems in different issue areas. For example, in 
2006 SPDC introduced a new way of working with communities. This Global 
Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) represented an important shift in the 
company’s stakeholder engagement approach, placing emphasis on more transparent 
and accountable processes, regular communication with grassroots organizations and 
greater sustainability and conflict prevention (Shell, 2012). Then managing director 
Sunmonu explained that this community development program, “managed through a 
Community Interface Model, is providing social infrastructure, promoting public health 
and connecting communities to electricity for the first time” (ECCR, 2010, p. 59). 
According to the independent Dutch specialist on Nigeria Van der Aa (2005), SPDC is one 
of the largest development aid organizations in Nigeria (Schouten & Remm, 2006, p. 
214). In 2014 SPDC has contributed US$112 million to voluntary social investment 
projects and US$202 million to the Niger Delta Development Commission in 2014 as 
required by law (Royal Dutch Shell, 2014b, p. 37). Also, SPDC was voted “Best Company 
in most Innovative CSR” in 2011 at the Nigerian Social Enterprise Report and Awards 
(Shell Nigeria, 2012c). Shell’s positive impact is also manifested in its economic 
contribution to the government. Being the country’s largest oil and gas company in 
Nigeria (accounting for 40% of the country’s oil production, and 53% of Nigeria’s 
hydrocarbon reserve base (Ite, 2007)), SPDC paid $48 billion revenues to the Nigerian 
government from 2010 to 2014 (Royal Dutch Shell, 2014b, p. 37). This makes up more 
than three quarters of all revenues. 
The second research level is the company’s headquarters in The Hague, Netherlands and 
its registered office in London (Shell Centre). This level is important for the analysis since 
it acts as the financial and strategic center for the company as a whole and it manages 
international stakeholder engagement and partnerships – particularly with regard to 
social and environmental issues negotiated within the global arena. The permanent 
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Nigeria team at headquarter level6 is responsible for partnerships management and 
external engagement with local and international stakeholders such as Nigerian (local) 
government institutions, academics, United Nations, NGOs etc. The team coordinates 
for example international initiatives such as Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) with the Nigerian government and engages with academics on human rights issues 
related to their business on international conferences (Jacoba Schouten, 2010, p. 223). 
In line with the HSSE & SP control framework policies are cascaded down from 
headquarters to the business units and the supply chain. In sum, this level of analysis is 
crucial since the company’s response to institutional demands is very much determined 
by the headquarters’ control framework (see also the confidential Design and 
Engineering Practice documents obtained by the lawyers of four Nigerian farmers and 
Friends of the Earth Netherlands (Milieudefensie) (Mileudefensie, 2013) and depending 
on the issue at stake the company uses different organizational levels (country or 
headquarters) to respond to institutional demands. 
Shell’s complex operating environment and the ‘controversial nature of its core 
business’ makes it a telling analytic and extreme case in which to explore both corporate 
responses and response determinants to political CSR demands. Extreme cases not only 
allow a better understanding of the phenomenon and concordant theory building 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a) but also “offer lessons for all organizations as they face an 
increasingly turbulent word” (Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 573). Hence, this study’s high-relief 
observations support a welcome agenda of formulating generalizable insights in the 
political CSR and institutional theory scholarly agenda. Furthermore, the case selection 
responds to recent calls for revealing a new framework for thinking about non-
institutional forms of decoupling (Bromley & Powell, 2012) with regard to the gap 
between political CSR activities and public ends (dependent variable is outcome for 
society) (Banerjee, 2007): the emphasis on organizational self-interest and agency (or 
non-institutional decoupling) directly links theorizing on political CSR – dominated by 
institutional and stakeholder theory (Frynas & Stephens, 2014) – to other perspectives 
such as critical management studies and institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
                                                 
6 Note, that no such team is installed for other countries at the group level 
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4.4.2. Data collection 
Longitudinal qualitative data were collected intermittently over six years (2010-15). To 
avoid potential bias from a single data source or informant (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 
1994), I used a range of field methods and interviewed informants from different 
professional backgrounds (corporate, civil society, academic) at multiple levels of 
hierarchy (e.g. CEO and intermediate managers). The data presented comes from 
multiple sources such as in-depth interviews, informal meetings, and extensive archives. 
Triangulation of data collected from multiple sources and multiple times allowed for a 
stronger substantiation of constructs (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 538) and strengthens 
confidence in the reliability of findings (Barratt et al., 2011; Jick, 1979).  
An important data source was semi-structured interviews, which was collected in two 
waves. The interviews lasted between 40 and 90 minutes and increased in focus and 
depth over the period because of the cumulative and iterative nature of the fieldwork 
process. Some informants were interviewed several times to triangulate information. 
Interviews and conversations with Shell employees provided valuable insights and 
guided the investigation, but statements were eventually not included in this 
manuscript due to confidentiality reasons. In total, I collected 46 interviews with 37 
informants (see Table 6 for an overview). During the first round of data collection (2010-
2013), I collected 21 face-to-face and 8 skype interviews. Here, the two-week research 
visit to Nigeria and Shell’s headquarters in Den Haag formed an important basis to gain 
firsthand experience in the topic and establish personal ties. I identified informants by 
sampling from key stakeholder groups in the Nigerian extractive industry: present and 
former directors of civil society organizations (critical as well as corporate-aligned), 
renowned academics, corporate consultants, as well as senior and middle managers of 
Royal Dutch Shell and SPDC. I was provided with an unusual degree of access to high 
profile informants due to my personal professional ties with civil society groups and a 
personal contact in Royal Dutch Shell. Furthermore, the snow-balling technique proved 
very helpful (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) to gain access to more high-caliber respondents until 
data saturation was reached. A key advantage of this sample is the high number of civil 
society informants, which allowed gaining first-hand insights into how the company’s 
response affects them; a focus that previous studies have not addressed (Banerjee, 
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2007). To complement these formal interviews and obtain additional documents such 
as training material and meeting handouts, I attended topic-specific workshops and 
conferences such as the Second Annual Conference on Regional Integration in Africa 
(ACRIA) in Abuja on the 7th and 8th of July and the Heinrich Böll workshop on climate 
change in Abuja on the 12th and 13th of July 2011.  
During a second wave of data collection (2014-2015) I conducted 17 semi-structured 
skype interviews. I followed theoretical sampling (Glaser & Corbin, 1996) to gather more 
specific data on Shell’s global response and response determinants to Nigeria-relevant 
political CSR issues (particularly transparency issues as a global issue area). The second 
round of data gathering allowed refining emergent themes and interrogating informants 
directly on specific aspects of nascent findings. This use of external informants enabled 
to induce richer insights from the aggregate data (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009) and 
densify categories in terms of their properties and dimensions (Glaser & Corbin, 1996, 
p. 201). 
I addressed potential informant bias in several ways. First, I relied on informants from 
different backgrounds (corporate actors, civil society and academics both cooperating 
and opposing Shell; local and international) and multiple levels of hierarchy (e.g. 
executive director and middle-level managers). Notably, these informants were 
particularly knowledgeable about corporate responses, response determinants and 
effects on the public good. This approach harnessed a mix of different perspectives and 
improved the likelihood of getting a complete, accurate picture. Second, I promised 
anonymity to informants to encourage uninhibited responses. Also, due the sensitivity 
of the research topic some interviews were not recorded (marked in Table 6 with *) to 
allow for more candor. Yet, significant note taking of proceedings and interactions and 
writing them up within 24 hours, as Yin (1994) recommended, constituted helpful 
alternatives. Third, in line with prior research (Huber, 1985; Huber & Power, 1985), I 
used interview techniques that have shown to yield accurate information from 
interviewees. For courtroom questioning, I emphasized open-ended narrative and facts 
(e.g. confronted corporate employees with scientific findings and legal accusations). For 
the non-directive questioning, I avoided questions typically encouraging vague 
speculations and pressed informants for specific answers (e.g. asked for details when an 
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informant termed a corporate response as manipulative). In line with the event tracking 
technique, I put informants back in the time frame of events and asked them to provide 
a step-by-step chronology of events (Eisenhardt, 1989a). This was particularly helpful 
for developing the narrative account as informants detailed the when, how and why of 
corporate responses to institutional demands. Finally, I triangulated interview data with 
informal meetings, extensive archival data and follow-up Emails to verify emerging 
constructs.  
I collected more than 250 documents (see 4.7.1. Appendix 1), including primarily 
internal ones (company’s press releases, sustainability and financial reports, leaked 
confidential company reports and communication minutes) and public documents 
(press releases, articles, and web pages). Notably, the documents are from different 
sources, so as to yield a mix of different perspectives and provide a running history of 
how corporate responses develop and change over time (Pondy, 1983). Particularly, 
given the confidential character of Shell’s primary data, internal documents provide 
credible and insightful information for the company’s voice as they give detailed insights 
into internal company structures, processes and motivations. The documents were 
searched several times. Initially I took field notes to construct the case story, which 
formed the background to the interview questions, and used following searches to 
validate interviews and antecedent material from secondary sources. In addition to the 
follow-ups via email I also contacted Shell’s sustainability reporting team for 
clarifications and additional information about the corporate sustainability report 
(11.09.2013 & 28.05.2015). Detailed field notes were written up within 24 hours, as 
recommended by Yin (1994). 
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Table 6 Overview of interviews (Study 3) 
Background 
(total no. of 
interviews) 
Organization Functional area Level Date 
Corporate 
(8) 
 
SPDC Energy Policy High Serial:  
 Interview 
06.07.2011 
 Email follow-ups 
SPDC Communication High Interview: 12.07.2011 
Royal Dutch Shell, Den 
Haag 
Communication High Interview: 19.11.2011 
Royal Dutch Shell, Den 
Haag 
Strategic relations High Interview: 19.11.2011 
Royal Dutch Shell, Den 
Haag 
CSR specialist Mid Serial:  
 Skype interviews: 
23.04.2012(*) & 
22.4.2015  
 E-Mail follow-ups 
Royal Dutch Shell, Den 
Haag 
External affairs High Skype interview: 
16.12.2014 
Royal Dutch Shell, 
London 
Tax and corporate 
structure 
High Skype interview: 21.04.2015 
Local civil 
society 
organization 
implementi
ng Shell’s 
GMoU (5) 
 
Initiative for Community 
Development 
 
Community 
development 
High Serial: 
 Interview: 13.07. 
2011 
 Skype interview:(*) 
19.08.2013 
 E-Mail follow-ups  
NIPRODEV Community 
relations 
Mid Serial: 
 Skype interview: 
29.09.2013 
 E-Mail follow-ups 
Environmental Health 
and Safety Network  
 
Environment, 
health and safety 
High Serial: 
 Interview: 
13.07.2011 
 Skype interview: 
04.11.2013 
Local civil 
society 
organization 
(11) 
 
Africa Center for 
Corporate Responsibility 
(ACCR) 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
High Skype interview: 13.08.2013 
Stakeholder Democracy 
Network/SDN 
Democracy and 
transparency 
High Serial: 
 Skype interview 
16.04.2015 
 E-Mail follow-ups 
 
The Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP) 
Community 
development and 
Human Rights 
High Skype interview:(*) 
07.07.2011 
Civil Society Legislative 
Advocacy Centre 
(CISLAC) 
Legislation, 
democracy and 
governance in 
issues related to 
corporate 
responsibility, 
Mid Serial: 
 Interviews:(*) 
05.07.2011 & 
11.07.2011 
 E-Mail follow-ups 
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health, education, 
fiscal responsibility 
Civil Society Legislative 
Advocacy Centre 
(CISLAC) 
Legislation, 
democracy and 
governance in 
issues related to 
corporate 
responsibility, 
health, education, 
fiscal responsibility 
High Serial: 
 Interview: 
07.07.2011 
 Skype interview(*): 
09.07.2013 
 E-Mail follow-ups 
African Network for 
Environment and 
Economic Justice 
Environmental and 
economic justice 
High Interview: 05.07.2011 
Niger Delta Budget 
Monitoring Group 
(NDBUMOG) 
Community 
development and 
accounting 
High Skype interview:(*) 
13.07.2011 
African Center for 
Leadership, Strategy and 
Development (LSD) 
Community 
development, social 
and economic 
justice 
High Interview: 11.07.2011 
Social Action Community 
development and 
social justice 
High Serial: 
 Interview: 
21.04.2010  
 Email follow-ups 
 
West-
African civil 
society 
organization 
(1) 
ECOWAS commission Extractive industry, 
community 
development, 
transparency 
High Interview (*): 04.05.2011 
Academic  
& Local civil 
society 
organization 
(5)  
West Africa Civil Society 
Forum 
Community 
development, 
peace and 
transparency 
High Interview: 07.07.2011 
Integrated Ecosystem 
Management Project - 
Nigeria-Niger Joint 
Commission for 
Cooperation 
Environment, social 
and economic 
justice 
High Interview: 12.07.2011 
ERA - Environmental 
Rights Action 
Environment and 
Human Rights 
High Interview: 12.07.2011 
Centre for Democracy 
and Development 
(Abuja, Lagos, 
Manchester) 
Community 
development, 
democracy and 
Human Rights 
High Serial: 
Interviews: 06.07.2011(*) & 
08.07.2011 
Academic 
& 
Internationa
l civil society 
organization 
(1) 
Revenue Watch Institute 
(RWI) 
Transparency, 
social and economic 
justice 
High Interview: 05.07.2011 
Internationa
l civil society 
organization 
(15) 
 
Heinrich Böll Foundation 
(HBS), Nigeria 
Environment, 
democracy, and 
education 
Mid Interview: 12.07.2011 
Publish What You Pay 
(PWYP), Nigeria 
Revenue 
transparency 
High Interview: 13.07.2011 
118 
Global Witness Revenue 
transparency 
Mid Serial: 
 Skype interviews:  
25.09.2014, 03.10.2014 & 
16.12.2014 
 Email follow-ups 
Global Witness  Revenue 
transparency 
High Serial: 
 Skype interview: 
30.10.2014 
 E-Mail follow-ups 
Earth Rights 
International 
Human Rights, 
environmental 
protection 
High Serial: 
 Skype interview: 
15.10.2014 
 E-Mail follow-ups 
PWYP UK Revenue 
transparency and 
accountability  
High Skype interview: 24.10.2014 
NRGI 
Natural Resource 
Governance Institute 
(formerly the Revenue 
Watch Institute – Natural 
Resource Charter) 
Revenue 
transparency and 
accountability 
High Serial: 
 Skype interview: 
4.12.2014 
 Email follow-ups 
ONE Campaign Poverty and Health High Serial: 
 Skype interview: 
31.10.2014 
 E-Mail follow-ups 
PWYP US Revenue 
transparency 
High Serial: 
 Skype interview: 
29.10.2014 
 E-Mail follow-ups 
PWYP International Revenue 
transparency 
High Skype Interview: 28.11.2014 
Open oil Governance and 
transparency in 
extractive industry, 
policy innovation, 
climate change, and 
energy security 
High Skype interview: 15.11.2014 
PWYP, UK Revenue 
transparency 
Mid Serial:  
 Skype interviews: 
04.12.2015 & 
05.12.2014 
 Email follow-ups 
Note: *interview not transcribed, coded based on notes 
4.4.3. Data analysis 
At the end of our period of data collection, I submitted all of the primary and secondary 
data to ATLAS TI, a software program useful for qualitative data. The analysis procedure 
consisted of 4 stages, a process that allowed going back and forth between the data and 
the emerging theoretical arguments (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
The purpose of these 4 stages was to uncover corporate responses to institutional 
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demands and for determining why the corporation used the chosen response strategy 
in line with other qualitative research designs (Leonardi et al., 2012; Mair et al., 2012). 
In the first stage, I started with a two-step within-case analysis to cope with the 
enormous volume of data (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Pettigrew, 1988). After the first round of 
data collection, I developed a narrative account (Langley, 1999) including interviews and 
archival data to establish a chronology of key events, actors and background conditions 
(see 4.7.2. Appendix 2) in order to understand Shell’s role and relationships in the 
particular operating environment. I triangulated these data, emphasizing themes that 
were confirmed by at least two informants and supported by at least two data collection 
methods (Jick, 1979). As I developed this narrative account, I occasionally discovered 
that there was detailed information about key events (such as actors or a precipitating 
event) that had not been made explicit during my data collection. In those cases, I either 
returned to the secondary source or to the primary source asking an open-ended 
question about the missing information, to ensure that I did not bias the respondent’s 
recall of the event. In a second step, I co-developed a teaching case (Hennchen & 
Lozano, 2012) as suggested by other qualitative analysis (Quinn, 1980). We reviewed 
the data to form independent views on the elements of the case and to create 
provisional categories and first-order codes (Van Maanen, 1979) (the first-order codes 
are visualized in Figure 2). We used ATLAS TI to keep track of the emerging categories. 
As Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested, these first categorical codes provided 
descriptive labels for the different corporate responses and the background conditions 
that determined them. These codes were largely built upon the words used by the 
informants and secondary and included for example ‘use policy of appeasement’ and 
‘address low-hanging fruits’. We then refined these initial categories via replication logic 
– the iteration between theory and data – to sharpen construct definitions, theoretical 
relationships between constructs, and underlying theoretical arguments (Eisenhardt, 
1989a). Following the procedures by Pratt el al. (2006), we either corrected a category 
or reconceptualized it when the revisited data did not fit it well (Pratt, Rockmann, & 
Kaufmann, 2006).  
After the first stage and examining the first-order codes, it became clear that Shell had 
engaged in a number of different responses to different events in the chronology. 
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Furthermore, I learned that some of these responses included global civil society 
organizations and addressed issue arenas that were global in scope such as revenue 
transparency. So, I initiated a second round of data collection in 2014 and 2015 with 
global civil society organizations and also followed up with local informants on this topic. 
I focused specifically on transparency issues, as it became evident during the initial 
phase of analysis that few additional ideas and issues were emerging when looking 
beyond this category (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In this second stage of analysis, I used a 
process of selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) to complement and refine the 
established first-order codes. A Master student was trained in the coding framework 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994) and we flagged each instance in which the company was 
evaluated against its social and environmental performance. We looked specifically at 
the actions Shell had taken and compared them with their public media statements to 
find out if and to what extent the company has implemented institutional demands for 
transparency into its processes and structures and refined the previously established 
first-order codes. For instance, after several iterations and discussions we ruled out full 
acquiescence as a likely response. 
The third stage involved axial coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) using the first two research 
questions as a lens (Eisenhardt, 1989a). The purpose of axial coding is to create more 
abstract codes by putting the fractured data back together (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This 
connecting is accomplished through the use of a coding paradigm, which focuses on 
three aspects of the phenomenon: the conditions or situations in which phenomenon 
occurs; the actions or interactions of the people in response to what is happening in the 
situations; and, the consequences or results of the action taken or inaction (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998). The axial coding was done by the author and reviewed by 2 colleagues 
familiar with the political CSR literature. The result was a classification into corporate 
responses to institutional demands – bargaining, internal buffering, ignoring and 
manipulating – and response determinants – efficiency, legitimacy, autonomy, legal 
coercion, voluntary diffusion, and dependency on institutional constituents. 
Finally, in the fourth stage I identified important dimensions from the sets of second-
order constructs. For instance, the some responses involved passive compliance with 
institutional demands (e.g. bargaining and internal buffering), whereas others rejected 
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or even tried to alter institutional demands or representative institutional constituents 
(e.g. ignoring and manipulating). Likewise, some categories pointed to response 
determinants in relation to conflicting goals (e.g. efficiency, legitimacy, and autonomy) 
whereas others seem more related to power relations (e.g. legal coercion, voluntary 
diffusion, and dependency). As the theoretical frame clarified, I added comparison with 
the extant literature to highlight similarities and differences, sharpen construct 
definitions, strengthen the internal validity of findings, and raise the generalizability of 
the emergent theory (Eisenhardt, 1989a). I engaged in repeated iterations among data, 
theory, and literature until I had a strong match between data and theory. For example, 
the phenomenon of the company’s increasing compliance with institutional demands 
resonated with recent extant institutional theory’s findings on means-end decoupling 
(Bromley & Powell, 2012; Wijen, 2014) and the new political role of MNCs (Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). In particular, I found the notion of symbolic 
implementation (Bromley & Powell, 2012) useful to consolidate the first two responses 
into one broad theoretical dimension. This dimension includes instances when 
normative demands are largely implemented into company’s processes and governance 
structures, but total conformity is precluded. Going beyond mainstream institutional 
theorizing, the conception of institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) and 
Oliver’s (1991) (Oliver, 1991) discussion of strategic responses to institutional processes 
were helpful to describe the instances of corporate self-interested agency and 
resistance to institutional pressure in more depth. For example, in line with Oliver (1991) 
I have identified ‘defying’ and ‘manipulating’ as active responses to political CSR 
demands. Then I collapsed these two responses into the final theoretical dimension 
‘active contestation’. This dimension refers to instances when normative demands are 
actively resisted and altered predominantly towards corporate ends as opposed to the 
rather passive reaction to institutional demands of the first category ‘symbolic 
implementation’. Figure 2 provides a schematic overview of this process and the 
resulting first-order codes, second-order constructs, and derived theoretical 
dimensions. The result of this inductive analytic process is the midrange theory that 
follows. In the next section, I present the findings around these two broad theoretical 
dimensions with regard to responses and response determinants respectively.  
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Figure 2 Analytic structure exemplified 
 
4.4. Findings  
The research questions asked about the company’s response institutional demands for 
political CSR, the conditions under which the different strategies are likely to be 
mobilized, and how this affects societal outcomes.  
Because it is not possible to offer a detailed account of all incidences that have been 
identified, I use representative data and vignettes in line with other qualitative studies 
(e.g. Jarzabkowski, Lê, & Feldman, 2012) to illustrate the company’s response (written 
in cursive), thus explaining what the company did. Here I focus on three public good 
issues that are relevant to the company’s core business: transparency7, community 
                                                 
7 For example, transparency advocates argue that disclosure of oil and gas company payments to host 
governments for natural resources is a public good as it reduces corruption and increases accountability 
in resource rich countries. 
Aggregate Theoretical Dimensions First-Order Codes Second-Order Constructs 
Symbolic implementation 
Active contestation 
Rationale 
Powerrelations 
Compromise 
Internal buffering 
Efficiency 
Defiance 
Manipulating 
Legitimacy 
Autonomy 
Legal coercion 
Dependency 
Voluntary diffusion 
Address low-hanging fruits  
Use policy of appeasement  
Negotiate terms of (non)compliance  
Conceal information  
Avoid external inspection  
Avoid meaningful participation & inclusive dialogue  
Failure of due diligence in asset integrity management 
Engage in corruption and bribery  
Complicit in human rights abuses  
Bully opposing NGOs or MPs 
Offer lucrative jobs to government officials  
Seek closed-door negotiations  
Build coalitions 
Seek legal action 
Play one off against the other  
Appeal to rationality of action  
Externalize negative externalities 
Risk management 
Dominance of economic bottom line 
Conflicting demands  
Controversial industry sector 
Public interest  
Opacity  
Control 
Unholy alliance  
Legal proceedings  
Imitation 
Uncertainty 
Technical expertise and resources  
Contract relationships 
Licence to operate 
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engagement and development, and peace and security. The data analysis has identified 
two main theoretical dimensions – symbolic implementation and active contestation. 
While the former involves a passive and rather responsive coupling with institutional 
demands to address public goods issues, the latter is characterized by active resistance 
and alteration of institutional demands towards corporate instrumental goals. Although 
the company’s responses are presented in a certain temporal order and within a certain 
representative response category, they should not be seen as having a linear 
relationship or being mutually exclusive. They are rather characterized by a temporal 
and categorical overlap showing that company employs various response strategies for 
one issue area at the same time. For example, the company responds to institutional 
demands for more transparency with internal buffering, defiance and manipulating 
strategies.  
The text in bold indicates the particular boundary conditions that were identified as 
contingency factors for each of the company’s response. This explains why the company 
responded in a certain way. The two main factors are 1) the company’s rationale such 
as efficiency, legitimacy, and autonomy (see Table 11 for an overview) and 2) power 
relations such as the company’s dependency on institutional constituents and 
constituency power to enforce their respective demands which are determined by legal 
coercion, voluntary diffusion of CSR standards, and dependency (see Table 12 for an 
overview). The latter illustrates the shifting opportunities and power dynamics of the 
company’s political engagement in multi-stakeholder initiatives and dialogue. This 
complex and dynamic process of corporate responses is extended over time, and 
somewhat indeterminate with predominantly negative consequences for public ends. 
The findings rule out full acquiescence to institutional demands in the context of these 
two boundary conditions. 
4.4.1. Symbolic implementation  
4.4.1.1. Compromise strategies 
Vignette 1. The joint investigation visit and the new GMoU in Nigeria illustrate 
institutional demands for collaborative and communicative MSI in the area of 
transparency, community development and peace  
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Shell started to implement self-regulating multi-stakeholder partnerships and dialogue 
with affected communities, civil society and governmental organizations. Political CSR 
principles for stakeholder engagement – dialogue and partnering - became a 
cornerstone of Shell’s strategy “of being a good neighbor” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2015c, p. 
4). The company seeks to engage with multiple stakeholders regarding the negative 
impacts of the company’s operations such as gas flaring and operational oils spills and 
on the other side the benefits it can bring to communities via social investment, 
employment and contractor opportunities, training and ecosystem restoration (Royal 
Dutch Shell, 2014b). With regard to the former, Mutiu Sunmonu (Chairman of Shell 
companies in Nigeria from 2010 to 2015) explains “We have also taken important steps 
forward to formalize the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil 
society representatives in the Joint Investigation Visits (JIVs) that follow oil spills. […] 
This has included building skills among people locally to respond to spills and help to 
remediate sites (Royal Dutch Shell, 2014b, p. 37). Shell works in partnership with the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and one of its member non-
governmental organizations, Nigerian Environmental Study Action Team and invited the 
National Coalition on Gas Flaring and Oil Spills in the Niger Delta (NACGOND) to join all 
JIVs (Royal Dutch Shell, 2014b). With regard to community development, SPDC 
introduced in 2006 the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) placing 
emphasis on more transparent and accountable processes, regular communication with 
grassroots organizations and greater sustainability and conflict prevention (Shell, 2012). 
Sunmonu explained that this community development program, “managed through a 
Community Interface Model, is providing social infrastructure, promoting public health 
and connecting communities to electricity for the first time” (ECCR, 2010, p. 59). Shell 
collaborates with both international and community based organizations. Whereas 
national non-profit organizations handle sensitization and communication of the GMoU 
model to the communities, develop the capacity of participating members on 
community development processes, and ensure quality delivery of GMoU projects and 
programs (Shell Nigeria, 2013), international organizations such as the Danish Institute 
for Human Rights (DIHR) help Shell to integrate human rights practices into the areas of 
labor practices, procurement, security and community impact (Royal Dutch Shell, 2014b, 
p. 22). In 2003, SPDC also forged a partnership with the government development 
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agency, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), within the broad framework 
of the company’s CSR strategy (Ite, 2007).  
While the company’s adherence to normative political CSR demands and its positive 
impact on public goods issues has been recognized by numerous awards (Channing 
Corporate Citizenship Award, 2011; Corporate Knights, 2010; World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development, 2015), scientific in-company analysis (Jacoba Schouten, 2010; 
Schouten & Remm, 2006), international civil society organizations such as the DIHR (in 
Schouten & Remm, 2006), and facilitating NGOs (Community relations, interview; 
Community development, interview), this in-depth study reveals that Shell attempts to 
compromise on its formal commitments (see Table 7 for an overview). The company 
seeks to achieve partial compliance with normative demands through actively 
bargaining with external constituents to exert some concessions for the scope and 
frequency of compliance, and the scope of the company’s involvement in development 
issues or employment provision. With regard to the former numerous interviews with 
affected community members and civil society organizations (Revenue Watch Institute, 
interview 05.07.2011; Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre, interview 11.07.2011; 
The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, interview 07.07.2011) and public 
documents about legal proceedings (Day, 2012, 2013; Leigh Day & Co., 2015; 
Milieudefensie, 2013a, 2013b; Standard, 2011) revealed that Shell negotiates the terms 
of (non)compliance with affected communities during the non-judicial (JIV) and the 
judicial compensation processes (e.g. Batan oil spill 2002, Bodo oil spills 2008/09, oil 
spills in Goi, Oruma and Ikot Ada Udo in 2008) instead of adhering to due processes and 
rules. For example, after the JIV visit had unanimously declared the two Bodo oil spills 
in 2008/09 as an operational failure of the pipelines, the company intended to placate 
the entire Bodo community with a compensation package of £4,000 (four thousand 
pounds GBP) (Leigh Day & Co., 2015). Only in 2011 when the villagers sought legal 
representation from lawyers in London, where Shell have their headquarters, Shell 
admitted liability for the spills. Yet, the company continued to dispute the amount of oil 
spilled and the extent of the damage caused until a settlement was reached in 2014 and 
agreed upon a compensation package of £55m (Leigh Day & Co., 2015).  
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The study also revealed that Shell tries to compromise on the company’s GMoU 
commitment by addressing ‘low-hanging fruits’ and adopting a policy of appeasement. 
With regard to the former, Shell intents to focus GMoU projects on issues that are 
instrumental to the company’s goals (e.g. road building) and achieve a win-win situation 
(Community relations officer, Skype interview: 29.09.2013) instead of getting involved 
in macro CSR issues that present the real challenges such as corruption, Dutch disease, 
equitable distribution of oil revenue to avoid upsetting the GON whose support is critical 
for their business interests (Dauda, 2012; Idemudia, 2010). In his academic research on 
Shell’s GMoU approach, one civil society member found that the company focused only 
on highly visible and salient projects that were consistent with social expectations while 
leaving the essential machinery of the company’s core business (with its negative 
environmental impact) intact (Environment and human rights, interview 12.07.2011). 
He claimed Shell’s engagement with stakeholders was perceived as rhetorical 
manipulation that did not transcend the company’s self-interested position, “they ride 
on the wings of CSR to gain access to oil” (ibid.).  
Shell has also adopted a policy of appeasement to compromise on its commitment to 
provide employment by pacifying powerful institutional constituents. Different sources 
revealed that the company offers controversial ‘surveillance’ contracts or one off 
payments to conflicting youths and anticipated ‘troublemakers’ for ‘protecting’ their 
pipelines and other facilities from attacks (Amunwa & Minio, 2011; Embassy Abuja, 
2003b; Pendleton et al., 2004; Platform, 2012a; Ten Kate, 2010; WAC Global Services, 
2003) and cleaning up oil spills (Stakeholder Democracy Network, interview 
16.04.2015), and an informal agreement to tap oil at prearranged times (Open Oil, skype 
interview 15.11.2014; Stakeholder Democracy Network, interview 16.04.2015) as a 
substitute for the employment and a fair share of oil revenues that communities 
demand. One civil society member from the Environmental Health and Safety Network 
described the generalized sentiment among affected communities and members of civil 
society organizations (Social Action, interview 21.04.2010; Environmental Health and 
Safety Network, skype interview 04.11.2013; Revenue Watch Institute, interview 
05.07.2011; PWYP Nigeria, interview 13.07.2011; (Stakeholder Democracy Network, 
interview 16.04.2015) as follows 
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“The new GMoU appears as a CSR approach but in actual sense, it is a community 
engagement model that seeks to keep the operating environment peaceful for 
effective exploration activities. Even though in theory the communities are 
meant to decide on projects and manage their funds as appropriate, in practice, 
there are still lots of controls and determinations from the GMoU office of SPDC” 
(Environmental Health and Safety Network, skype interview 04.11.2013).  
 
Table 7 Overview of compromise strategies 
First order code Representative quotes 
Negotiate terms 
of 
(non)compliance 
 In the aftermath of the spills Shell originally offered £4,000 (four thousand 
pounds GBP) compensation to the entire Bodo community before the villagers 
sought legal representation from lawyers in London, where Shell have their 
headquarters (Leigh Day & Co., 2015)  
 In 2011 Shell admitted liability for the spills but continued to dispute the 
amount of oil spilled and the extent of the damage caused. Leigh Day began 
legal action at the High Court in March 2012 after talks broke down over 
compensation and a cleanup package for the community (Leigh Day & Co., 2015) 
Address low-
hanging fruits 
 “The new GMoU appears as a CSR approach but in actual sense, it is a 
community engagement model that seeks to keep the operating environment 
peaceful for effective exploration activities. Even though in theory the 
communities are meant to decide on projects and manage their funds as 
appropriate, in practice, there are still lots of controls and determinations from 
the GMoU office of SPDC” (Environmental Health and Safety Network, skype 
interview 04.11.2013) 
 Shell focuses only on highly visible and salient projects that were consistent with 
social expectations while leaving the essential machinery of the company’s core 
business (with its negative environmental impact) intact (Environment and 
human rights, interview 12.07.2011) 
 Shell “rides on the wings of corporate social responsibility to get access to oil […] 
so corporate social responsibility becomes a leverage; an entrance; a means of 
entrance into the communities, to drill oil” (Environment and human rights, 
interview 12.07.2011) 
Use policy of 
appeasement 
 Oil companies make payments to local youth, as a substitute for the 
employment that communities demand’ (Pendleton et al., 2004) 
 Contracts are still seen as “gifts” to the community rather than as actual 
contracts. (WAC Global Services, 2003) 
 a Shell manager in Nigeria confirmed that the one-off contracts in Rumuekpe 
were: “just something to keep the youths busy during the Christmas period so 
that they will not be wanting to create jobs for themselves by vandalizing Shell 
or Elf facilities.” (Platform, 2012a) 
 Testimony and contracts seen by Platform implicate Shell in regularly assisting 
armed militants with lucrative payments. In one case from 2010, Shell is alleged 
to have transferred over $159,000 to a group credibly linked to militia violence 
(Amunwa & Minio, 2011) 
 “With regards to clean up, it is just like the other contracts … In the name of 
giving resources as part of local content to community leaders, community 
chiefs, and community contractors, Shell gives out these clean up contracts to 
individuals that have absolutely no clue, no expertise, no technical knowledge of 
what to do, and what to do well. And yet they give them these clean-up 
contracts in the name of local content” (Stakeholder Democracy Network, 
interview 16.04.2015) 
128 
 
4.4.1.2. Determinants of Shell’s compromise strategy 
The company’s response to implement MSI such as the JIV and GMoU was essentially 
triggered by the Ogoni crisis in the mid-90s (see for a detailed analysis Mirvis, 2000), 
which provoked a profound legitimacy crisis and affected by extension the company’s 
economic bottom line (efficiency) (Mirvis, 2000; Tangen et al., 2000). The company 
faced increasing criticism from all sides: consumer boycotts in Europe and North 
America, shareholder activism through formal resolutions in Europe, increasing levels of 
community disruption in the Niger Delta, falling share prices and hemorrhaging staff 
(Pendleton et al., 2004). In this context, Shell was willing to trade off autonomy in return 
for greater legitimacy or economic viability. Particularly, the company’s dependence on 
both the Federal Government and local communities for its license to operate is 
determinant. An interviewee from Publish What You Pay (PWYP), Nigeria explained  
“Shell started with their social responsibility agenda in the nineties because they 
were pressured to do so from civil society. […] I tell you, if you go to the place 
where we have the very first oil field in Nigeria, you will weep! You will weep! So 
it is actually the agitation of civil society that made them start thinking about 
giving back and showing that they are not only destroying everything. Only when 
they felt that the environment was no longer too conducive for them, they begun 
engaging with civil society organizations, NGOs, to go into communities and talk 
to communities” (PWYP Nigeria, interview 13.07.2011).  
Communities continue make direct claims to Shell to provide for their needs. A member 
from an NGO implementing Shell’s GMoU approach explains  
“for so many years the national government is not delivering socio-economic 
development. So the nearest representative is seen are the oil companies, who 
were doing some services, who were building facilities and infrastructure for 
their business, invest the most proximate government. That is why they were 
consolidating their social investment initiatives and started the GMoU” (Initiative 
for Community Development, interview 13.07. 2011).  
Interviews with a community relations officer (NIDPRODEV, Skype interview 29.09.2013) 
and a civil society member (Revenue Watch Institute, interview 05.07.2011) confirm 
that Shell cannot ignore powerful demands from local communities. For example, not 
giving in monetary demands signifies increasing attacks and facility closures directly 
affecting the company’s economic bottom line (efficiency) such as the sabotage incident 
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in August 2011 on the Bonny pipeline (Vidal, 2011). On the other hand Shell also high 
compliance pressure by the government to deliver public goods within its GMoU to 
maintain its legal license to operate. Boele and Fabig (2001) pointed for example to this 
core tension that has so far received limited attention. They stated that “what should 
companies like Shell do when faced with a situation where one of its key stakeholders 
(e.g. Nigerian government) expects it to act as its development agent” (Boele & Fabig, 
2001, p. 132). 
Furthermore, this unprecedented situation created high uncertainty within the 
company in which “everything – even the most hallowed of Shell's practices, beliefs, and 
traditions – is up for grabs” (Shell’s exploration and production director Robert Sprague 
in (Guyon, 1997, pp. 121-125). Since the company was “moving forward briskly into the 
fog” (ibid.) the concurrent rationalizing trends of the Global Environmental Justice 
Movement, the 1992 Rio Earth Summit putting CSR on the top of the public agenda, and 
the Human Rights Movement (voluntary diffusion) provided a powerful rationale for 
acquiescence (Jacoba Schouten, 2010; Mirvis, 2000). In the same line of thought, an 
interviewee from PWYP Nigeria informed  
“And you know, even globally, the corporate social responsibility started in the 
early nineties; people knowing that, "Okay, if I'm getting something out of this, 
then I should be responsible. […] If you are making so much money and you are 
bettering your own lot, why don't you better the lot of the people also where 
you are taking the resources from?” (PWYP Nigeria, interview 13.07.2011). 
While compliance was instrumental to Shell, by virtue of the increasing legitimacy 
benefits, normative demands to address public goods issues were also conflicting with 
internal organizational objectives related to efficiency. In line with the logic of capitalist 
production, Shell’s profitability largely depends on the capacity to externalize the cost 
of production and negative externalities (e.g. oil spill remediation and compensation) 
and is at cross-purposes with normative demands to provide public goods or large-scale 
employment (e.g. GMoU) (Idemudia, 2010, p. 839). Thus, in an attempt to achieve parity 
between conflicting interests, the company’s interest was served most effectively by 
obtaining an acceptable compromise on competing goals and expectations. As 
illustrated above, the company seeks to pass on the costs for its negative externalities 
to local communities by negotiating scope and timing of compliance and sanctions for 
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non-compliance (e.g. JIV), by minimizing the costs for its community development 
program (e.g. GMoU: Shell negotiates the scope of its development assistance with a 
focus on micro issues that are relevant to the company’s core business and limits the 
geographical scope to ‘host’ communities), and by appeasing conflicting community 
members with controversial surveillance and clean up contracts and informal 
agreements to steal oil at prearranged times. 
Shell is able to compromise on its normative promises since legal enforcement is low 
and all parties involved in the MSI – the government, affected communities, and civil 
society organizations – depend on Shell to monitor its own compliance (e.g. JIV) and 
provide socio-economic development (e.g. GMoU). In Nigeria “legislation is not 
enforced” (Initiative for Community Development, interview 13.07. 2011) and the oil 
industry remains largely self-regulated or even unregulated due to a lack of government 
capacity and will (Amnesty International, 2009b, p. 41). The weakness of the regulators 
relative to the oil companies has been documented by numerous actors, including the 
World Bank, UN agencies (UNDP, 2006; UNEP, 2011) and several reports (Friends of the 
Earth International & Amnesty International, 2013) (Ten Kate, 2010) and interviews with 
civil society organizations in 2011 and 2013. Amnesty International explains that when 
it comes to conducting site inspections (e.g. JIV), “government agencies are at the mercy 
of oil companies” (Amnesty International, 2009b, p. 46). The regulatory bodies, 
including the Nigerian National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), have 
no independent means to initiate oil spill investigations. They are usually dependent on 
the company both to take staff to the site and to supply much of the data about spills 
(ibid). The government also lacks will to enforce compliance and impose sanctions as 
95% of its export earnings and 80% of the government’s revenue depend oil the oil 
sector (Center for Global Development) particularly on Shell as the country’s largest oil 
and gas company (accounting for 40% of the country’s oil production and 53% of 
Nigeria’s hydrocarbon reserve base (Ite, 2007)). As a consequence “the whole economy 
is driven by oil exploration. That is the key thing. As a result of this Shell has a lot of 
political influence. Politics cannot move without money” (NIPRODEV, interview 
29.09.2013). Furthermore, the government faces a conflict of interest as the mayor 
shareholder in the joint venture with Shell. Thus, the failure to enforce laws and 
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regulations is related to the fact that the regulator is partner in, and major financial 
beneficiary of, the oil projects and would have to bear 55 percent of the additional cost 
associated with pollution regulation (Amnesty International, 2009b, p. 41; Bassey, 2008; 
Idemudia, 2010, p. 839).  
Civil society organizations and affected communities also depend on Shell for several 
reasons. During the JIV affected communities lack the technical knowledge to determine 
the cause and volume of oil spilt (Amnesty International, 2009b) and they have a limited 
organizational capacity and information to engage in on going monitoring and 
enforcement activities (Africa Center for Corporate Responsibility, skype interview 
13.08.2013). Furthermore, communities also depend on Shell for delivery of public 
goods since the government is unwilling and unable to do so due to the corrupt nature 
of the Federal Government. As a consequence, communities enter the Shell’s 
‘bargaining game’ since they know that this is the only way to get a share of the ‘national 
oil cake’ (Environmental Rights Action, interview 12.07.2011). A community relation 
officer explained in an interview  
“The Government is far away. Communities make direct claims to Shell to 
provide for their needs. Shell is the Government for them. […]  “Many 
communities also have a higher awareness of these issues and want Shell to 
operate so that they can survive. […] Communities cannot survive without Shell’s 
provision of socio-economic services, because the Government is not doing 
anything and thus they ask Shell to stay or come back” (NIDPRODEV, Skype 
interview 29.09.2013) 
In sum, Shell is able to compromise on its commitments since it retains autonomy in 
decision-making processes of MSI such as the JIV and GMoU in particular. In other 
words, “Shell calls the shots” (Environmental Rights Action, interview 12.07.2011). For 
example, two independent academic investigations on Shell’s GMoU confirmed that 
“Shell maintains an upper hand” (Environmental Rights Action, interview 12.07.2011) in 
which the company as the giver of funds for projects dictates the pace and terms of 
engagement (Dauda, 2012). For example, when signing the GMoU “there are three 
signatures to the accounts: community of twelve clusters that is strung together have 
one signature. The companies of Nigeria, in terms of the local government, have one 
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signature. Shell - just a single entity: one signature. This explains to you the power 
correlations in this sector” (Environmental Rights Action, interview 12.07.2011).  
4.4.1.3. Internal buffering strategies 
Vignette 2. Voluntary reporting to illustrate institutional demands for collaborative 
engagement in MSI in the area of transparency and accountability 
Shell started to acquiescence to political CSR demands for transparency and stakeholder 
engagement “to achieve practical and effective solutions, beneficial to all parties 
involved” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2015c, p. 4). For the company “collaboration is key: 
without it no true transparency is possible” (ibid). At the global level, Shell supports MSI 
such as EITI, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VP), the UN Global 
Compact (GC) and reports voluntarily to leading indices such as the KLD Research and 
Analytics’ Global Climate 100 Index, the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, the FTSE4Good, 
the Carbon Disclosure Project, and Goldman Sachs GS SUSTAIN ESG (environmental, 
social and governance) that assess companies’ economic, environmental and social 
performance on behalf of investors (Royal Dutch Shell, 2015f). At the local level in 
Nigeria, SPDC started in 2002 to publicly register oil spill data on its website (Ten Kate, 
2010) and introduced a zero tolerance policy on corruption and bribery in line with the 
VP and Principle 10 of the UN GC (Royal Dutch Shell, 2015f). 
However, interviews with affected community members, civil society organizations and 
leaked company documents reveals that the company attempts to preclude the 
necessity of total conformity by concealing information and avoiding external inspection 
and meaningful participation and inclusive dialogue (see table 8 for an overview). For 
example, Shell conceals information to affected communities and civil society at large 
about processes and issues that affect them such as “the scope, impact and duration of 
major projects” (WAC Global Services, 2003) and “about (a) to whom the company pays 
compensation; (b) the basis on which the amount is calculated; and (c) how individual 
or communal compensation is divided” (ibid). Also SPDC does not provide substantial 
information about impact of oil spills on the environment and human rights such as the 
Shell’s oil spill contingency plan, the Niger Delta Environmental Survey, the Asset 
Integrity Review, and all information regarding the two 2008 Bodo spills; the JIV reports, 
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any environmental impact assessments related to Shell oil infrastructure and operations 
in Bodo, Bureau Veritas’ verification of the oil spill investigation system in 2011, the 
Environmental Evaluation Report and any post impact assessments (Amnesty 
International, 2009a, 2009b, 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Rwabizambuga, 2007)(NIPRODEV, 
skype interview 29.09.2013; Environmental Health and Safety Network, skype interview 
04.11.2013). Shell is also blamed to conceal information during legal proceedings such 
as the 2008 court case in the Netherlands (Milieudefensie and Oruma, Goi and Ikot Ada 
Udo vs Shell), in the UK (Bodo oil spills), and the US (Ken Saro Wiwa). The NGO 
Mileudefensie bewails for example that “Shell has systematically delayed the case by 
placing procedural obstacles in the way and by withholding important documents” 
(Mileudefensie, 2012, p. 1). Shell is also criticized by its own consultants and civil society 
organizations for concealing information in its sustainability report. For example KPMG, 
the external auditing firm for Shell’s sustainable performance in Nigeria, is “not able to 
assess whether these data reflect the performance of SPDC” (Shell Nigeria, 2002, p. 50) 
due to the company’s “weakness in the control environment, and inaccuracies and 
incompleteness of data” (ibid.). Shell’s external review team also bewails the provision 
of inaccurate and incomplete data so that they are unable to assess performance and 
impact on community well-being (Royal Dutch Shell, 2013), the company’s greenhouse 
gas emissions (Royal Dutch Shell, 2010b, 2014b) and the past and future gas flare picture 
of SPDC (Royal Dutch Shell, 2014b). In the same line of thought Amnesty International 
notes that Shell does not “disclose any information on the environment and social 
impacts of the company’s operations” (Amnesty International, 2009b). 
Shell also buffers its core business by avoiding external inspection and thus effective 
monitoring or verification of baseline data. Since 2005 the company’s sustainability 
report is not subject to external assurance for the accuracy of the information provided. 
Instead, Shell hires an External Review Committee of seven (independent) experts to 
check that its Sustainability Report is ‘balanced, relevant and responsive to 
stakeholders’. One consequence is for example that “the exact proportion of oil spills in 
the Niger Delta caused by sabotage, as opposed to equipment failure or human error, 
cannot be determined” (Amnesty International, 2012b) and Shell is able to dramatically 
under-estimate the quantities involved. In the case of the Bodo oil spills for example 
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“the difference is staggering: even using the lower end of the Accufacts estimate, the 
volume of oil spilt at Bodo was more than 60 times the volume Shell has repeatedly 
claimed leaked,” said Audrey Gaughran, Director of Global Issues at Amnesty 
International (ibid). 
Shell also tries to preclude the necessity of total conformity with normative demands 
for more transparency and accountability by excluding affected community members 
and critical civil society organizations (avoiding meaningful participation and inclusive 
dialogue) during multi-stakeholder processes that determine the baseline data for the 
company’s sustainability reports. This allows the company to control and alter the 
information about organizational achievements and transgressions that are announced 
to the public. While Shell opened up to greater scrutiny by supporting observers from 
the national coalition on gas flaring and oil spills (NACGOND) during the JIV, one member 
NGO criticized that  
“Shell’s efforts to involve civil society members into the oil spill investigation visit 
is still very dodgy. […] We wanted to see more transparency for how the joint 
investigation visits are carried out. We wanted to observers in these JIV process. 
After Shell has received a lot of pressures, especially from embassies, to do that 
and then we discovered that one, they were very selective in the number and 
type of JIV that they brought to our attention. In our opinion, any JIV that was 
caused by equipment failure, we were not told and they only invited us to JIVs 
that were obviously caused by sabotage. That is number one. Number two, they 
definitely used our participation to clean their image. It was a propaganda thing. 
And furthermore, we discovered that, even when people disagree on the cause 
of the spill it is very difficult for the community folks to follow up. In one of our 
follow up processes that was the case. So we decided to stop the collaboration.” 
(Stakeholder Democracy Network, skype interview 16.04.2015) 
Likewise, affected community members are excluded from meaningful participation. For 
example during the JIV of the Bodo oil spill on November, 7th in 2008 Shell “did not 
inform the king, the chiefs or the youth” (Kpoobari Patta, the President of the Bodo 
Youth Council in (Amnesty International, 2011) and “after the investigation, the 
community say that Shell claimed the JIV report was company property and that the 
community was not entitled to a copy” (ibid). The company’s denial to provide due 
information to affected community members in other occasions was confirmed during 
several interviews (NIPRODEV, skype interview 29.09.2013; Civil Society Legislative 
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Advocacy Centre, interview 07.07.2011; Niger Delta Budget Monitoring Group, 
interview 13.07.2011; Integrated Ecosystem Management Project - Nigeria-Niger Joint 
Commission for Cooperation, interview 12.07.2011) and other civil society reports 
(Amnesty International, 2009b). In this sense, a community relation officer from one 
NGO that was implementing Shell’s GMoU approach bewailed in an interview 
“Communities don’t have right now enough access to relevant information and facts. So 
it is not transparent enough” (NIPRODEV, skype interview 29.09.2013). Shell also shields 
its multi-stakeholder community development initiative (GMoU) from public scrutiny by 
excluding opposing NGOs from meaningful participation and hiring contractor NGOs. 
One interviewee informed for example “The GMoU started in 2003, 2004, and 2005. It 
was never test-run. It was done in secrecy; NGOs opposing Shell were never invited and 
never part of this” (Environmental Rights Action, interview 12.07.2011). Also, Shell hires 
NGOs that “run like a consultancy” (Initiative for Community Development, interview 
13.07. 2011) and are only accountable to Shell. One interviewee informed,  
“We call these ‘Shell NGOs’. They just become contractors … they are beholden 
to Shell and not the communities. They want the Shell money. They will do the 
bidding for Shell, but definitely not for the community” (Stakeholder Democracy 
Network, skype interview 16.04.2015).  
Civil society organizations and academics bewail that Shell’s internal buffering strategy 
allows the company to control and even alter information about organizational 
achievements and transgressions that are announced to the public in its sustainability 
reports (e.g. claims about sabotage) (Amnesty International, 2009b, 2012b; Frynas, 
2005; Pendleton et al., 2004; Ten Kate, 2010). 
Table 8 Overview of internal buffering strategies 
First order 
code 
Representative quotes 
Conceal 
information 
 SPDC does not “provide substantial information about the scope, impact and 
duration of major projects” and  “about (a) to whom the company pays 
compensation; (b) the basis on which the amount is calculated; and (c) how 
individual or communal compensation is divided” (WAC Global Services, 2003) 
 “Shell has systematically delayed the case by placing procedural obstacles in the 
way and by withholding important documents”(Mileudefensie, 2012, p. 1) 
 annual reports don’t disclose any information on the environment and social 
impacts of the company’s operations (Amnesty International, 2009b) 
Avoid 
external 
inspection 
 Since 2005 the company’s sustainability report is not subject to external assurance 
for the accuracy of the information provided. Instead, Shell hires an External 
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Review Committee of seven (independent) experts to check that its Sustainability 
Report is ‘balanced, relevant and responsive to stakeholders’ 
Avoid 
meaningful 
participation 
& inclusive 
dialogue 
 “Shell’s efforts to involve civil society members into the oil spill investigation visit is 
still very dodgy. […] In our opinion, any JIV that was caused by equipment failure, 
we were not told and they only invited us to JIVs that were obviously caused by 
sabotage. […] So we decided to stop the collaboration.” (Stakeholder Democracy 
Network, skype interview 16.04.2015) 
  “The GMoU started in 2003, 2004, and 2005. It was never test-run. It was done in 
secrecy; NGOs opposing Shell were never invited and never part of this” 
(Environmental Rights Action, interview 12.07.2011) 
 “We call these ‘Shell NGOs’. They just become contractors … they are beholden to 
Shell and not the communities. They want the Shell money. They will do the bidding 
for Shell, but definitely not for the community” (Stakeholder Democracy Network, 
skype interview 16.04.2015) 
 
4.4.1.4. Determinants of Shell’s internal buffering strategy 
The company’s acquiescence to demands for transparency and stakeholder engagement 
was essentially triggered by potent movements toward transparency, monitoring and 
accountability (Frynas, 2003, 2005)(Global Witness, skype interview 25.09.2014; Global 
Witness, skype interview 30.10.2014; Earth Rights International, skype interview 
15.10.2014; PWYP International, skype interview 15.11.2014). These pressures were 
particularly strong in the extractive industry as it has long been at the epicenter of the 
resource curse8. A whole new institutional infrastructure emerged in this field resulting 
in self-regulating MSI such as the GRI and EITI and related efforts with the same 
emphasis such as the VP and the UN GC (voluntary diffusion). As a consequence, Shell 
strategically chose to participate in these MSI in anticipation of self-serving benefits such 
as increasing legitimacy and social support (Global Witness, skype interview 25.09.2014; 
Global Witness, skype interview 30.10.2014; Earth Rights International, skype interview 
15.10.2014; PWYP International, skype interview 15.11.2014).  
However, the company also tries to buffer its core business by concealing information 
and avoiding external inspection and meaningful participation and inclusive dialogue as 
increasing institutional demands for more transparency and public scrutiny are in 
conflict with the company’s legitimacy and by extension efficiency. Belonging to the so-
called controversial industry sector, Shell’s core business operations present inherent 
                                                 
8 The resource curse, also known as the paradox of plenty, refers to the paradox that countries rich in 
natural resources suffer from extreme poverty, economic neglect and corruption (Auty, 1993) 
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social and environmental risks and are blamed for distorting national economies and 
governance (Frynas, 2005). Thus, maintaining legitimacy becomes more challenging 
when Shell must report less attractive details or respond to criticism. All interviewees 
agreed that internal buffering allows avoiding judgements on negative impact of core 
business and/or the impact of social investment on community well-being. With regard 
to the former, Friends of the Earth Netherlands  (Milieudefensie) said for example “the 
company’s behavior shows that it is concealing information to avoid having to clean up 
its pollution and begin compensating the local communities” (Real World Radio). With 
regard to the latter, Shell’s own Corporate External Relations manager, Mr. Precious 
Omuku, revealed that Shell’s contribution towards social services and infrastructure in 
the region’s development could be likened to drops in the Ocean when juxtaposed with 
what the company makes out of the region in term of profits (Ojakorotu, 2008, p. 110). 
Furthermore, Shell is in a powerful position to buffer its core business operations by 
taking advantage of the lack of legal coercion and the resulting lack of an external 
control environment for data accuracy. A community relation officer from one NGO that 
was implementing Shell’s GMoU approach explained in an interview in 2013 that Shell 
increases its bargaining power and autonomy in decision making by retaining control 
over public scrutiny. He explains, “communities don’t have right now enough access to 
relevant information and facts. So it is not transparent enough. Information is power. 
Shell could create more power” (NIPRODEV, skype interview 29.09.2013). 
4.4.1.5. Effect on societal outcomes 
While the company’s symbolic implementation have provided the company with 
legitimacy and efficiency benefits, the company’s compromise and internal buffering 
strategies had predominantly negative societal outcomes. Interviewees bewailed that 
Shell’s compromise strategies – negotiate terms of (non)compliance, address low-
hanging fruits,  and use policy of appeasement – had a limited efficacy in addressing the 
negative impact of core operations and in bringing benefits and meaningful 
development to communities, but created additional negative externalities such as 
conflict over contracts and proper oil spill remediation. For example, Audrey Gaughran 
of Amnesty International explains that the JIV “is clearly a system open to abuse and we 
have evidence that it has been abused” (Friends of the Earth International & Amnesty 
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International, 2013). The lack of independent oversight and enforcement, 
representative inclusion, procedural fairness and transparency means that “it is 
effectively the company that investigates itself” (Friends of the Earth International & 
Amnesty International, 2013). Shell as the potentially liable party has substantial control 
over the process that determines not only the parameters for the company’s liability 
(e.g. the cause of the spill, the volume spilled, the area affected and the scale and extent 
of the resulting impact), but also access to remedy for affected communities (Amnesty 
International, 2012b, p. 7). According to own interviews with civil society organizations 
and scientific investigations there are strong indications that Shell has used false claims 
of sabotage to avoid compensation payments during both the non-judicial and juridical 
compensation processes (Amnesty International, 2009b, 2011, 2012b; Frynas, 2005; Ten 
Kate, 2010) (Environmental Rights Action, interview 12.07.2011; Niger Delta Budget 
Monitoring Group, interview 13.07.2011; Africa Center for Corporate Responsibility, 
skype interview 13.08.2013). As a consequence, Shell is able to pass on its operating 
costs to local communities which continue to suffer the negative impact of oil operations 
(Idemudia, 2010, p. 839). With regard to Shell’s new community development initiative 
(GMoU), there is a generalized sentiment among oil-affected communities and civil 
society organizations that Shell’s MSI is an unholy alliance of players – Shell, contract 
partners (e.g. GMoU-implementing NGOs, clean up companies) and the Nigerian state 
– against the oil-bearing communities rather than a partnership for meaningful 
community development (Stakeholder Democracy Network, skype interview 
16.04.2015; African Network for Environment and Economic Justice, interview 
05.07.2011)(Dauda, 2012; Idemudia, 2010, p. 839). In this sense, interviewees claim that 
Shell’s GMoU “appears as a CSR approach but in actual sense it is a community 
engagement model that seeks to keep the operating environment peaceful for effective 
exploration activities” (Environmental Health and Safety Network, skype interview 
04.11.2013). Here “communities are often seen and treated as a ‘risk’ to be pacified, 
rather than as stakeholders with critical concerns about the impact of oil operations” 
(Africa Center for Corporate Responsibility, skype interview 13.08.2013). This risk-based 
approach is confirmed by other independent studies (Charles, 2014; Jacoba Schouten, 
2010; WAC Global Services, 2003). An interviewee from PWYP Nigeria warns about the 
negative societal consequences of this corporate ‘disengagement’  
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“That's disengagement; they don’t engage the communities properly in the first 
place! […] So for me, whatever do they think they are doing, without properly 
carrying the people along? It will continue to just go round in a vicious circle with 
no improvement for the affected communities” (Faith, PWYP) 
Shell’s compromise strategies also create additional negative externalities such as 
conflict over contracts and no proper oil spill remediation. For example, investigations 
by Shell security consultants WAC Global (2003), Amnesty International (2005), the 
Financial Times (2006), Platform (2011, 2012), confidential communication of the US 
ambassador in Nigeria (2003) and interviews with civil society organizations (Social 
Action, interview 21.04.2010; Centre for Democracy and Development, interview 
08.07.2011) agree that Shell has exacerbated conflict by awarding contracts to youth 
groups and paramilitaries responsible for or linked to human rights abuses in the Niger 
Delta. Furthermore,  
“It is a known fact that a lot of Shell staff have their own companies: clean-up 
companies, surveillance companies, (and) Shell gives out these clean up contracts to 
individuals that have absolutely no clue, no expertise, no technical knowledge of what 
to do, and what to do well. And yet they give them these clean-up contracts. They should 
give these contracts to organizations with a recognized expertise and furthermore, the 
verification and monitoring should also be handled by independent organizations. We 
found situations whereby cleaned-up sites that have passed certification by Nigerian 
regulating agencies like NOSDRA were still found to be heavily polluted” (Stakeholder 
Democracy Network, skype interview 16.04.2015). 
Shell’s internal buffering strategies – conceal information, avoid external inspection, 
avoid meaningful participation and inclusive dialogue – were also criticized for limiting 
the effectiveness for evaluating the impact of Shell’s political CSR initiatives (benefits 
and harm) on the public good. Thus, there is a generalized perception among the 
interviewees that Shell’s sustainability reporting serves rather corporate goals of 
increasing legitimacy rather than serving public ends such as helping to reduce 
corruption and increase accountability (Environmental Health and Safety Network, 
interview 13.07.2011; Africa Center for Corporate Responsibility, skype interview 
13.08.2013; Stakeholder Democracy Network, skype interview 16.04.2015; Civil Society 
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Legislative Advocacy Centre, interview 07.07.2011). What is more, this lack of 
transparency has caused much distrust (Environmental Health and Safety Network, 
skype interview 04.11.2013) and even violent conflict (Charles, 2014).  
4.4.2. Active contestation 
4.4.2.1. Defiance 
Vignette 3. Local and international regulatory requirements to illustrate institutional 
demands for addressing the company’s negative impact on communities’ health, 
security, and economic development 
Shell publicly praises its asset integrity management to achieve “zero safety incidents 
(by securing) excellence in process safety management, asset design, operations and 
maintenance and inspection” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2014a) and publicly advocates the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPs) and the United Nations Global 
Compact’s anti-bribery and corruption principle. In line with the principles, Shell has 
formalized a company-wide zero tolerance policy on corruption and bribery (Royal 
Dutch Shell, 2014b, p. 10) and includes de VPs into private and public security contracts 
(Royal Dutch Shell, 2015d). However, this study reveals failures of due diligence in the 
company’s asset integrity management, and allegations of corruption and bribery and 
complicity in human rights abuses thus dismissing local regulatory requirements, Shell’s 
own principles, and international standards (defiance) (see Table 9 for an overview). 
Shell had to accept legal liability in two court proceedings in the UK (2011) and the 
Netherlands (2013) for failures of due diligence in the company’s asset integrity 
management. For example, in the case of the two Bodo oil spills in the UK proceeding, 
Shell failed to comply with Nigerian regulations and appears to have disregarded 
repeated requests by NOSDRA to take action to avoid these operational oil spills. In the 
second case, the district court of The Hague found Shell’s subsidiary Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) guilty of neglecting its duty of care in that the 
company failed to take reasonable steps to stop a foreseeable sabotage from occurring 
on their crude oil wellhead (Standard, 2013). Also own interviews and reports by civil 
society organizations (Amnesty International, 2009b; 2011, p. 42), independent 
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scientific investigations by academics (Steiner, 2010), international organizations (UNEP, 
2011), and Shell’s own consultants (WAC Global Services, 2003) criticized the company’s 
unequivocal rejection of voluntary and mandatory regulations with regard to oil spill 
prevention and timely and proper cleaning up. For example, Professor Steiner concluded 
in a scientific report in 2010 that Shell Nigeria continues to operate well below 
internationally recognized standards to prevent and control pipeline oil spills. The 
company has not employed the best available technology and practices that it uses 
elsewhere in the world – a double standard (Steiner, 2010, p. 12). In the same line of 
thought the Ogoni fishing and farming communities accused Shell of applying different 
standards to clean-ups in Nigeria compared with the rest of the world. They claim for 
example that Trans-Niger Pipeline has suffered an incidence of operational oil spills 
between 2006 and 2010 at a rate 133 times greater than the European average (Leigh 
Day & Co., 2015). Also an US diplomatic cable from 2008, recently published by 
WikiLeaks, stated that a contractor with many years’ experience of laying pipelines in 
the Niger Delta told the US consulate in Nigeria that “73 per cent of all pipelines are 
more than a decade overdue for replacement […] making it more vulnerable to 
intentional and unintentional damage from natural and human causes, spills occur daily, 
and it often takes man hours to find the location of the spill and deploy the necessary 
clean-up equipment” (US Embassy Lagos, 2008). The confidential telegram concludes 
that this “assessment of the current state of pipelines has been confirmed by other of 
our interlocutors” (ibid). With regard to Shell’s integrity asset management, Amnesty 
International and CEHRD reveal that the company has still not accomplished the 
replacement and upgrading all ageing facilities as established by law and the results of 
the full Asset Integrity Review (which examined the condition of Shell’s pipelines) have 
never been made public (Amnesty International, 2011, p. 35; 2012b). Shell also fails to 
employ adequate methodologies and practices for detecting oil leaks on time (Heinrich 
Böll Foundation Nigeria, interview 12.07.2011)(Leigh Day & Co., 2015), correctly 
estimating volume of oil spilt (Amnesty International, 2012b), and cleaning-up (Steiner, 
2010, p. 12; UNEP, 2011; WAC Global Services, 2003)(Stakeholder Democracy Network, 
interview 16.04.2015) (PWYP Nigeria, interview 13.07.2011) were ineffective. For 
example, the UNEP report found that RENA, the primary method of oil remediation used 
by Shell on affected sites “failed to achieve either clean-up or legislative compliance […]. 
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Ten out of 15 investigated sites which SPDC records show as having completed 
remediation, still have pollution exceeding the SPDC (and government) remediation 
closure values” (UNEP, 2011). Furthermore, the company has knowingly allowed 
contractors using unqualified staff to clean up oil spills (Amnesty International, 2009b) 
(Stakeholder Democracy Network, interview 16.04.2015), or failed to manage poor 
performance by community contractors (WAC Global Services, 2003)(Stakeholder 
Democracy Network, interview 16.04.2015). One interviewee from the Stakeholder 
Democracy Network explained “Shell gives out these clean up contracts to individuals 
that have absolutely no clue, no expertise, no technical knowledge of what to do, and 
what to do well. […] We found situations whereby cleaned-up sites that have passed 
certification by Nigerian regulating agencies like NOSDRA were still found to be heavily 
polluted” (Stakeholder Democracy Network, interview 16.04.2015). An internal 
company report confirms that these contractors are “not subject to same efficiency, 
transparency and accountability standards (which) is especially problematic as it sends 
a message of impunity to contractors leading to an entrenchment of poor practice and 
further problems for both the communities and the company” (WAC Global Services, 
2003). 
While Shell officially declares to “not tolerate the direct or indirect offer, payment, 
solicitation or acceptance of bribes in any form” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2014b, p. 10), the 
company faces allegations and legal persecution for corruption and bribery of the former 
Nigerian minister of oil and Minister of State for the Environment, Nigerian customs 
officials, and parliament members among others. For instance, with regard to Shell’s 
illegal licensing payment to Nigeria’s former oil minister Etete in 2011, the Nigerian 
House of Representatives voted in February 2014 on the recommendation of an 
investigation into the deal, for the deal’s cancellation and criticized the deal for being 
contrary to the laws of Nigeria (House of Representatives' votes and proceedings, 2014; 
Report by the ad-hoc committee on the transaction involving the federal government 
and Shell/Agip companies and Malabu Oil and Gas Limited in respect of the sale of oil 
bloc OPL 245, 2014). In July 2013, a British High Court also ruled that Etete was indeed 
a beneficial owner of Malabu Oil & Gas and thus the recipient of Shell’s illegal licensing 
payment (Lady Justice Gloster, 2013).  
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Shell is also alleged to ignore the VP’s and The United Nations Framework for Business 
and Human Rights and be complicit in human rights abuses due to the company’s 
ongoing support and reliance on military support. Civil society reports, own interviews 
with civil society organizations and leaked US embassy telegrams support allegations 
that Shell continuous to facilitate military and policy repression after agreeing to pay 
US$15.5 million to settle the Ken-Sawo Wiva lawsuit for alleged human rights abuses in 
2009. For instance, leaked US embassy cables dating from 2003 to 2006 reveal that Shell 
continued to pay substantial amounts of money to the Nigerian army, navy and Mobile 
Police Force on a regular basis and provided transportation and accommodation for 
soldiers notorious for their record of human rights abuses (Consul General Brian L. 
Browne, 2006; Embassy Abuja, 2003a, 2003b; US Consulate Lagos, 2003). Investigations 
by the NGO Platform also confirmed “Shell, the largest operator in the region, continues 
to depend on military protection much like it did in the 1990s” (Platform, 2012a). The 
NGO alleged that “as recently as 29 November 2011, several demonstrators were 
reportedly shot and killed at a Shell facility in Uzere, Delta State, when government 
forces intervened at a protest against the company” (Platform, 2012a, p. 1). Also an 
activist from social action publicly denounced Shell’s complicity in his unlawful 
detention and torment  
"I was captured right in this pit last Saturday by a team of Nigerian soldiers paid 
by tax payers money. Regained my freedom after 4 long hours detention in a 
SHELL facility in Rumuekpe, Rivers state and answering questions on phone from 
a superior military officer I didnot see. arrests, beatens, unlawful 
detentions......haba! should I still continue in the struggle?" (Akpobari, 2010) 
 
Table 9 Overview of defiance strategies 
First order code Representative quotes 
Failure of due 
diligence in asset 
integrity 
management 
 
 
 
 Shell’s failure to comply with Nigerian regulations regarding oil spills represents 
the true tragedy of the Bodo disaster (Amnesty International, 2011, p. 42) 
 In August 2011 a scientific assessment of the United Nations Environment 
Program criticized the company for its continuing failure to operate fully in 
accordance with local regulatory requirements, SPDC’s own procedures and 
international best practices (UNEP, 2011) 
 Professor Steiner concluded in a scientific report in 2010 that Shell Nigeria 
continues to operate well below internationally recognized standards to 
prevent and control pipeline oil spills. It has not employed the best available 
technology and practices that it uses elsewhere in the world – a double 
standard (Steiner, 2010) 
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 The Ogoni fishing and farming communities had accused Shell of applying 
different standards to clean-ups in Nigeria compared with the rest of the 
world. The Trans-Niger Pipeline has suffered an incidence of operational oil 
spills between 2006 and 2010 at a rate 133 times greater than the European 
average (Leigh Day & Co., 2015) 
 In 2006, Shell’s former Head of environmental studies in Nigeria, Bopp van 
Dessel, claimed on the TV program World in Action that Shell was “not meeting 
their own standards; they were not meeting international standards. Any Shell 
site that I saw was polluted. Any terminal that I saw was polluted. It was clear 
to me that Shell was devastating the area” (Amnesty International, 2009b, p. 
59).  
 US diplomatic cable from 2008, recently published by WikiLeaks, stated that a 
contractor with many years’ experience of laying pipelines in the Niger Delta 
told the US consulate in Nigeria that  “73 per cent of all pipelines are more 
than a decade overdue for replacement […] making it more vulnerable to 
intentional and unintentional damage from natural and human causes, spills 
occur daily, and it often takes man hours to find the location of the spill and 
deploy the necessary clean-up equipment” (US Embassy Lagos, 2008) 
 “In the mid-1990s, Shell established a program to replace and upgrade ageing 
facilities and pipelines, and improve the way the company operated and 
maintained facilities, and how it responded to spills. However, only a limited 
amount of work was done to fulfil this objective. Many pipelines were not in 
fact replaced. Instead, between 2003 and 2005, SPDC switched to a pipeline 
Integrity management system. This involves checking the condition of pipes 
and replacing them on the basis of their condition, rather than age. The results 
of the full Asset Integrity Review (which examined the condition of Shell’s 
pipelines) have never been made public” (Amnesty International, 2011, p. 35) 
 An internal company report confirms that clean-up contractors are “not 
subject to same efficiency, transparency and accountability standards (which) 
is especially problematic as it sends a message of impunity to contractors 
leading to an entrenchment of poor practice and further problems for both the 
communities and the company” (WAC Global Services, 2003) 
Engage in 
corruption and 
bribery  
 
 With regard to Shell’s illegal licensing payment to Nigeria’s former oil minister 
Etete in 2011, the Nigerian House of Representatives voted in February 2014 
on the recommendation of an investigation into the deal, for the deal’s 
cancellation and criticized the deal for being contrary to the laws of Nigeria 
(House of Representatives' votes and proceedings, 2014; Report by the ad-hoc 
committee on the transaction involving the federal government and Shell/Agip 
companies and Malabu Oil and Gas Limited in respect of the sale of oil bloc OPL 
245, 2014). In July 2013, a British High Court also ruled that Etete was indeed a 
beneficial owner of Malabu Oil & Gas and thus the recipient of Shell’s licensing 
payment (Lady Justice Gloster, 2013) 
 Late 2010, Shell paid a total of USD 58 million to U.S. and Nigerian authorities 
to head off the threat of legal action for corruption. SNEPCO, a 100% Nigerian 
subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell, had paid approximately USD 2 million in the 
period 2004-2006 to its subcontractors with the knowledge that some or all of 
the money would be paid as bribes to Nigerian customs officials to import 
materials and equipment into Nigeria in relation to the offshore Bonga project. 
SNEPCO and the U.S. based Shell International Exploration and Production Inc. 
employees were aware that as a result of the payment of the bribes, official 
Nigerian duties, taxes, and penalties were not paid when the items were 
imported. In November 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced that Shell had agreed to 
pay USD 48 million to settle investigations on violation of the U.S. Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The Deferred Prosecution Agreement Shell signed 
with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) still requires Shell to report to the 
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DOJ, promptly, any credible evidence of questionable or corrupt payments. 
Separately, Shell also agreed to pay USD 10 million to the Nigerian authorities 
(Ten Kate, 2010) 
Complicit in human 
rights abuses 
 “Shell, the largest operator in the region, continues to depend on military 
protection much like it did in the 1990s” (Platform, 2012a) 
 Shell's security manager confirmed that Shell is providing logistical assistance 
to the military deployed to the area in the form of food, staging areas and the 
use of non-military boats for troop and equipment movement” (US Consulate 
Lagos, 2003) 
 “Shell contacts informed us the company plans on buying several millions of 
dollar worth of vessels and equipment to provide to the GON military in order 
to enhance facility security” (Consul General Brian L. Browne, 2006) 
 "I was captured right in this pit last Saturday by a team of Nigerian soldiers paid 
by tax payers money. Regained my freedom after 4 long hours detention in a 
SHELL facility in Rumuekpe, Rivers state and answering questions on phone 
from a superior military officer I didnot see. arrests, beatens, unlawful 
detentions......haba! should I still continue in the struggle?" (Akpobari, 2010) 
 “As recently as 29 November 2011, several demonstrators were reportedly 
shot and killed at a Shell facility in Uzere, Delta State, when government forces 
intervened at a protest against the company” (Platform, 2012a, p. 1) 
 “Shell’s security spending in Nigeria is a colossal failure of due diligence. 
Instead of spending vast sums on harmful security practices, Shell should 
address the root causes of the conflict by cleaning up decades of oil spills, 
ending gas flaring, adequately compensating the victims of human rights 
abuses and insisting that government forces and other perpetrators are held 
accountable for violations.” (Platform, 2012a) 
 
4.4.2.2. Determinants  
Institutional demands for asset integrity and heightened duty to avoid human rights 
violations in conflict-zones like the Delta are in conflict with the unsustainable nature of 
the company’s core business (see Frynas, 2005) and the capitalist logic of profitability 
(efficiency) (Environmental Rights Action, interview 12.07.2011)(Idemudia, 2010, p. 
839). In line with other interviewees, a member from ERA states “the case is very clear. 
Shell is interested in profit. They are not interested in putting an end to environmental 
pollution” (Environmental Rights Action, interview 12.07.2011). The anticipated 
economic loss from implementing a proper asset integrity management is higher than 
paying sanctions for non-compliance. For example, Amnesty International informs that 
financial penalties are too low to present meaningful deterrent. For example, the fine 
for failing to report an oil spill to NOSDRA is 500,00 Naira (approx. US$3,500) (see 
National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency Establishment Act 2006) and the fine 
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for failure to clean up the impacted site incurs a fine of one million Naira (approx. 
US$7,000) (Amnesty International, 2009b). Also, the anticipated economic gain from 
continuing to support military action is high. A leaked embassy conversation reveals that 
Shell consciously takes the risk of increasing conflict and becoming complicit in human 
rights abuses in order to end the profit loss:  
“The multiple missions of military personnel assigned to Shell sites could well 
result in Shell being tied to a major human rights incident if the military attempts 
to assert its control over communities dominated by militants, ironically Ijaws.  
The latest Shell strategy seems surprising in light of the relative improvement in 
Shell's corporate and social responsibility profile over recent years. Shell officials 
on the ground seem aware and accepting of the balance between gains and risks, 
especially the risk of renewed fighting" (Embassy Abuja, 2003b). 
Furthermore, the temptation to ignore institutional values and norms is high for Shell 
since the potential for external enforcement by both legal coercion and voluntary 
standards is low. While legal coercion by home states (e.g. UK, the Netherlands) is 
posing increasing compliance pressure, successful court cases are rather the exception 
than the rule (Natural Resource Governance Institute, skype interview 04.12.2014). 
Also, international voluntary standards have no enforcement mechanism and the 
Nigerian government has no incentive to enforce environmental laws due to the 
collusion of business interests (Bassey, 2008; Idemudia, 2010, p. 839). Shell and the 
Nigerian state are united by a common purpose, that is, “capitalist expansionism and 
the appropriation of surplus value” (Omotola, 2006, p. 12 in Agbiboa, 2012).  
Also the government dependence on oil revenues (Graf, 1988, p. 219; Ite, 2007) gives 
Shell enormous leverage in the regulatory system. “The whole economy is driven by oil 
exploration. That is the key thing. As a result of this Shell has a lot of political influence. 
Politics cannot move without money” (NIPRODEV, skype interview 29.09.2013). Other 
interviewees echo this sentiment: “the real decision-makers, those who are really 
operating, are the Shell Corporation. So that is clear for everyone to understand. They 
call the shots” (Environmental Rights Action, interview 12.07.2011). At the end, “it's all 
about environmental policy. You come up with good incentives, good contra-measures; 
[…] But that is not happening, which is very unfortunate. That is not happening in 
Nigeria. There are a lot of power relations; there is a lot of power play in the business. 
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So I think that is the problem” (Heinrich Böll Foundation Nigeria, interview 12.07.2011). 
The lack of the Nigerian government’s will and capacity also serves as a powerful excuse 
for non-compliance. Shell justifies his strategic choice of defying environmental laws by 
demonstrating organizational dependency on the government. As one Shell consultant 
explains “Shell cannot do it alone because it's a partnership. […] Everything they are 
going to change, it will cost them money. Both partners will have to bring money. If you 
have a partnership where you have a joint venture, if you are going to invest, both 
parties have to agree to invest. If you agree to have commensurate amount of money 
you are going to invest” (Initiative for Community Development, interview 13.07.2011). 
For example when confronted with criticism due to significant spills occurring after the 
asset integrity review and the initiation of the Pipeline Integrity Management system, 
SPDC’s Country Chair Basis Omiyi blamed the underfunding by partners and the lack of 
security for the backlog of asset integrity work to reduce spills (Royal Dutch Shell, 2006; 
2015e, p. 37). 
4.4.2.3. Manipulation 
Vignette 4. Mandatory initiatives such as the 2013 EU Accounting and Transparency 
Directive and the transposition into UK law, the US Cardin-Lugar amendment 1504 of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and the Nigerian 
Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) to illustrate institutional demands for more transparency 
and accountability 
Shell publicly supports voluntary multi-stakeholder transparency initiatives such as the 
EITI and mandatory tax regimes (Royal Dutch Shell, 2015c). Recently, many voluntary 
transparency initiatives such as the PWYP campaign and the MSI EITI have become 
institutionalized into laws and regulations to ensure corporate compliance and thereby 
making societal considerations unavoidable inputs into managerial decision-making. In 
Nigeria, a new petroleum industry reform bill (PIB) was proposed in 2007 to complement 
and enforce the Nigerian EITI by increasing the indigenous content, tackling 
environmental and air quality emissions, increasing transparency of government and 
associated participation in the sector and encouraging community development (Okoye, 
2012). The Bill would also provide a greater share of oil revenues to the Federal 
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Government and oil producing communities (U.S. Embassy Abuja, 2009b) and require 
an end to gas flaring by 2010, which Shell won’t be able to do said Pickard (then Shell's 
vice president for sub-Saharan Africa) in a confidential conversation with the US 
embassy in Abuja (U.S. Embassy Abuja, 2009b). Also complementary to the EITI, the US 
proposed in 2010 an amendment at Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act 2008 (known as ‘The Cardin-Lugar Amendment’) to 
increase disclosure requirements for extractive companies listed in the US. Although the 
process for hard law implementation stalled in the US, the European Union successfully 
passed similar laws under the EU Accounting and Transparency Directives9 in 2013, with 
deadline for member state implementation in 2015. 
While many civil society organizations support these new mandatory initiatives, Shell 
tries to alter these more stringent institutional demands for transparency and 
accountability by co-opting institutional constituents and influencing institutional belief 
systems (see Table 10 for an overview). Interviews with civil society organizations reveal 
that Shell tries to persuade or even establish control over institutional constituents that 
apply pressure on the organization by using bullying tactics, misrepresenting 
collaboration, offering lucrative economic incentives, seeking closed door negotiations, 
and building coalitions. For example, the company used informal meetings with 
opposing NGOs to bully participants and to advertise these information-sharing sessions 
as mutual consensus pretending to the public they are on board (PWYP US, skype 
interview 29.10.2014). With regard to the former, one interviewee from PWYP US 
exemplified “They tried to come in and pretend that it was like an information sharing 
session and then attempted to turn it into instead a do-or-die negotiation session where 
we've come to the table and if you don't negotiate with us now maybe we won't come 
to the table again. […] Multiple times there were these bullying tactics” (PWYP US, skype 
interview 29.10.2014). Shell also tried to intimidate Members of Parliament. One 
interviewee from Global Witness recalled the reaction of one Member of Parliament in 
Brussels “thank god you guys are here because yesterday Shell had a 130 people here’. 
Omg. There are 2 of us and there’s a 130 of them. And they went around every single 
                                                 
9 The European rule tracks Section 1504 of Dodd Frank but adds logging companies and large unlisted 
companies, whereas the US law covers only listed oil, gas and mining companies. 
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MEP trying to get them to vote against where the latest stage was” (Global Witness, 
skype interview 30.10.2014). Informants also frequently reported that the company 
used ‘lift pitches’ to get opposing NGOs on board (Global Witness, skype interviews 
03.10.2014 and 16.12.2014; PWYP US, skype interview 29.10.2014). In this line of 
thought one interviewee bewailed “So they were very much wolves in sheep's clothing. 
After the information-sharing session They went on and actually told law makers or 
regulators in other countries and another jurisdictions that they were in negotiations 
with the NGO which is exactly not what they were doing at all so they manipulated that 
process to use it to their own advantage” (PWYP US, skype interview 29.10.2014). This 
misrepresentation of collaboration with opposing NGOs to demonstrate the 
organization’s worthiness and acceptability to the public from whom it hopes to obtain 
approval was also confirmed by interviewees in Nigeria “they definitely used our 
participation to clean their image. It was a propaganda thing” (Stakeholder Democracy 
Network, Skype interview 16.04.2015).  
Shell also tries to co-opt institutional constituents by offering host and home 
government officials an influential position as a senior manager or as temporary 
secondment. For example to influence the PIB in Nigeria, Ann Pickard (then Shell's vice 
president for sub-Saharan Africa) is quoted as telling U.S. diplomats that Shell had placed 
its employees throughout the Nigerian government and "consequently had access to 
everything that was being done in those ministries" (U.S. Embassy Abuja, 2009b). She 
explained that “we are working with the House and the House appears to want to work 
with us” (ibid). She continued that if the Senate passes the PIB, “we aren’t worried” 
(ibid). When the Ambassador asked if Shell had had engagements with the government 
outside the National Assembly, such as with the Ministry of Finance and the Central 
Bank of Nigeria, Pickard said, “We are meeting with them at all levels”(US Consulate 
Lagos, 2008). Another confidential telegram from the Embassy in Den Hague confirms 
the existence of “an ongoing program in which a Dutch diplomat works at Shell's 
headquarters in The Hague and a UK diplomat works at Shell's London offices“ (Embassy 
The Hague, 2009). While Shell's former vice president for sub-Saharan Africa Pickard and 
the Dutch ministers of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs don’t see any conflict of 
interest related to the exchange of personnel by Shell and the Dutch government since 
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it could help to build knowledge and get a better understanding of the sector, many civil 
society members criticize this revolving door practice. In this line of thought an 
informant states, ”for me, I always look from the outside that whoever goes into Shell - 
this is not even particular to him - whoever is in Shell and then left it finds it difficult to 
be independent from the operational policies and guidelines of SPDC, because it is sort 
of like you have been indoctrinated with SPDC's policies and all that. So to a great extent 
I don't think he is independent from the SPDC” (Environmental Health and Safety 
Network, interview 13.07.2011). He added that for example “the traditional leader from 
Nembe was from the Ministry of Petroleum, and then also worked through the rank and 
file in SPDC, then NNPC, then Minister for Petroleum. Or the Minister of Petroleum Mrs. 
Diezani Allison-Maduelke also worked previously for Shell” (ibid).  
Shell also uses closed-door negotiations to improve conditions for persuasion and the 
re-evaluation of parties’ own interests. To accommodate the company’s interests in the 
PIB, Shell intervened by “bribing parliament members and paying them trips to 
conferences to Ghana and the US, in which the new regulatory framework governing 
investment in Nigeria was discussed, excluding any participation from civil society 
actors” (Revenue Watch Institute, interview 05.07.2011). As a result of the tussle three 
versions of the bill existed in 2011. They include the original 2008 Presidency 
submission, the ﬁnal 2010 submission by the federal Inter-Agency Team (IAT); and the 
weakened 2011 Senate version (Sayne, 2011; Okoye, 2012). Many interviewees were 
scandalized  
“Shell reversed the PIB in that they submitted their own version as a new bill. 
This is not legal! We don't even know what suggestions the companies have 
made, in detail because it's not made public. […] We already know that they are 
lobbying the legislators; they will take the legislatures out for the workshop to 
abroad or to conferences and reach out to the legislators in subtle ways. They 
get consultants, they get media people, they sponsor articles in the newspaper 
to influence public opinion. Those are the strategies they use! The oil companies, 
they will not come out to say, "Well, this Bill should not be passed." No, they 
won't” (African Center for Leadership, Strategy and Development, interview 
11.07.2011). 
Another manipulation strategy is coalition building with like-minded business groups 
and industry bodies, contract experts (law firms) to signal that the company’s response 
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deserves public support. In a confidential conversation Pickard revealed the company’s 
network to influence the PIB. Apart from the IMF team headed by Charles McPherson 
she said that “she would also like to use the American embassy as a ‘silver bullet’ if the 
PIB passes the House” (U.S. Embassy Abuja, 2009b). “She said it would be helpful if the 
Embassy would continue to deliver low-level messages of concern. In particular, she 
thought it would be helpful for the Embassy to call on Speaker of the House Dimeji 
Bankoke to see where he stood on the bill” (ibid). In another confidential meeting with 
the US embassy, Ann Pickard added that “The IOCs will be asking U.S., Dutch and U.K. 
COMs to convey points on the bill to GON policymakers (and that) they will hire 
consultants, like McKinsey, to produce common themes so the messages from the IOCs 
to be shared with the relevant Ambassadors are clear and consistent” (U.S. Embassy 
Abuja, 2009a). A lawmaker who was a member of the three committees in the Senate 
handling the Bill confirmed to a Daily Trust reporter that they were put under intense 
pressure by the Presidency to accommodate some of the demands of the oil majors. 
“Our intention was to pass the bill as sent to us by the late President Umaru Musa 
Yar’adua, but these companies put us under intense pressure, they even got the 
American government to intervene on their behalf. Shortly after his return from the 
United States early this year when he was Acting President, Jonathan requested that the 
provisions of the bill be reviewed after which he asked the leadership of the two 
chambers to look at the issue of tax and reduce it to allow for ‘investment’ in the sector,” 
he said (Hassan, 2010). At the global level, Shell also works with industry bodies, 
academics, lawyers and media to influence the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act and the 
EU Transparency Initiative. For instance one interviewee claims that “What we see with 
the oil companies in the US is that they hide behind the American Petroleum Institute 
which is the lobbying arm in the industry association of the oil sector (and) they enlist 
help from academics or other lawyers and crafting arguments against mandatory 
disclosure” (PWYP US, skype interview 29.10.2014). Another interviewee added “we've 
seen in the last three years memos drafted by corporate lawyers for some of the big 
companies claiming to prove that there were legal prohibitions on reporting in China 
and elsewhere. That's been a major strategy” (PWYP UK, skype interview 24.10.2014). 
For instance, law firms like Cravath, Swain & Moore LLP (API Submission 2011, 
ExxonMobil Submission 2011), Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton (Submission 2011), 
152 
PriceWaterHouse Coopers LLP (Submission 2011) in the US, and Clifford Chance LLP 
(Memorandum to International Chamber of Commerce UK from Clifford Chance LLP 
Beijing 2013) in the UK, participated in proving the arguments of the corporations on 
legal grounds. Furthermore, law schools like the George Mason University participated 
in the consultation process for the Section 1504 (see George Mason University 
Submission, 2011) arguing for similar purposes as the API (PWYP US, skype interview 
29.10.2014). The company also “got the Wall Street Journal, which is a very 
conservative, a very business friendly publication, to publish an editorial in which they 
described the section 1504 as a gift to Vladimir Putin” (Earth Rights International, skype 
interview 15.10.2014). 
Shell’s manipulation strategy is also directed towards influencing institutionalized belief 
systems and norms, which define the criteria of desired or required corporate practices 
via legal action and playing timing, countries, and regulatory regimes one off each other. 
With regard to the former, Shell tries to influence political processes by taking legal 
action against mandatory regulations. In the US, legal action was directed against 
Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act (API et al vs. SEC, March 2013). Shell is among those 
pushing to prevent the Securities and Exchange Commission from reintroducing tough 
disclosure requirements – a step that Global Witness interprets as "lobbying to weaken 
laws" on transparency (Eagleton, 2013). As a consequence many civil society 
organization are accusing Shell of hypocrisy (Global Witness, skype interview 
30.10.2014; Global Witness, skype interview 25.09.2014). A senior specialist in the field 
of anti-corruption of the NGO Global Witness accused Shell accordingly “while Shell 
publicly advocates EITI standards to fight corruption, the company is supporting a 
lawsuit that would destroy U.S. legislation designed to strengthen the EITI standard” 
(Global Witness, skype interview 03.10.2014). Another interviewee added  
“They weren’t just interested in amending Dodd Frank 1504, they wanted to 
destroy it. They had no interest in going through it at all. They were quite open 
about that. The suing lawsuit that the API launched against the SEC after this rule 
was created was absolutely about destroying it, it wasn’t about amending it. It 
was about killing it all. That was the intention, but there were a number of 
arguments that Shell in particular pushed that were sort of adopted by the API 
in their lawsuit… the oil companies are still trying to undermine, under threat of 
lawsuit, and Shell is even threatening to sue the EU countries who implement 
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the Accounting and Transparency Directives. They don’t want to disclose project 
level disclosure (Global Witness, skype interview 30.10.2014) 
To influence institutionalized belief systems Shell also tried to play one off against the 
other and promote voluntary MSI as an alternative – and potentially more effective – 
form of regulation to annul efforts for mandatory regulation. For instance, Shell 
frequently referred to the status quo, thus using voluntary initiatives to preempt 
mandatory laws and playing the rule making in the US and the EU off against another. 
With regard to the former a legal Advocacy Coordinator explained 
 “Was EITI used as an excuse to not face mandatory regulation? The answer is 
absolutely yes! Certainly we heard that argument many times; it was used in 
official submissions by individual oil companies and by the API (American 
Petroleum Institute), which is their lobbying arm in the United States, as kind of 
an argument for why the rules… But as soon as section 1504 was passed they 
started coming out and saying oh! You know this is unnecessary or we don’t need 
strong rules, we don’t, you know the oil companies… we’re working on it, you 
know. We are doing this, and the world is progressing through EITI and we don’t, 
so therefore the law itself should not press as beyond our comfort zone. […] you 
know we have the EITI, many countries are signing up to EITI so there is no need 
to put us in a difficult situation (Earth Rights International, skype interview 
15.10.2014) 
He added that they are also “playing with timing and they are playing the two countries 
off each other” (ibid). When the oil companies realized that the EU directive was more 
stringent, they started to lobby again the SEC “in hopes that a weak U.S. rule will lead 
the European countries to create a weaker process” (ibid.) (see also Joint comment 
letter by Exxon and Shell, 2014).  
Shell also tries to alter these directives by showing that they are not ‘rational’ (appeal 
to rationality of action) and that their own behavior on the issue at stake is above 
reproach. This psychological framing aims to influence public perception to neutralize 
opposition’s arguments and thus reduce political support for regulatory change. For 
example, “an argument they make is that mandatory disclosure will hurt their bottom 
line and it'll make them less competitive with other companies. Internationally or less 
competitive with national oil companies…” (PWYP US, skype interview 29.10.2014) (see 
also API Comment Letter, 2011). Another interviewee reported, “They've said that even 
institutional investors and shareholders will be swamped by the data and won't be able 
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to make sense of it” (PWYP UK, skype interview 24.10.2014). A legal advisor of Earth 
Rights International asserts that Shell and other big oil companies hired legal and 
scientific experts to support their arguments and even “put forward their proposal 
publically; a proposal of what they thought maybe reporting should look like” (Earth 
Rights International, skype interview 15.10.2014). In other words, Shell reinforces his 
opposition to the new transparency laws with demonstrations of organizational 
rationality to obtain public approval and hence legitimize its actions. The presented 
arguments depended on the targeted audience and location. “So when they present 
their arguments it can depend on the location” (PWYP US, skype interview 29.10.2014) 
“and the audience” (Earth Rights International, skype interview 15.10.2014). For 
example, “the legal arguments which honestly did not surface until the lawsuit began, 
and it was not something that had been part of their public redirect and still isn’t really 
part of the public redirect” (ibid). Many interviewees criticized that these arguments 
were not substantive (Earth Rights International, skype interview 15.10.2014; PWYP US, 
skype interview 29.10.2014; PWYP UK, skype interview 24.10.2015), but recognized that 
they became performative over time 
“Normally, it is not followed with any substantive evidence, it's usually just their 
same arguments repeated over and over again with the intention that if they 
repeat them enough times they are going to somehow become factual. That 
appears to be the strategy, to be honest” (PWYP US, skype interview 
29.10.2014). 
 
Table 10 Overview of manipulation strategies 
First order code Representative quotes 
Bully opposing 
NGOs or MPs 
 
 
 
 
 
 “They tried to come in and pretend that it was like an information sharing 
session and then attempted to turn it into instead a do-or-die negotiation 
session where we've come to the table and if you don't negotiate with us 
now maybe we won't come to the table again […] Essentially, we went to a 
room where they flew in a lot of people from different locations. It was all 
very impressive display. They previously had their opportunity to give their 
perspective and their arguments and so we were utilizing this as an 
opportunity to give our perspectives and our arguments. Not even two 
minutes going into the introduction, one of them rudely interrupts the 
person speaking and was like 'why are we here, what are we doing, I just 
don't want this to be focused on X, I want it to be focused on Y' and then we 
tried to carry on with the agenda and multiple times there were these 
bullying tactics that were being done” (PWYP US, skype interview 
29.10.2014) 
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 “We thought we were going to negotiate, we were willing to compromise but 
you guys are just not willing to compromise” (PWYP US, skype interview 
29.10.2014) 
  “You are in the same room and then you might go into the lift and they 
might stop you and say ‘hey, why don’t we come to a nice, friendly 
agreement. What would you really want? What would you be willing to 
give?’” (Global Witness, skype interview 16.12.2014)  
 “One of the parliamentarians said, ‘thank god you guys are here because 
yesterday Shell had a 130 people here’. Omg. There are 2 of us and there’s a 
130 of them. And they went around every single MEP trying to get them to 
vote against where the latest stage was” (Global Witness, skype interview 
30.10.2014) 
Misrepresent 
collaboration with 
opposing NGOs 
 “They went on and actually told law makers or regulators in other countries 
and another jurisdictions that they were in negotiations with the NGO which 
is exactly not what they were doing at all so they manipulated that process to 
use it to their own advantage.” “So they were very much wolves in sheep's 
clothing” (PWYP US, skype interview 29.10.2014) 
 “They definitely used our participation to clean their image. It was a 
propaganda thing” (Stakeholder Democracy Network, Skype interview 
16.04.2015) 
Offer lucrative jobs 
to government 
officials (revolving 
door) 
 Ann Pickard (then Shell's vice president for sub-Saharan Africa) is quoted as 
telling U.S. diplomats that “the GON had forgotten that Shell had seconded 
people to all the relevant ministries and that Shell consequently had access 
to everything that was being done in those ministries” (U.S. Embassy Abuja, 
2009b) 
 Following the disclosure of this cable, she clarified that Shell has a total of 11 
staff seconded to the Nigerian government, mainly technical specialists, 
which is usual in the oil industry (Ten Kate, 2010) 
 “Pickard routinely meets with the oil, gas, and defense ministers as well as 
top military leaders and senior advisors to the President.”(US Consulate 
Lagos, 2008) 
 ”For me, I always look from the outside that whoever goes into Shell - this is 
not even particular to him - whoever is in Shell and then left it finds it difficult 
to be independent from the operational policies and guidelines of SPDC, 
because it is sort of like you have been indoctrinated with SPDC's policies and 
all that. So to a great extent I don't think he is independent from the SPDC” 
(Environmental Health and Safety Network, interview 13.07.2011) 
Seek closed-door 
negotiations  
  To accommodate the company’s interests in the PIB, Shell intervened by 
“bribing parliament members and paying them trips to conferences to Ghana 
and the US, in which the new regulatory framework governing investment in 
Nigeria was discussed, excluding any participation from civil society actors” 
(Revenue Watch Institute, interview 05.07.2011) 
 “Shell reversed the PIB in that they submitted their own version as a new bill. 
This is not legal! We don't even know what suggestions the companies have 
made, in detail because it's not made public. […] We already know that they 
are lobbying the legislators; they will take the legislatures out for the 
workshop to abroad or to conferences and reach out to the legislators in 
subtle ways. They get consultants, they get media people, they sponsor 
articles in the newspaper to influence public opinion. Those are the strategies 
they use! The oil companies, they will not come out to say, "Well, this Bill 
should not be passed." No, they won't” (African Center for Leadership, 
Strategy and Development, interview 11.07.2011) 
Build coalitions 
 
 
 “she would also like to use the American embassy as a ‘silver bullet’ if the PIB 
passes the House” (U.S. Embassy Abuja, 2009b). “She said it would be helpful 
if the Embassy would continue to deliver low-level messages of concern. In 
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particular, she thought it would be helpful for the Embassy to call on Speaker 
of the House Dimeji Bankoke to see where he stood on the bill” (ibid) 
 “What we see with the oil companies in the US is that they hide behind the 
American Petroleum Institute which is the lobbying arm in the industry 
association of the oil sector (and) they enlist help from academics or other 
lawyers and crafting arguments against mandatory disclosure” (PWYP US, 
skype interview 29.10.2014) 
 “We’ve seen in the last three years memos drafted by corporate lawyers for 
some of the big companies claiming to prove that there were legal 
prohibitions on reporting in China and elsewhere. That's been a major 
strategy” (PWYP UK, skype interview 24.10.2014) 
 “They got the Wall Street Journal, which is a very conservative, a very 
business friendly publication, to publish an editorial in which they described 
the section 1504 as a gift to Vladimir Putin” (Earth Rights International, skype 
interview 15.10.2014) 
Seek legal action 
 
 “For all of these reasons we respectfully submit this rule should be vacated, 
and again, we urge the Court that we have sought expedition, and we believe 
that's a reason that jurisdiction belongs here, but at minimum we believe it's 
a reason that …would be valuable to all concerned for the Court to address 
this as its schedule permits” (API et al vs. SEC, March 2013)) 
 “They weren’t just interested in amending Dodd Frank 1504, they wanted to 
destroy it. They had no interest in going through it at all. They were quite 
open about that. The suing lawsuit that the API launched against the SEC 
after this rule was created was absolutely about destroying it, it wasn’t about 
amending it. It was about killing it all. That was the intention, but there were 
a number of arguments that Shell in particular pushed that were sort of 
adopted by the API in their lawsuit… the oil companies are still trying to 
undermine, under threat of lawsuit, and Shell is even threatening to sue the 
EU countries who implement the Accounting and Transparency Directives. 
They don’t want to disclose project level disclosure (Global Witness, skype 
interview 30.10.2014) 
Play one off against 
the other 
  “Was EITI used as an excuse to not face mandatory regulation? The answer is 
absolutely yes! “ (Earth Rights International, skype interview 15.10.2014)  
 “They are playing with timing and they are playing the two countries off each 
other” (Earth Rights International, skype interview 15.10.2014) 
 “Normally, it is not followed with any substantive evidence, it's usually just 
their same arguments repeated over and over again with the intention that if 
they repeat them enough times they are going to somehow become factual. 
That appears to be the strategy, to be honest” (PWYP US, skype interview 
29.10.2014) 
Appeal to rationality 
of action 
 “An argument they make is that mandatory disclosure will hurt their bottom 
line and it'll make them less competitive with other companies. 
Internationally or less competitive with national oil companies…” (PWYP US, 
skype interview 29.10.2014) 
 “If the rules under Section 13(q) require public disclosure of unnecessarily 
detailed information, such disclosure will provide competitors, specifically 
foreign government owned companies, not covered by section 13(q) with 
sensitive commercial information and place covered U.S. companies at a 
competitive disadvantage” (API Comment Letter, 2011) 
  “They've said that even institutional investors and shareholders will be 
swamped by the data and won't be able to make sense of it” (PWYP UK, 
skype interview 24.10.2014) 
 “The cost-benefit analysis fails to show any benefits to investors, the market 
place or capital formation” (US Chamber of Commerce, 2010) 
 “Don't hamper us with too many regulations and rules because you'll prevent 
us from creating wealth for society” (PWYP UK, skype interview 24.10.2014) 
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  “They pay their PR people a lot money, they pay millions of dollars to get 
very subtle and effective arguments and so how to they tailor those 
arguments for different audiences, and different times and how do they 
adapt over time as the landscape changes” (Earth Rights International, skype 
interview 15.10.2014) 
 
4.4.2.4. Determinants 
Shell’s strategic response to institutional demands become more aggressive and 
coordinated with the headquarters and other like-minded groups, the more the issue 
matures and convergent pressures emerge in form of more stringent regulations. In 
other words, a ‘battle for control’ (Burgis, 2009) erupted. As rationalizing trends in 
society such as the increasing emphases on accountability and transparency and the 
demand to address public good issues such as climate change, human rights, and 
delivery of socio-economic services, become more pervasive and institutionalized into 
mandatory measures, Shell faces increasing conflict with the economic and technical 
standards against which its performance is primarily assessed by its shareholders 
(efficiency). For example in 2008, when the PIB was ﬁrst drafted, the Financial Times ran 
a headline that simply stated that ‘oil groups fear Nigeria’s reforms could cost them 
billions in proﬁt’, “highlighting the continued emphasis on the single bottom line, 
proﬁts” (Green, 2008 in Goldman, 2011). Indeed the change of regulation of such a 
cornerstone of the economy is fundamental and contentious as it proposes a greater 
share of oil revenues to the Federal Government and oil producing communities (U.S. 
Embassy Abuja, 2009b) and it aims tackling environmental and air quality emissions, 
increasing transparency of government and associated participation in the sector (linked 
to EITI) and encouraging community development (Okoye, 2012). 
Furthermore, a shift from voluntary to mandatory regulation in the area of revenue 
transparency presents a loss in decision-making discretion (autonomy) and the 
weakening or even annulation of previous pacifying, bargaining and internal buffering 
strategies (due to potentially higher legal coercion and sanctions in Nigeria) (Centre for 
Democracy and Development, interview 08.07.2011; Global Witness, skype interview 
25.09.2014; Natural Resource Governance Institute, skype interview 04.12.2014; Open 
Oil, skype interview 15.11.2014; PWYP International, skype interview 28.11.2014). For 
example, Dominic Eagleton from Global Witness emphasized that Section 1504 of the 
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Dodd-Frank Act forces companies to publish the kind of payments made by Shell and Eni 
in Nigeria on a project-by-project basis. “Deals like this would have been incredibly 
difficult to execute had there been strong transparency laws requiring the disclosure of 
payments by extractive companies to governments (Global Witness, 2013). He adds, 
“without this 'sunshine' on natural resource deals, business will continue to be 
conducted in an opaque environment that enables payments to end up in the wrong 
hands” (Eagleton, 2013). Also, the PIB’s demands for more transparency, tackling 
environmental and air quality emissions (such as put an end to gas flaring) and a greater 
share of oil revenues to the Federal Government and oil producing communities (U.S. 
Embassy Abuja, 2009b) jeopardize the company’s current powerful position due to 
associated losses of the company’s autonomy and profits. While other oil companies 
pursue similar strategies and work in partnerships with Shell, Shell has been described 
as the most active company as it has most to lose or “most to hide” as of one interviewee 
from Global Witness (skype interview 30.10.2014) asserted. For example, a leaked US 
embassy cable reveals that even though  
“Shell’s views of the PIB and the alignment among the IOCs and with the Nigerian 
oil companies track closely with the views of ExxonMobil, […] Shell is much more 
vulnerable than the other IOCs because its operations are concentrated in less 
favorable JV concessions that are located in the violence-prone Niger Delta. […]. 
In the event that the PIB retains negative terms or violence returns to the Delta, 
Shell can be expected to hurt the most and cry the loudest” (U.S. Embassy Abuja, 
2009b).  
4.4.2.5. Effect on societal outcomes 
Shell’s active contestation of institutional demands has significant negative societal 
outcomes. Audrey Gaughran, Amnesty, International’s Head of Business and Human 
Rights, describes for example the impacts of oil spills on communities as follows:  
“People living in the Niger Delta have to drink, cook with and wash in polluted water. 
They eat fish contaminated with oil and other toxins – if they are lucky enough to be 
able to still find fish. The land they farm on is being destroyed. After oil spills the air they 
breathe smells of oil, gas and other pollutants. People complain of breathing problems 
and skin lesions – and yet neither the government nor the oil companies monitor the 
human impacts of oil pollution” (Ten Kate, 2010).  
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Shell’s defiance and even manipulation of institutional demands for more transparency 
have also a dampening effect on any efforts to achieve social and economic 
development. Simon Taylor asserts for example with regard to Shell‘s involvement in a 
billion dollar corruption scandal in Nigeria: “Such shady deals expose investors to risks 
they do not know about, entrench corruption and rob people in countries like Nigeria of 
money they badly need for things like schools and hospitals” (Taylor, 2015). He adds 
“regardless of who paid what to whom, there is one clear loser in the whole affair: the 
Nigerian public. The money should have ended up in state coffers, where it is badly 
needed – the amount in question is equivalent to two thirds of the Nigerian healthcare 
budget” (ibid).  
Shell’s defiance of best practices and international standards with regard to security 
spending is also criticized for leading to a culture of violence and systematic human 
rights violations (Amnesty International, 2009b; Amunwa, 2012; Amunwa & Brown, 
2013; Amunwa & Minio, 2011; Consul General Brian L. Browne, 2006; Platform, 2012a). 
Leaked information from Shell’s security department to Platform disclose that between 
2007 and 2009 Shell spent at least US$383 million on security in Nigeria (40% of Shell’s 
total expenditure on security) (Platform, 2012a). Investigations by Platform reveal that 
during the period, Shell’s security spending fueled conflict and enabled systematic 
human rights abuses by government forces and armed militants in Uzere (2011), 
Gbaramatu (2009), Rumuekpe (2005-2008), Joinkrama (2007-2010), Oru Sangama 
(2004), Dere (2009-2010), Odioma (2005), and Warri (2003) (ibid). Platform’s researcher 
Ben Amunwa summed up:  
”Apart from its enormous size, what is striking about Shell’s security spending is 
how little security it actually created. Shell paid many millions of dollars to 
government forces with a track record for corruption and creating instability 
across Nigeria. Shell appear to have spent even larger sums on pacifying militant 
groups, a practice that has worsened the violence. While primary responsibility 
for human rights abuses lies with the Nigerian government and other 
perpetrators, Shell bears a heavy responsibility for the devastating social impacts 
of its security spending” (Platform, 2012a). 
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Table 11 Analytic structure exemplified for corporate response determinants I: Rationale 
Second 
order 
constructs 
First order 
code 
Representative quotes 
Efficiency 
Externalize 
negative 
externalities 
 
 
 
 Normative demands to address public goods issues were also conflicting with internal organizational objectives related to 
efficiency. In line with the logic of capitalist production, Shell’s profitability largely depends on the capacity to externalize the 
cost of production and negative externalities (e.g. oil spill remediation and compensation) and is at cross-purposes with 
normative demands to provide public goods or large-scale employment (e.g. GMoU) (Idemudia, 2010, p. 839) 
 “One case in point is the oil spill incident at Ogoniland in the Ogoni communities. I have been to that site myself just in the last 
few weeks. Shell claim that they have cleaned up the spill, but as we speak the spill is evident. So the use of deceit, lies has been 
the modus operandi; has been the means by which Shell claims they cleaned the environment - and not really by engaging with 
their mess that they have created” (Environmental Rights Action, interview 12.07.2011) 
 But they will tell you all kinds of problems: "This is a swampy area; it's difficult to clean up…Yeah, because the vegetation is this; 
it's a swampy in this area; it's difficult to go in there because of the militant…" You know, these are justifications - well, febrile 
points as far as I'm concerned. It has no serious reasoning in not cleaning the whole thing. And even if they claim that because of 
the vegetation, and the swampy area, when you go into the lagoon, where you see pure, real oil spills, they have not done 
anything either” (Heinrich Böll Foundation Nigeria, interview 12.07.2011) 
Risk 
management 
 “The multiple missions of military personnel assigned to Shell sites could well result in Shell being tied to a major human rights 
incident if the military attempts to assert its control over communities dominated by militants, ironically Ijaws. The latest Shell 
strategy seems surprising in light of the relative improvement in Shell's corporate and social responsibility profile over recent 
years. Shell officials on the ground seem aware and accepting of the balance between gains and risks, especially the risk of 
renewed fighting" (Embassy Abuja, 2003b) 
 “This thinking is even formalized in a ‘Risk & Internal Control Policy’, which means that the Shell Group has a risk-based approach 
to internal control and that management in the Group is responsible for implementing, operating and monitoring the system of 
internal control, which is designed to provide reasonable but not absolute assurance of achieving business objectives (Shell 
annual report, 2004)” (Jacoba Schouten, 2010, p. 91) 
 “appears as a CSR approach but in actual sense, it is a community engagement model that seeks to keep the operating 
environment peaceful for effective exploration activities” (Environmental Health and Safety Network, interview 13.07.2011)  
 “Crisis management. They were not really keen about the impact of development. They were only looking for how to make sure 
profits. […] they are not doing it because they are genuinely committed to that dialogue. They are doing it just for business 
purposes. So when you understand it from that context, you understand that there is no genuine intention to improve the 
situation for the community” (African Network for Environment and Economic Justice, interview 05.07.2011) 
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 “They realized that that (unilateral approach) was not very successful so they've now adopted this participatory - getting 
partnerships from people. Because they are not - you know, most of civil society in the region are skeptical about Shell; that the 
purpose of Shell doing this is not genuine; that Shell is only doing it to buy time for peace, so that they can get to do their 
business. They are not genuinely committed to helping to see a genuine development in the region. So there is skepticism” 
(African Network for Environment and Economic Justice, interview 05.07.2011) 
Dominance of 
economic 
bottom line 
 
 “they believe in short cause” (Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre, interview 07.07.2011) 
 “Shell is also majorly responsible because Shell would generally - there was no attempt for Shell to see the need to work towards 
having a government transparent system in Nigeria because obviously they understand the implication that once government is 
able to enforce a regulatory system, it also hits deeply into their profits, their bottom line. So it is a win/win for Shell to see a 
weak government, as a matter of fact - and that they took advantage of very strongly” (African Network for Environment and 
Economic Justice, interview 05.07.2011) 
 “They will do that contribute to public good in as much as it doesn't affect their business. That's why they subscribe to the 
voluntary; anything that will have to impact on their profit, they will not want to support it. They would rather leave it at the 
voluntary level” (African Network for Environment and Economic Justice, interview 05.07.2011)  
 “They are interested in profit. They are not interested in putting an end to gas flaring. So they are interested in monetizing the 
solutions through market -based mechanisms” (Environmental Rights Action, interview 12.07.2011) 
 “They want to see how they can continue to operate in Nigeria. And to do that, they should be also seen to be addressing the 
issues, otherwise it will reduce their license to operate in the region. It will affect their business. And even internationally they 
will not be able to invest; investors will not be able to invest their share. So they see it that, if they are in peace with the 
community, they will be able to operate; then you have credibility, and the cost of accessing finance in Nigeria will reduce the 
risk of buying Shell shares would also increase. The shareholders will also be happy with the management of Shell. So it's a 
win/win for Shell to be seen to be doing an engagement in corporate social responsibility” (African Network for Environment and 
Economic Justice, interview 05.07.2011) 
 “They've said that even institutional investors and shareholders will be swamped by the data and won't be able to make sense of 
it” (PWYP, skype interview 24.10.2014) 
 “The cost-benefit analysis fails to show any benefits to investors, the market place or capital formation” US Chamber of 
Commerce 2010 
 “I mean number one were they said you are going to put us at a competitive disadvantage. If we have to reveal our payments 
and other companies don’t then many governments will prefer not to do business with us or our competitors will use this 
information to outbid us for lucrative contracts” (Earth Rights International, skype interview 15.10.2014) 
 “If the rules under Section 13(q) require public disclosure of unnecessarily detailed information, such disclosure will provide 
competitors, specifically foreign government owned companies, not covered by section 13(q) with sensitive commercial 
information and place covered U.S. companies at a competitive disadvantage” API Comment Letter, 2011 
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 “An argument they make is that mandatory disclosure will hurt their bottom line and it'll make them less competitive with other 
companies. Internationally or less competitive with national oil companies…” (PWYP US, skype interview 29.10.2014) 
Conflicting 
demands 
 “Shell is not a business for charity. They are in business for profit” (African Network for Environment and Economic Justice, 
interview 05.07.2011)  
 “Shell oftentimes says that it is not their responsibility to do some of the things that the community has requested from them. 
Like the community wants them to come and build roads, bring electricity. That is a basic function of the state” (African Network 
for Environment and Economic Justice, interview 05.07.2011)  
 “If government takes back the responsibility and says, "Shell, leave the community development domain," Shell would not be 
able to do that because they ride on the wings of corporate social responsibility to get access to the oil. Oil, as we speak, is being 
drilled behind military shield. So corporate social responsibility becomes a leverage; an entrance; a means of entrance into the 
communities, to drill oil” (Environmental Rights Action, interview 12.07.2011) 
 “Well, my view is that - and this is a general view in any case - that corporate social responsibility is something imposed on 
companies. It is not a voluntary choice they make - except in the context when now there is an excepted norm, they feel it 
improves their public relations when they engage in activities that are considered part of corporate social responsibility. So I 
don't believe for companies they get out of their mind frame of the profiteer motive. Companies don't exist to be good guys; 
they exist to make money - and that is how they have operated” (Centre for Democracy and Development, interview 08.07.2011) 
 So we really need to go back even to that level, to look at what is the role of the councilor; what is the role of the local 
government, so that the community will not take the role of local government and dump it on Shell” (PWYP Nigeria, interview 
13.07.2011) 
Legitimacy 
Controversial 
industry 
sector 
(Nature of 
industry 
sector) 
 “Oil operations pose a threat to the environment at each stage of the supply chain - exploration, production, transportation and 
refining” (Frynas, 2005) 
 “Oil operations also have adverse social effects on the local communities in oil-producing areas. In the most extreme cases in the 
developing world, establishment of oil infrastructure may deprive the local people of any means of subsistence” (Frynas, 2005) 
 “The oil industry has been blamed for distorting national economies and governance. Many oil-producing states in the 
developing world have suffered from the phenomenon known as the ‘resource curse’” (Frynas, 2005) 
 The company faced increasing criticism from all sides: consumer boycotts in Europe and North America, shareholder activism 
through formal resolutions in Europe, increasing levels of community disruption in the Niger Delta, falling share prices and 
hemorrhaging staff (Pendleton et al., 2004) 
Public interest 
(Nature of 
claims) 
 “Don't hamper us with too many regulations and rules because you'll prevent us from creating wealth for society” (PWYP UK, 
skype interview 24.10.2014) 
 The Commission may provide exemptions from the Exchange Act’s requirements when consistent “with the public interest or the 
protection of investors.” (cite) 
 “Legitimacy? Income, receipts for the government; and that kind of allowance allowed them to continue here. That is the 
legitimacy. Beyond that, there is none whatsoever.” (Environmental Rights Action, interview 12.07.2011) 
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Autonomy
/ Loss of 
decision-
making 
discretion 
Opacity  
 Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act forces companies to publish the kind of payments made by Shell and Eni in Nigeria on a 
project-by-project basis. “Deals like this would have been incredibly difficult to execute had there been strong transparency laws 
requiring the disclosure of payments by extractive companies to governments (Global Witness, 2013)  
 “Without this 'sunshine' on natural resource deals, business will continue to be conducted in an opaque environment that 
enables payments to end up in the wrong hands” (Eagleton, 2013) 
Control 
 “They want to have control. They are very concerned. That's why they try to influence legislation that is - at the national 
assembly. Even they also inflated it, as to what they have done. They do all this because anything that will have to do with to 
build a profit, they want to stop it. That's why they want to get the control of the government.” (African Network for 
Environment and Economic Justice, interview 05.07.2011)  
 A Senior Program Advisor for the Africa Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project claimed that oil companies have the 
political power to “actively pressure the government regarding such things as tax laws” (Manby, 1999, p. 283) 
 “Shell remains the major operator of the oil and gas ventures in Nigeria. It is true that government controls the major shares but 
it is in terms of profit, in terms of investment. But the real decision-makers, those who are really operating, are the Shell 
Corporation. So that is clear for everyone to understand. They call the shots. They make sure that they have got the information 
where there are priorities” (Environmental Rights Action, interview 12.07.2011) 
 Two independent academic investigations on Shell’s GMoU confirmed that “indeed, when it comes to this conflict of interest, 
Shell maintains an upper hand” (Environmental Rights Action, interview 12.07.2011) in which the company as the giver of funds 
for projects dictates the pace and terms of engagement (Dauda, 2012). For example, when signing the GMoU “there are three 
signatures to the accounts: community of twelve clusters that is strung together have one signature. The companies of Nigeria, in 
terms of the local government, have one signature. Shell - just a single entity: one signature. This explains to you the power 
correlations in this sector” (Environmental Rights Action, interview 12.07.2011). As a consequence “the thinking by many oil 
communities and some NGOs is that the GMoU system of CSR conveys a sense of an unequal partnership (in which) oil 
companies micro-manage what should ordinarily have been the responsibility of the oil communities” (Dauda, 2012) 
 Shell has most to lose or “most to hide” (Global Witness, skype interview 30.10.2014) 
 “Shell’s views of the PIB and the alignment among the IOCs and with the Nigerian oil companies track closely with the views of 
ExxonMobil, […] Shell is much more vulnerable than the other IOCs because its operations are concentrated in less favorable JV 
concessions that are located in the violence-prone Niger Delta. […] . In the event that the PIB retains negative terms or violence 
returns to the Delta, Shell can be expected to hurt the most and cry the loudest” (U.S. Embassy Abuja, 2009b) 
 “Communities don’t have right now enough access to relevant information and facts. So it is not transparent enough. 
Information is power. Shell could create more power” (NIPRODEV, skype interview 29.09.2013) 
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Table 12 Analytic structure exemplified for corporate response determinants II: Power relations 
Second 
order 
constructs 
First order 
code 
Representative quotes 
Legal 
coercion 
Legal 
proceedings 
 “Legislation is not enforced” (Initiative for Community Development, interview 13.07. 2011)  
 “because the laws are so poorly enforced, in reality the oil industry remains largely self-regulated or, frequently, unregulated” 
(Amnesty International, 2009b, p. 41) 
 Shell did not fully implement Federal High Court of Nigeria ruling (on 14.11.2005) to stop gas flaring in the Iwerekan community 
in the Delta State. Jonah Gbembre’s legal representatives (Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth Nigeria & Climate 
Justice Program) discovered that Shell and NNPC had not fulfilled the conditions attached to the court ruling (stop gas-flaring 
activities in Nigeria by 30.4.2007 and a detailed plan of action on how to stop gas flaring), the judge had been transferred to 
another court district, the court file had disappeared, and SPDC obtained a further stay of the court order with no conditions 
attached. Gbemre bewailed “we use standard avenues (but) the multinationals make the rules. They do a lot of advocacy. Within 
the joint venture they hide and seek” (Amnesty International, 2009b, p. 78) 
 On January 30th in 2013, the district court found Shell’s subsidiary Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) 
guilty of neglecting its duty of care in that the company failed to take reasonable steps to stop a foreseeable sabotage from 
occurring on their crude oil wellhead (Standard, 2013). 
Unholy 
alliance 
 Shell and the Nigerian state are united by a common purpose, that is, “capitalist expansionism and the appropriation of surplus 
value” (Omotola 2006, p. 12 in (Agbiboa, 2012) 
 The Nigerian government has no incentive to enforce environmental laws due to the collusion of business interests (Bassey, 
2008; Idemudia, 2010, p. 839) 
Voluntary 
diffusion 
Uncertainty 
 
 When Shell embarked on its new CSR agenda in May 1994, Shell’s exploration and production director Robert Sprague tossed a 
blank transparency on the overhead projector: “It means that everything – even the most hallowed of Shell's practices, beliefs, 
and traditions – is up for grabs …. But getting there won't be easy. … We are moving forward briskly into the fog" (Guyon, 
1997, pp. 121-125). 
Imitation 
 “And you know, even globally, CSR started in the early nineties; people knowing that, "Okay, if I'm getting something out of this, 
then I should be responsible. […] If you are making so much money and you are bettering your own lot, why don't you better the 
lot of the people also where you are taking the resources from?” (PWYP Nigeria, interview 13.07.2011). 
 The concurrent rationalizing trends of the Global Environmental Justice Movement, the 1992 Rio Earth Summit putting CSR on 
the top of the public agenda, and the Human Rights Movement provided a powerful rationale for acquiescence (Mirvis, 2000) 
 “Chevron who came up with the Global Memorandum of Understanding approach to corporate social responsibility issues - the 
very first organization to go in that light. So while that was taking place, it was going to look as if - that if you don't adjust to that 
 165 
early enough, you will be left behind. So Shell had to also fall into this foray. And what Chevron came up with is also very similar 
with what Statoil Hydro is going there” (Revenue Watch Institute, interview 05.07.2011) 
 “Shell imitated Chevron’s PIND - Partnership in the Niger Delta” (PWYP Nigeria, interview 13.07.2011) 
Dependen
cy  
Technical 
expertise and 
resources 
 “Government agencies are at the mercy of oil companies when it comes to conducting site inspections” (Amnesty International, 
2009b, p. 46) 
 “The regulatory bodies, including the Nigerian National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), have no independent 
means to initiate oil spill investigations. They are usually dependent on the company both to take staff to the site and to supply 
much of the data about spills” (Amnesty International, 2009b, p. 46) 
 Affected communities lack the technical knowledge to determine the cause and volume of oil spilt so that it is rare for the 
community to be able to make their case effectively (Amnesty International, 2009b) 
 In 2010, the oil sector accounted for approximately 25% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 95% of its export 
earnings and 80% of the government’s revenue (Center for Global Development) 
 “The whole economy is driven by oil exploration. That is the key thing. As a result of this Shell has a lot of political influence. 
Politics cannot move without money” (NIPRODEV, skype interview 29.09.2013) 
Contract 
relationships 
 “We call these ‘Shell NGOs’. They just become contractors … they are beholden to Shell and not the communities. They want the 
Shell money. They will do the bidding for Shell, but definitely not for the community” (Stakeholder Democracy Network, skype 
interview 16.04.2015) 
 “What should companies like Shell do when faced with a situation where one of its key stakeholders (e.g. Nigerian government) 
expects it to act as its development agent” (Boele & Fabig, 2001, p. 132) 
 “Shell cannot do it alone because it's a partnership. […] Everything they are going to change, it will cost them money. Both 
partners will have to bring money. If you have a partnership where you have a joint venture, if you are going to invest, both 
parties have to agree to invest” (Initiative for Community Development, interview 13.07.2011) 
Social license 
to operate 
 “Shell started with their social responsibility agenda in the nineties because they were pressured to do so from civil society. […] I 
tell you, if you go to the place where we have the very first oil field in Nigeria, you will weep! You will weep! So it is actually the 
agitation of civil society that made them start thinking about giving back and showing that they are not only destroying 
everything. Only when they felt that the environment was no longer too conducive for them, they begun engaging with civil 
society organizations, NGOs, to go into communities and talk to communities” (PWYP Nigeria, interview 13.07.2011) 
 “The Government is far away. Communities make direct claims to Shell to provide for their needs. Shell is the Government for 
them. […]  “Many communities also have a higher awareness of these issues and want Shell to operate so that they can survive. 
[…] Communities cannot survive without Shell’s provision of socio-economic services, because the Government is not doing 
anything and thus they ask Shell to stay or come back” (NIDPRODEV, Skype interview 29.09.2013) 
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 “So they have evidence of lack of transparency in these places. And it continues unchecked. Why? Why? Because the mindset of 
the communities is to accept money from Shell as a share of part of the national cake that is their own portion. So a Shell project 
starts; everybody goes there. But in reality it is to get a national cake” (Environmental Rights Action, interview 12.07.2011) 
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4.5. Discussion 
In the introduction to this article, I noted the apparent dilemma that MNCs face when 
confronted with public responsibilities. How should a company respond? Should a 
successful business try first to serve public ends or to profit its shareholders? Satisfying 
one demand may require violating others and potentially jeopardize organizational 
legitimacy. For the public at large, this dilemma becomes particularly critical in a context 
of a governance void where there is no control to ensure that MNCs involvement in 
public good issues are done in the best interest of the public. While institutional scholars 
have contributed to a sophisticated normative account of the adoption of political 
responsibilities and role (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007), and 
depicted paradox of compliant adopters not achieving the desired goals (Bromley & 
Powell, 2012), it remains theoretically underdeveloped and empirically under-explored 
to what extent companies can and do conform to external institutional pressure to 
achieve societal outcomes. To understand the effect of a company’s response to 
institutional norms for political CSR on societal outcomes, this paper addressed the 
following research questions: (1) How do companies respond to political CSR demands? 
(2) Under which conditions are the different response strategies likely to be mobilized? 
(3) How do corporate response strategies affect societal outcomes? 
4.5.1. A response model to political CSR demands  
The emergent model reveals a rather more complex and dynamic picture of MNCs’ 
responses to political CSR demands than that presented in the literature above and 
sheds new light on the gap between political CSR activities and public ends. The findings 
identify four main responses ranging from symbolic implementation (compromise and 
internal buffering) to active contestation (defiance and manipulation). Notably, they 
vary in organizational resistance to institutional demands (active agency): from partial 
compliance with institutional demands to address public ends to increasing active 
resistance and intent to alter institutional norms towards corporate ends. The intensity 
of organizational response is related to the maturity and the convergent pressures of 
the issue at stake. For example, in line with the emergence of transparency as a 'global 
issue arena' and related government efforts for stringent regulations, Shell’s strategies 
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become more aggressive and coordinated (with the headquarters engaging in industry 
partnerships and alliances). This complex and dynamic process of corporate responses 
is extended over time, and somewhat indeterminate with predominantly negative 
consequences for public ends. The findings rule out full acquiescence to institutional 
demands in the context of these two boundary conditions. Political CSR norms are 
considered an institution: they formally prescribe adopter behavior and specify 
intended goals within an emerging CSR infrastructure (for an overview see Waddock, 
2008). In other words, they constitute the rules of the game serving to define social 
practices, assign roles, and guide interactions (Young, 1994).  
In this section I describe the dynamic process nature of these four responses and the 
boundary conditions in relation to societal outcomes. I regard each response and trigger 
factor as a conceptual building block for the emergent framework and corporate 
response model (presented in Table 13 and Figure 3 respectively). 
 
Table 13 A response framework for normative political CSR demands 
Aggregate 
theoretical 
dimensions 
Corporate 
response 
strategies 
Corporate response determinants 
Rationale 
Constituency power to enforce 
demands 
Efficiency Legitimacy Autonomy 
Legal 
coercion 
Voluntary 
diffusion 
Corporate 
dependency 
on external 
constituents 
Symbolic 
implementation 
Compromise Medium 
Medium-
high 
Low Low High 
Medium-
high 
Internal 
buffering 
Medium 
Medium-
high 
Medium-
low 
Low High Medium 
Active 
contestation 
Defiance High Low Medium Medium 
Medium-
low 
Medium-
low 
Manipulating High 
Medium-
low 
High High 
Medium-
low 
Low 
 
Symbolic implementation involves the company’s partial acquiescence to institutional 
demands through an integration of normatively prescribed processes such as 
evaluation, monitoring, partnering and dialogue despite a clear connection to desired 
outcomes (for both the community and the company) and a complete integration with 
core business processes and goals. Thus, the core of symbolic implementation is a focus 
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on appearance – the adherence to rationalizing accounts and myths of the environment 
– rather than a complete integration of institutional demands to address public ends 
with to core business processes and goals. It involves compromise and internal buffering 
strategies. Symbolic implementation is similar to symbolic adaption (commonly referred 
to as policy-practice decoupling) in that it protects core business practices, but it differs 
in that policies and practices are largely implemented within processes and subunits 
(Bromley and Powell (2012) define this form of decoupling as means-ends decoupling). 
Compromise strategies involve actively bargaining alternations of demands and 
expectations. In other words, organizations negotiate with external constituents to 
exact some concessions for the scope and frequency of compliance. In the case of Shell, 
the findings show that the company has actually increasingly acquiesce to institutional 
demands and largely implemented them into its core processes and structures. In other 
words, formal political CSR demands such as engagement in self-regulating MSI, 
dialogue, and democratic corporate governance have had real organizational 
consequences as daily practices and structure are altered. Yet, the adaption of political 
CSR norms remains symbolic. For instance, the findings reveal that Shell formally 
engages in multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the JIV, but at the same time seeks to 
compromise on the scope and timing of compliance and sanctions for non-compliance 
by negotiating with local communities or institutional constituents and community 
representatives in court settings the volume and cause of oil spills and the compensation 
rates. The company’s response is largely determined by (medium-high) anticipated 
legitimacy gains and (medium) efficiency gains. While organizational conformity to 
deliver public goods via self-regulating MSI (e.g. GMoU) makes Shell less efficient 
(external expectations to allocate corporate resources to public ends conflict with 
shareholder demands for more profit), it increases the company’s legitimacy by 
mobilizing the social support of host communities (in context of increasing communities’ 
demands for filling the governance void and addressing the negative impacts of the 
company’s core business) and international civil society (in context of high uncertainty 
and legitimacy crisis in the mid-90s). Shell is able to compromise on its normative 
promises since legal enforcement is low and all parties involved in the MSI – the 
government, affected communities, and civil society organizations – depend on Shell to 
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monitor its own compliance (e.g. JIV) and provide socio-economic development (e.g. 
GMoU). Furthermore, the high diffusion of voluntary standards and the positive 
evaluation of Shell’s participation these MSI serve as adaptive symbols as they provide 
the company with the causal link to societal ends.  
Internal buffering refers to the organization’s attempt to disguise the non-conformity of 
its core business operations by avoiding external inspection, evaluation and public 
scrutiny. While Shell started to acquiescence to political CSR demands for transparency 
and stakeholder engagement, the findings show that the company attempts to preclude 
the necessity of total conformity by concealing information and avoiding external 
inspection and meaningful participation and inclusive dialogue. The company’s response 
is largely determined by powerful movements for more transparency and stakeholder 
engagement in the extractive industry sector (voluntary diffusion) and related 
anticipated gains in legitimacy (medium-high) and by extension efficiency (medium). 
Shell is in a powerful position to buffer its core business operations by taking advantage 
of the lack of legal coercion and the resulting lack of an external control environment 
for data accuracy.  
Compromise and internal buffering strategies serve as adaptive symbols to the political 
CSR discourse, which have taken substantive value over and above their desired direct 
contribution to societal outcomes. The findings reveal that the company’s compromise 
and internal buffering strategies had predominantly negative societal outcomes but 
served corporate instrumental goals such as increased legitimacy and efficiency. For 
example, compromise strategies not only had a limited efficacy in addressing the 
negative impact of core operations and in bringing benefits and meaningful 
development to communities, but created additional negative externalities such as 
conflict over contracts and proper oil spill remediation. Also the company’s internal 
buffering strategies were criticized for limiting the effectiveness for evaluating the 
impact of Shell’s political CSR initiatives (benefits and harm) on the public good and for 
fueling distrust and even violent conflict.  
While symbolic implementation is on the thin edge of the wedge in organizational 
adaption to institutional demands, active contestation is rooted in the intentional 
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efforts to bypass or even alter the source and content of institutional demands or 
constituents. Hence it differs in the level of active resistance to given normative political 
CSR demands and draws attention to the dark side of organizational responses 
undermining the achievement of public ends. The findings reveal that Shell defies local 
regulatory requirements, Shell’s own principles, and international standards due to 
failures of due diligence in the company’s asset integrity management, allegations of 
corruption and bribery and complicity in human rights abuses. The company’s response 
is essentially determined by anticipated efficiency gains. Institutional demands for asset 
integrity and heightened duty to avoid human rights violations in conflict-zones like the 
Delta are in conflict with the unsustainable nature of the company’s core business (see 
Frynas, 2005) and the capitalist logic of profitability (Environmental Rights Action, 
interview 12.07.2011)(Idemudia, 2010, p. 839). Also, the temptation to ignore 
institutional values and norms is high for Shell since the potential for external 
enforcement by both legal coercion and voluntary standards is medium-low. The 
government dependence on oil revenues gives Shell enormous leverage in the 
regulatory system. The study also shows that Shell tries to alter upcoming more 
stringent demands and regulations in the area of revenue transparency by co-opting 
institutional constituents and influencing institutional belief systems. These more 
aggressive and coordinated responses were essentially determined by anticipated losses 
in efficiency and autonomy. A shift from voluntary to mandatory regulation presents a 
loss in decision-making discretion and the weakening or even annulation of previous 
pacifying, bargaining and internal buffering strategies (due to potentially higher legal 
coercion and sanctions in Nigeria). 
These four strategies presented in Table 13 form the basis for a new model for theorizing 
on corporate responses in the context of political CSR demands (see Figure 3 below). 
Each column answers one of the research questions with regard to the company’s 
strategy, response determinants and the societal impact. It is critical that the model 
demonstrates that these strategies do not come ready-packed, but present a complex 
picture in which a MNC is able to mobilize different response strategies at the same time 
in different institutional settings with different resistance to institutional demands to 
address public goods issues. This view of corporate response strategies provides a new 
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set of conceptual tools to understand the important question of how a company 
responds to institutional demands that are conflicting with the goals and the nature of 
the company’s core business. 
 
 
Figure 3 Model of corporate response strategies and determinants and their societal 
impact 
 
4.5.2. Implications  
The new model of corporate response strategies, visualized in Figure 3, make two 
important contributions to the literature: (1) it identifies previously unidentified 
responses to normative political CSR demands – namely compromise, internal buffering, 
defiance and manipulation; and (2) it sheds light on the interests and power relations 
behind the company’s response strategy. This study offers several contributions to the 
political CSR literature in specific and the broader CSR literature in general. Since the 
political CSR field is dominated by institutional theory and stakeholder theory (Frynas & 
Response determinants Response strategies Impact on societal outcomes 
Rationale 
 
• Efficiency 
• Legitimacy 
• Autonomy 
Constituency power to 
enforce demands 
 
• Legal coercion 
• Voluntary diffusion 
• Corporate dependency 
on external constituents 
Symbolic implementation 
 
• Compromise 
• Internal buffering 
Active contestation 
 
• Defiance 
• Manipulation 
• Limited efficacy in 
addressing negative impact of 
core operations & in bringing 
meaningful development 
• Created additional negative 
externalities: conflict over 
contracts & proper oil spill 
remediation 
• Limited effectiveness for 
evaluating impact of Shell’s 
political CSR initiatives 
(benefits & harm)  
• Distrust 
• Violent conflict 
• Entrenched corruption 
• Dampened efforts to achieve 
social & economic 
development 
• Contributed to a culture of 
violence & systematic human 
rights violations   
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Stephens, 2014) the critical gaps depicted here also contribute to future theory 
development in this body of literature. I now review these contributions in detail. 
4.5.2.1. The dynamic and indeterminate nature of responses to political CSR demands 
With regard to the first point, MNCs are assumed to acquiescence to political CSR 
demands due to a governance void (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007), 
increasingly rationalizing pressures to increase transparency and accountability 
(Bromley & Powell, 2012) and an increased homogenization of CSR across borders 
through cognitive, normative and regulative pressures (Matten & Moon, 2008; 
Waddock, 2008). The emerging institutional CSR infrastructure is even predicted to 
facilitate the adaption of hard law (Rivoli & Waddock, 2011). In this line of thought, 
scholars assume that any form of decoupling of corporate policies or practices from 
institutional demands is considered a transitory phenomenon (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 
2008; Bromley & Powell, 2012; Haack et al., 2012) as it does not provide general 
legitimacy benefits (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 516) and thus may not be a viable long-
term option for adopters of CSR-related practices (Haack et al., 2012). 
This study reveals a more complex and dynamic repertoire of alternative strategies 
available to organizations than previously acknowledged in the political CSR literature 
in specific and the institutional literature in general. Notably, it introduces the role of 
organizational self-interest and active agency in organizational responses to political CSR 
demands. This research draws on and contributes to previous institutional work that 
proposed a useful typology of responses to institutional demands (Oliver, 1991) and 
introduced the conception of ‘institutional work’ or the “purposive action of individuals 
and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence 
& Suddaby, 2006, p. 215). In particular, it enhances the predictive power of these 
theoretical concepts when discussing responses to conflicting demands in a particular 
empirical setting. So far these scholars merely suggests “that organizations find it 
difficult to acquiesce to what is expected from them and, thus, are highly likely to resort 
to more resistant strategies, such as compromise, avoidance, defiance, or manipulation” 
(Pache & Santos, 2010). Specifically, this research introduces a previously 
unacknowledged response, internal buffering, as a symbolic effort to implement 
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political CSR demands into the company’s core processes and structure. In line with 
other studies, the findings also reveal symbolic implementation (Bromley & Powell, 
2012; Wijen, 2014) and active contestation (Levy, 2008) and as new, and potentially 
more consequential forms of deviation from institutional demands such as the 
normative benchmark of political CSR. As a consequence, the findings demonstrate the 
dynamic, and somehow indeterminate nature of corporate responses to political CSR 
demands as opposed to the current framing of any deviation from this normative 
benchmark as a transitory phenomenon (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Bromley & 
Powell, 2012; Haack et al., 2012): the findings show that company employs various 
response strategies for one issue area at the same time ranging from symbolic 
implementation to active contestation. In line with other studies (Oliver, 1991; Pache & 
Santos, 2010), this study rules out full compliance as a likely response in the context of 
the identified boundary conditions. 
These findings show furthermore, that – contrary to the assumptions of political CSR – 
conformity is neither inevitable nor invariably instrumental for achieving corporate 
legitimacy. For example, internal buffering strategies serve as (to borrow from the 
vocabulary of Jürgen Habermas) a ‘procurement of legitimation’. The company uses CSR 
reporting and transparency initiatives as adaptive symbols to the political CSR discourse 
to portray themselves as responsible citizens that care about the public good while 
selecting only a few areas for openness and avoiding independent verification of 
baseline data. Thus, established input legitimacy dimension such as transparency, 
consensual orientation, procedural fairness, and stakeholder inclusion are ironically 
used as adaptive symbols to serve corporate instrumental goals instead of public ends. 
In the same line of thought Henriques (2007, p. 150) commented that it is ironic that 
CSR or sustainability reports “were originally conceived as mechanisms for companies 
to demonstrate that they were being influenced by their stakeholders, rather than 
vehicles for the opposite”. Given Shell’s positive evaluations from MSI such as the GRI 
and numerous CSR awards, this confirms previous claims that “not only that deviations 
from the normative prescripts occur in successful organizations, but that they may even 
be a major promoter of success” (Brunsson, 1993) and obtain even legitimacy benefits 
by co-optation institutional constituents (Oliver, 1991). 
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In sum, this study sheds light on the limited assumptions of political CSR literature with 
regard to the finite deliberation process leading to consensual outcomes to enhance 
both corporate legitimacy and societal ends as it depicts a rather complex and somehow 
indeterminate process of contestation leaning towards corporate instrumental goals 
and interests. It also extents institutional work on the relationship between action and 
institutions (Oliver, 1991), subsequent empirical studies and theoretical extensions (Rao 
et al. 2001; Seo and Creed 2002; Thornton 2002; Zilber 2002; Lawrence 2004; 
Washington and Zajac 2005; Greenwood and Suddaby 2006) and more general 
descriptions of the relationship between action and institutions (DiMaggio and Powell 
1991; Beckert 1999; Lawrence 1999; Fligstein 2001 in (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
4.5.2.2. Conflicting goals and power struggles 
The political CSR literature prescribes MNCs’ conformity to external pressures in line 
with institutional theory’s assumptions about the similarity of expectations between 
organizations and constituents that impose pressures and expectations. For example, 
the authors claim that MNCs should, and already do, engage in traditional government 
activities of political and social regulation even in areas not directly related to their 
business (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007) and operate as new providers of citizenship rights 
and public goods (Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer et al., 2009). 
In other words, business firms’ interaction with the political sphere should be in the 
name of the public interest (Scherer et al., 2009, p. 577) reflecting a pro-social logic that 
differs fundamentally from narrow self-interest (Suchman, 1995, p. 579 in Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2011). Furthermore, political CSR’s normative yardstick is a power-free 
discourse (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011) based on the ‘forceless force of the better 
argument’ (Habermas, 1990, p. 185 in Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). In this sense, multi-
stakeholder deliberation is understood as a ‘school of democracy’ where power 
differences are neutralized by the democratic design of the arena (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2011) following input and output legitimacy criteria (Mena & Palazzo, 2012). Political 
CSR scholars also assume that corporations become subjects of new forms of 
democratic processes of legitimacy and control by engaging in the processes of self-
regulation (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). The authors assume that these normative means 
encourage processes of ‘communication’ and ‘deliberation’ with multiple stakeholders 
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contributing to organizational learning and democratization rather than mere 
bargaining along the lines of participants’ pre-defined institutional interests and power 
differences (Dryzek, 2005; Risse, 2004; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 
2007).  
The data however indicates in line with other studies (Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 
2010) that this emphasis on the consensual nature of institutional demands with 
corporate goals is “bounded by the potential for dissensus between organizational and 
institutional expectations, which gives rise to the mobilization and defense of 
organizational interests” (Oliver, 1991, p. 162). In this line of thought, the analysis has 
revealed the paradox of conflicting institutional demands with regard to efficiency, 
legitimacy and autonomy as one important determinant for Shell’s response strategies. 
For example, Shell’s political CSR activities in the area of community development and 
transparency became deeply shaped by external legitimacy criteria that have little to do 
or are even at odds with the organization’s core goals. However, the business case for 
political CSR (efficiency) and the ‘procurement of legitimation’ mask the underlying 
paradox.  
Ignoring this paradox has hampered organizations like Shell to act responsible and 
undermined the achievement of broader social and ecological ends. This dilemma of 
contradicting demands has been identified by Weber (Weber, 1930; Weber, Roth, & 
Wittech, 1921) as the tensions between formal and substantive rationalities and is also 
captured in the vast array of extant literature on paradox (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; 
Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010; Smith & Lewis, 2011) and multiple institutional logics 
(Lounsbury, 2007; Thorton & Ocasio, 1999). Yet, it has gained little attention in the 
political CSR literature. In line with paradox scholars this study suggest that paradoxes 
are particularly relevant in the field of business in society (Bouckaert, 2006), as the 
market structure and business systems naturally constrain the forms and extent of CSR 
approaches (Sum & Ngai, 2005). In that regard, one of the key issues in implementing 
political CSR seems to be the tensions involved in integrating and embedding normative 
demands into the company’s core business activities (Campbell, 2007; Porter & Kramer, 
2007). 
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This study also follows a call to shed light on motivations and interests (Whelan, 2012) 
and the underlying power relations (Banerjee, 2008) that inform MNC’s responses to 
political CSR demands and can obstruct the rights of citizens (Nyberg et al., 2013) and 
undermine representative democracy and the public good (Barley, 2007). Following the 
critique on asymmetric interests above, this study suggests that it is empirically more 
accurate to conceive ‘political CSR’ initiatives as a politically contested environment 
driven by instrumental reasoning and struggles for control and power. Notably, this 
study has identified a corporation’s response repertoire ranging from accommodative 
strategies such as bargaining and internal buffering to more resistant and disruptive 
strategies such as active defiance and manipulation. Here, this study has revealed that 
a second important determinant for MNC’s responses to political CSR demands are 
institutional control mechanisms such as legal coercion and voluntary diffusion and 
corporate dependence on institutional constituents who exert power. These findings 
show that CSR should not be perceived as mere ‘greenwashing’ (i.e. symbolic adaption), 
but a continuous power play in which MNCs have substantially altered elements of the 
company’s discourse, business model, and governance structure in line with the 
normative benchmark of political CSR, and at the same time continuously try to extend 
the boundaries for corporate action/limitation – ‘a battle for control’. 
Thus, in line with other scholars, this study finds that the political CSR literature “is yet 
to take full or consistent account of the fact that Western MNCs are ‘specialized 
economic organs’“ (Ruggie, 2008, p. 16 in Whelan, 2012) and that global and local MSI 
are not inherently equitable or democratic, but depending on dynamics of power and 
strategy (Gill, 2002; Levy & Prakash, 2003; Levy et al., 2015) to sustain corporate 
legitimacy and deflect regulatory threats (Barley, 2010; Shamir, 2004). For instance, the 
tobacco industry’s CSR efforts have been described as “a tool of stakeholder 
management aimed at diffusing the political impact of public health advocates by 
breaking up political constituencies working towards evidence-based tobacco 
regulation” (Fooks et al., 2012, p. 283). In the same line of though it has been observed 
that “CSR evolves as a complex site where pressures and counter-pressures begin to 
assume a more or less definitive structure, with ‘authorized’ agents who occupy certain 
‘recognized’ positions from which they assert ‘what is at stake’” (Shamir, 2004, p. 671). 
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Also, in line with Levy et al. (2015) the identified response determinants show that 
“strategic power is […] curtailed, however, by the same forces of indeterminacy and 
complexity, which limit the ability of agents to anticipate every contingency” (Levy et 
al., 2015, p. 7).  
Altogether this study revealed that political CSR in practice fails to fully attain to the 
normative benchmark of a Habermasian ideal of a public-oriented company 
participating in a power-free and deliberative process of decision-making. Yet, this study 
also showed that political CSR practice is not an empty rhetoric or a case of mere 
‘greenwashing’, but that political CSR norms have been largely implemented into the 
corporate processes and governance structure. Thus, corporations can act responsible 
in line with political CSR norms. But the response to institutional demands are likely to 
be partial and short-term as long as essential determinants such as rationales and 
underlying power structures are not addressed with effective regulation and 
monitoring. 
4.5.3. Limitations 
This study has limitations that should be taken seriously. First, this study is based on a 
single case, and it would be important to examine others in different industrial and 
geographical contexts. Notably, the case of Shell is unique for the nature of its 
controversial core business and complex operating environment, which are not found 
in other industry sectors or geographical settings. Despite these boundary conditions, 
an extreme case such as the one presented in this paper offers an opportunity to study 
a familiar phenomenon and set of strategies in-depth and focus on key elements that 
existing work has neglected (Bamberger & Pratt, 2010). Notably scholars call for more 
empirical investigation on the impact of corporate response strategies on outcomes for 
society (Banerjee, 2007, p. 167; Devinney, 2009, p. 54; Margolis & Walsh, 2003) in 
particular settings (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 519; Brunsson et al., 2012; Frynas & 
Stephens, 2014) such as in complex and heterogeneous environments (Scherer et al., 
2013). In the case of Shell the process of interest is ‘transparently observable’ 
(Pettigrew, 1988) and thus “offer lessons for all organizations as they face an 
increasingly turbulent world” (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Moreover, extant research supports 
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the thesis that symbolic implementation is not limited to the extractive industry sector. 
For example, it has been shown that information and technology departments are 
commonly buffered from the rest of an organization (Boynton & Zmud, 1987), or that in 
hospitals subunits such as nurses, physicians, or paramedical staff are often distinct 
entities (Leatt & Schneck, 1984). Also strategy scholars (Gupta, 1984; Horwitch & 
Thietart, 1987) and recent research in organizational complexity and institutional 
pluralism (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011) and multiple 
institutional logics (Lounsbury, 2007; Thorton & Ocasio, 1999) observe incongruent and 
buffered units within organizations which would fit the characterization of symbolic 
implementation.  
Second, I am aware that there are other trigger factors that may influence the response 
of the organization. For instance, in addition to the factors that I have outlined in this 
study, organizational responses might also differ in terms of the pillar on which they rest 
such as normative, regulative, and cognitive factors. For example building on the 
cognitive factors, stakeholder theory literature (Freeman, 1984; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 
1997) point to the ‘perception of the importance of constituents’ as a determinant 
response factor. Also, recent strategy scholars (Murillo-Luna, Garces-Ayerbe, & Riverra-
Torres, 2008; Sharma & Henriques, 2005) find that organizations are more likely to 
respond to stakeholder pressures that they perceive as important. Other response 
determinants could include structural factors such as relationships with other 
organizations that favor a certain set of responses (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Westphal 
& Zajac, 2001) and the organization’s position in the field (Dorado, 2005; Haveman & 
Rao, 1997). They may also differ with regard to organizational factors such as the profile 
of organizational leaders (Ingram & Simons, 1995; Oliver, 1991), and the extent to which 
organizational members adhere to and promote a given demand (Greenwood & Hinings, 
1996; Kim, Shin, Oh, & Jeong, 2007). Notably, taking into account the latter would have 
shed light on why Shell has resorted to compromise and manipulation strategies – 
responses that have been predicted as unlikely in the context of conflicting institutional 
demands (Pache & Santos, 2010). Overall, while I acknowledge the importance of other 
factors, their detailed analysis is out of the scope for this study and suggested for future 
research. Furthermore, in the context of political CSR critical management scholars have 
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pointed to the importance of shedding light on the underlying rationale (Barley, 2007; 
Whelan, 2012) and power relationships (Banerjee, 2007; Levy & Scully, 2007) as 
important response determinants to political CSR demands. 
4.6. Conclusion 
This research embraces the company’s dilemma between economic and broader social 
objectives and the lack of attention to societal outcomes as a starting point for a 
systematic in-depth empirical inquiry of the oil mayor Royal Dutch Shell. The emergent 
theoretical model of MNCs’ responses to political CSR demands develops two key 
insights. First, it identifies previously unidentified responses to normative political CSR 
demands – namely compromise, internal buffering, defiance and manipulation. Notably, 
they vary in organizational resistance to institutional demands (active agency): from 
partial compliance with institutional demands to address public ends to increasing 
active resistance and intent to alter institutional norms towards corporate ends. The 
intensity of organizational response is related to the maturity and the convergent 
pressures of the issue at stake. This complex and dynamic process of corporate 
responses is extended over time, and somewhat indeterminate with predominantly 
negative consequences for public ends. Contrary to the current framing of decoupling 
of political CSR as a transitory phenomenon (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Bromley & 
Powell, 2012; Haack et al., 2012), the findings also show that conformity is neither 
inevitable nor invariably instrumental for achieving corporate legitimacy. In sum, this 
study sheds light on the limited assumptions of political CSR literature with regard to 
the finite deliberation process leading to consensual outcomes to enhance both 
corporate legitimacy and societal ends as it depicts a rather complex and somehow 
indeterminate process of contestation leaning towards corporate instrumental goals 
and interests. It also extents institutional work on the relationship between action and 
institutions (Oliver, 1991), subsequent empirical studies and theoretical extensions (Rao 
et al. 2001; Seo and Creed 2002; Thornton 2002; Zilber 2002; Lawrence 2004; 
Washington and Zajac 2005; Greenwood and Suddaby 2006) and more general 
descriptions of the relationship between action and institutions (Beckert, 1999; 
DiMaggio, 1991; Fligstein, 2001; Lawrence, 1999). Second, the response model sheds 
light on the interests and power relations behind the company’s response strategy. In 
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particular, the findings reveal the paradox of conflicting institutional demands with 
regard to efficiency, legitimacy and autonomy as one important determinant for the 
Shell’s response strategies, which questions the emphasis of political CSR scholars on 
the consensual nature of institutional demands with corporate goals. This study also 
sheds light on motivations and interests (Whelan, 2012) and the underlying power 
relations (Banerjee, 2008) that inform MNC’s responses to political CSR demands. These 
findings show that CSR should not be perceived as mere ‘greenwashing’, but a 
continuous power play in which MNCs have substantially altered elements of the 
company’s discourse, business model, and governance structure in line with the 
normative benchmark of political CSR, and at the same time continuously try to extend 
the boundaries for corporate action/limitation – ‘a battle for control’. Thus, this study 
suggests that it is empirically more accurate to conceive ‘political CSR’ initiatives as a 
politically contested environment driven by instrumental reasoning and struggles for 
control and power. Altogether this study revealed that political CSR in practice fails to 
fully attain to the normative benchmark of a Habermasian ideal of a public-oriented 
company participating in a power-free and deliberative process of decision-making. Yet, 
this study also showed that political CSR practice is not an empty rhetoric, but that 
political CSR norms have been largely implemented into the corporate processes and 
governance structure. Thus, corporations can act responsible in line with political CSR 
norms. But the response to institutional demands are likely to be partial and short-term 
as long as essential determinants such as rationales and underlying power structures 
are not addressed with effective regulation and monitoring. Thus, while the case of Shell 
is uncommon and analytically extreme in the literature, the phenomenon under 
investigation is increasingly relevant in the world and hence, timely and important for 
the research community. 
The case study approach taken in this research also allows for theoretical generalizability 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Geertz, 1973). The company’s dilemma between economic and 
broader social objectives is not limited to the extractive industry sector. The ascendency 
of neo-liberal ideology and associated privatization of traditional government 
responsibilities is putting increasing pressure on all industry sectors to address public 
goods problems and regulation. Furthermore, the pervasive spread of rationalizing 
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trends in society such as the increasing emphases on measurement, transparency, and 
accountability is putting growing pressure on organizations to align their policies and 
practices more closely and to conform to external evaluative criteria.  
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Exhibit 4.7.2. Timeline of events 
Date Events & Shell’s response strategies 
1980s Environmental Justice Movement 
1990 Movement of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) & Ogoni Bill of Rights campaigning for social, economic 
and environmental justice in the Niger Delta of Nigeria 
1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro: Modern CSR was born, when UN-sponsored recommendations 
on regulation were rejected in favor of a manifesto for voluntary self-regulation put forward by 
a coalition of companies called the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
1995 MOSOP chief and Ogoni leader Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other Ogoni were hanged by Nigerian 
authorities 
1996 Wiwa-Shell court case: Shell faces lawsuit under the US Alien Tort Claims Act 1789 for alleged 
human rights violations in Nigeria, including summary execution, crimes against humanity, 
torture, inhumane treatment and arbitrary arrest and detention 
1996 Shell lobbies against ATCA in collaboration with Shell’s chief executive Sir Philip Watts, then chair 
of the UK branch of the International Chamber of Commerce (Pendleton et al., 2004) 
1996 Shell Corporate governance restructuring after broad inquiry of stakeholder perceptions on 
Shell’s reputation and trust from 1995 to 1996 
 Installation of permanent Nigeria team at headquarters level to defend the company’s 
position with regard to the ’Ogoni issue’. Today the team is responsible for partnerships 
management and external engagement with local and international stakeholders 
 Employed Shandwick, one of the world’s largest PR firms, to repair its public image, improve 
its ability to lobby effectively and to develop the www.shell.com website 
 Took on four new in-house senior PR executives (Pendleton et al., 2004) 
1997  Shell is the first company to make an explicit commitment to safeguard human rights  
 Rewrites its 1976 Statement of Business Principles into the statement of General Business 
Principles  
1997 Shell sets up Social Responsibility Committee  
1997 Shell International Renewables was created as a new core business and catapulted Shell to 
become one of the leading renewables companies in the world (Frynas, 2003) 
1998 First Shell Report presents a Road Map of how Shell planned to integrate sustainable 
development into the way it does business over the next few years 
1998 Shell withdrew from the Global Climate Coalition (lobby group) and started to brand itself as a 
caring, green company 
1999 Second Shell Report reports on Shell’s performance under each of our Business Principles and 
hires financial auditors KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers to verify the social information 
(Shell, 1999) 
1999 Corporate governance reform: a new Sustainable Development Management Framework  
 The framework is implemented at the Group level and in key areas of the businesses 
 A Sustainable Development Council encourages and monitors progress across the Group and 
comprises senior chief executives (Shell, 1999, p. 20) 
2000 Shell Foundation is set up as a legally independent charity 
2000 Shell joins the Global Compact and Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
2001 Shell develops with the help of the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) the Human Rights 
Compliance Assessment (HRCA) tools (Jacoba Schouten, 2010, pp. 289-292) 
2001 A leaked US embassy cable reveals that Shell blocks Global Initiative on Gas Flaring (US Embassy, 
2001) 
2002 SPDC report admits that the cash payments remain a problem (Pendleton et al., 2004) 
03/2002 Shell joins the Global business coalition on Health to work in partnerships with relevant local 
and global organizations as well as other key stakeholders to help combat the AIDS epidemic 
http://www.shell.com/global/environment-society/society/hiv-and-aids.html 
08/2002 As a response to peaceful protests by women from several ethnic groups (Ijaw, Urhobo and 
Itsekiri) Chevron and Shell invite the military who brutalizes most of the women (Human Rights 
Watch, 2003) 
10/2002 A leaked cable reports that Shell have denied responsibility for an oil spill which, according to 
the NGO Center for Social and Corporate Responsibility was caused by corrosion 
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2003 Shell starts its liveWIRE Nigeria program to provide access to entrepreneurship training, 
business development services and start-up capital to establish and expand youth-owned 
businesses (Shell Nigeria, 2012b) 
08/2003 A leaked embassy cable reports that Shell appears to be closely involved in the Nigerian 
military's plans for a large-scale deployment in the Warri area and is providing the army with 
helicopters for reconnaissance (US Embassy, 2003) 
08/2003  A leaked US Embassy cable reveals that Shell and two other multinational oil companies (who 
signed the VPs) don’t have a codified use of force guidelines in either their internal policies 
for Nigeria or bilateral agreements with the government 
 Shell’s global (not Nigeria-specific) set of use of force Guidelines and its supplement for 
Nigeria (Police Force Order Number 237) is non-compliant with a raft of human rights 
instruments (US Embassy, 2003) 
09/2003 A leaked US Embassy cable reveals that Shell confirms the extent of support for the military 
(Amunwa & Brown, 2013) 
09/2003 A leaked US Embassy cable reveals that Shell is responsible for major oil spill in village of Tia, 
Ogoni (Amunwa & Brown, 2013) 
2003 A leaked report of Shell’s consultants WAC Global Consultants on the peace and security 
situation in the Niger Delta reveals most company-community conflicts can be traced back to 
poor company practices, not poor policies (WAC Global Services, 2003, p. 11). 
12/2003 Shell’s consultants, KPMG, officially state that they are unable to evaluate community spending 
due to significant control weaknesses which impacts on data integrity (SPDC, 2004, p. 29) 
01/2004 Christian Aid report criticizes Shell’s Community Development (CD) approach (Pendleton et al., 
2004) 
2004  Shell restructures its community development program (CD) to become ‘sustainable 
community development program (SCD)’ including a Peace and Security Strategy (PaSS) (WAC 
Global Services, 2003) 
 Teams up with US Agency for International Development and the World Bank’s International 
Finance Corporation for a three-year malaria-prevention and a new youth employment 
initiative respectively (Pendleton et al., 2004) 
11/2005 Shell ignores court ruling to stop gas flaring in the Iwherekan community/Niger Delta (Climate 
Justice Programme, 2005) 
2005 Nominated for the Public Eye People’s Award 
http://www.publiceye.ch/en/hall-of-shame/royal-dutch-shell-group/ 
01/2006 Violence against Shell starts: MEND rebels attack an SPDC oil field (International Crisis Group, 
2006) 
2006 UNDP report reveals damages from oil exploration and negative impact on socio-economic 
development (UNDP, 2006) 
05/2006 A Nigerian court orders SPDC to pay $1.5 billion in damages to a host community in the Niger 
Delta for years of environmental pollution. Shell files an appeal and refuses to accept the 
judgment. 
02/2006 
 
Military helicopter gunships and jet fighters are deployed over Okerenkoko and surrounding 
communities emitting explosives and shooting into communities indiscriminately. The aircraft 
used for the attacks are said to have been deployed from Osubi airstrip in Warri, a civilian airstrip 
owned by Shell (International Crisis Group, 2006) 
09/2006 
 
Documents released to the Guardian under the Freedom of Information Act show that the Shell 
Foundation lobbied for commercial interests of the company even though the multinational oil 
company says the charity it funds - the Shell Foundation - is completely independent and 
contributes nothing towards its profits (Evans & Macalister, 2006) 
12/2006 65 Nobel laureates comprising the Commission of Nobel Laureates on Peace, Equity and 
Development in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria proposed measures to oil companies to 
prevent the spiral of deadly violence in the oil-rich yet impoverished Niger Delta region: (1) 
publish audits of their revenues; (2) establish a “Community Investment Fund”; (3) clean up oil 
spills, eliminate gas flares, and provide special compensation to communities devastated by 
environmental degradation; and (4) train and hire residents from affected populations in the 
Delta region. http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/954799/link_page_view 
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2006  SPDC formalizes new approach to Community Development: Global Memorandum of 
Understanding, which places emphasis on more transparent & accountable processes, regular 
communication with grassroots organizations and greater sustainability and conflict 
prevention  
 Shell integrated a commitment to business integrity & transparency in Code of Conduct (Shell, 
2012). 
05/2008 Victims of oil pollution from Shell installations in Oruma, Goi and Ikot Ada Udo, in conjunction 
with Milieudefensie, have started legal proceedings against Shell Nigeria and Royal Dutch Shell 
plc (the parent company) in the Netherlands 
08/2008 Oil spill due to equipment failure (“weld defect”) in Bodo, Ogoniland (Amnesty International, 
2011) 
12/2008 Oil spill in Bodo caused by equipment failure as a result of natural corrosion 
07/2009 
 
The Global Business Coalition names SPDC the first winner of the annual award for Partnership 
in Collective Action for the company’s Niger Delta AIDS Response program 
http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/media/news-and-media-releases/2009/niger-delta-
aids-response-program-24062009.html 
10/2009 A leaked US cable reveals that Shell has tied grip over Nigerian government (Amunwa & Brown, 
2013) 
2009 Shell agreed to pay US$15.5 million to settle the Ken Saro-Wiwa case lawsuit in the US 
2009 Corporate Governance Reform 
 Embedded CR governance structures at the Board (Royal Dutch Shell, 2009a, p. 10).  
 Introduces a clause on the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights to all new and 
renewed security contracts (Royal Dutch Shell, 2009a) 
2010 Winner of the Social enterprise and reports award (Shell Nigeria, 2012b) 
2010 3-year partnership with Discovery Channel global education to improve quality of education in 
Nigeria through enhanced visual aid and technology in the classroom (Shell Nigeria, 2012b) 
2011 Shell’s liveWIRE Nigeria program received the African leadership Magazine award for Youth 
Development (Shell Nigeria, 2012b) 
2011 United Nations Environment Program scientific assessment criticized Shell over its inadequate 
oilfield infrastructure and clean-up of oil spills, a practice which did not meet local regulatory 
requirements, SPDC’s own procedures or international best practices. 
2011 Shell’s “Cradle-to-Career” program receives special recognition at the 2011 United Nations 
innovation Fair in Geneva, Switzerland. (Shell Nigeria, 2012b) 
2011 Amnesty Report denounces Shell’s oil spill investigation process (Amnesty International, 2011) 
2011 Shell announced hired Bureau Veritas to verify the oil spill investigation system, but refuses to 
inform civil society members what exactly Bureau Veritas has verified or will verify, and whether 
Bureau Veritas will be allowed to consider evidence provided by communities and NGOs 
(Amnesty International, 2012a, p. 8) 
07/2012 Nigerian authorities fined Shell US$5 billion as an ‘administrative penalty’ for an oil spill in 
December 2011 at the Bonga offshore field. 
08/2012 Information from Shell’s security department was leaked to Platform by an ex-Shell manager 
and reveals failure of due diligence. Shell’s security spending fueled conflict and enabled 
systematic human rights abuses by government forces and armed militants. 
2012 Shell successfully sued along with other oil companies, American Petroleum Institute, National 
Foreign Trade Council & US Chamber of Commerce the Securities and Exchange Commission in 
federal court to challenge the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act Section 1504  
01/2013 The district court of the Hague ruled that Shell was responsible for an oil spill in the Niger Delta 
and ordered the oil giant to pay damages to one farmer, Mr. Friday Akpan 
07/2013 The National Contact Point (NCP) agency (which has been set up to oversee the OECD 
guidelines), found that Shell’s statements that sabotage is responsible for most oil spilt in Nigeria 
were based on disputed evidence and flawed investigation (Bawden, 2013) 
2013 Nominated for the Public Eye People’s Award 
2014 Out of court settlement: UK court case: Shell had to accept, in the first case of this kind, legal 
liability for two massive oil leaks in Ogoni in 2008/2009 as a result of equipment failure. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion, limitations and future research 
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This thesis has examined a phenomenon that is both contemporary and lasting in time: 
the political role and responsibilities of MNCs to serve public goods and business 
regulation. The final section provides a synthesis and extension of the key findings of 
chapters 2,3, and 4. I first reiterate the key contributions, and then I identify some of 
the key patterns and limitations that have emerged in this thesis to present avenues for 
future research. 
Firstly, the chapters presented here have focused on the political role and 
responsibilities that the company Shell has adopted in a context of a governance void at 
the global and local level in Nigeria. Chapter 2 has broadly explored political CSR’s 
practices and the impact on societal outcomes in one particular area of political CSR – 
peace and development. The findings reveal first empirical insights into a predominantly 
normative and young debate10. On the one hand, this study highlights the negative 
impact of the Shell’s CSR practices on the dynamics of local violence and the company’s 
failure to address the negative social and environmental impact of its core business. On 
the other hand, the findings show the prevailing ambiguity in theory and practice 
surrounding the company’s new political role and responsibilities. Chapter 3 draws on 
scholarly work in in political philosophy (Habermas, 1998b; Habermas, 2001; Young, 
2004; Young, 2006) as well as subsequent works in political CSR (Mena & Palazzo, 2012; 
Scherer & Palazzo, 2011) to shed light on the previously identified ambiguity around the 
scope of the company’s political responsibility and the basis of corporate legitimacy. It 
enables to depict the limits of upstreaming political responsibilities based on Young’s 
(2006) parameters for reasoning and delineates the fragile basis of company’s licence to 
operate with regard to Mena and Palazzo’s (2012) criteria for input and output 
legitimacy. Chapter 4 draws on these findings to conceptualize a corporate response 
model to institutional demands for political CSR which reveals a rather more complex 
and dynamic picture of MNCs’ responses than that presented in the extant literature. 
Notably, it sheds light on the instrumentally motivated nature of the company’s 
response, underlying power relationships and identifies previously unidentified 
responses such as compromise, internal buffering, defiance, and manipulation 
                                                 
10 The first version of this bookchapter was published in Spanish in 2010 before Scherer and Palazzo’s 
extensive literature review with a new societal frame of reference for theorizing came out in 2011  
 197 
strategies. Collectively, these studies expose, both empirically and conceptually, the 
workings and shortcomings of a relatively new but influential phenomenon and in this 
way differentiates itself from previous research. 
The above presented challenges associated with the phenomenon are even expected to 
becoming more prevalent and consequential over time, which present many challenging 
avenues for future research. The ascendency of neo-liberal ideology, and associated 
privatization of traditional government activities, as well as a governance void at the 
global level and in many developing countries, push MNCs increasingly to address public 
goods issues and business regulation (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). Furthermore, the 
pervasive spread of rationalizing trends in society, such as the increasing emphases on 
accountability and transparency and the growing influence of managerial sciences, force 
organizations to align their ‘words and deeds’ and actually implement and measure their 
CSR policies (Bromley & Powell, 2012). Thus, questions related to the scope of these 
political responsibilities and the legitimacy of this involvement for both the company 
and democracy at large – particularly in the context of corporate malpractice – will 
become even more pressing. In my opinion, this presents not only an opportunity for 
future research but also a moral imperative for management scholars to address more 
closely issues related to environmental and social problems. There is no doubt that 
MNCs cannot solve these issues alone or turn into welfare organizations. Yet, the failure 
of solving persisting social and environmental problems cannot be attributed to 
technical problems solely, but to managerial or organizational failures which are not 
seldom related to instrumental interests or even greed. Hence, the study of this 
phenomenon can be particularly relevant to the solution of persisting social and 
environmental problems.  
5.1. Limitations and future research  
Altogether, this thesis has brought to the fore some main themes, which could lead the 
way for further studies. These themes relate to societal impact, accountability, and 
ambiguity, visually presented in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 Overarching patterns across the three research studies 
 
This thesis has also limitations that should be taken seriously. In the following I will 
discuss how future research can build on these themes and limitations. 
5.1.1. Societal impact 
The effectiveness of achieving desired societal outcomes emerged in this thesis as a 
main concern of affected stakeholders and the studies provided first important insights 
into this underresearched area. Future work should further examine the effectiveness 
of the actual achievement of desirable societal outcomes and in this way test one of 
political CSR’s main assumptions: that corporations should operate as new providers of 
public goods that transcent corporate economic ends. In other words, future studies 
should also go beyond the business case (searching for the positive impact for the 
corporation) and examine if political CSR practices effectively solve societal problems. 
As a starting point, future studies can address the following limitations of this thesis.  
The main limitation of this thesis is that it deals with a specific, extreme case that can 
be indicative of, but not conclusive regarding different industrial and geographical 
contexts. While the case of Shell offered a unique opportunity to yield rich insights into 
the respective areas of study, the nature of the company’s controversial core business 
is unique for its inherent social and environmental risks. Thus, it would be important to 
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examine if other, less controversial industry sectors might be more effective in achieving 
societal outcomes. The effectiveness of achieving societal goals might also vary 
considerably across different industry sectors since CSR practices can be more or less 
related to the company’s core business and thus competencies. With regard to the later, 
Valente and Crane (2010) developed for example a public responsibility matrix in which 
corporate strategies are categorized along the relation to the firm’s core operations 
(Valente & Crane, 2010). In sum, given that the normative goal of political CSR’s is the 
provision of public goods and the fact that this thesis has focused only on the extractive 
industry sector, future studies should examine the effectiveness of MNCs in adressing 
societal issues in different industrial and geographical settings to corrobate the 
arguments advanced here. A fruitful avenue for future research could also include the 
synthesis of multiple case studies in an effort to systematically map conditions and 
processes. Admittedly, future researchers have to deal with the challenge that public 
goals are a complicated area to measure. Specifically in the realm of socioenvironmental 
governance, goals are intially provisional and inherently contested due to the different 
and sometimes colliding interests in regulating global issues such as deforestation 
(Haack & Schoeneborn, 2015).  
Efforts at measuring the effectiveness on social outcomes have been increasing 
nevertheless in other areas and can inspire future political CSR scholarship. For example, 
in the area of social entrepreneurship exists a burgeoning literature on social impact 
indicators, blended value, and social return on investment (Dees, Emerson, & Economy, 
2002; Emerson, 2003; Lingane & Olsen, 2004; Nicholls, 2009). Also, impact investing, 
with its emphasis on measureable social and financial impact, is generating increasing 
interest among academics and can be worth of examination for future research in the 
area of political CSR’s societal impact. 
A second challenge of this thesis is the access to company data particularly with regard 
to the negative societal impact and sensitive information related to power relations and 
instrumental reasoning. While interviews with Shell employees provided valuable 
insights and guided the investigation, statements could eventually not be included due 
to confidentiality reasons. Since political CSR scholarship also neglects the individual 
level of analysis (Frynas & Stephens, 2014), future research should focus more on this 
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individual and organizational level of analysis. Other scholars have shown that the 
internal perspective of the corporation is vitally important to gaining an understanding 
of the company’s strategies and response determinants. For example, Pache and Santos 
(2010) take into account intraorganizational political processes and show that internal 
representation is one important factor for the mobilization of various response 
strategies. Also, Basu and Palazzo (2008) depicted the  degree of stakeholder integration 
into corporate decision-making and organizational sensemaking as a determining factor. 
Longitudinal research using participatory and ethnographic research methods would be 
of great value, although it would be challenging to achieve due to the before-mentioned 
confidentiality issues.  
5.1.2. Accountability 
Accountability has emerged as another key dimension in this PhD thesis. Main affected 
stakeholders as well as civil society organizations call for more account-giving of 
powerful MNCs such as Shell – particularly in the face of organizational misconduct. 
Notably, they question the self-regulating nature of political CSR initiatives that – in the 
face of a governance void – yield enourmous power to MNCs. Corporations that engage 
in self-regulating initiatives not only perform a legislative role, but also an executive and 
judicative function, since none of the prevailing standards is endowed with formal 
monitoring or enforcement systems. Thus, self-regulation allows its subjects to both 
design and enforce the rules themselves (Haufler, 2001, p. 8). It increases their power 
enormously compared to those of nation-states, which are controlled by democratic 
processes and structures based on the rule of (formal) law and the separation of powers. 
In this context, the thesis has revealed the enourmous power of oil companies such as 
Shell in both its home and host country and its strategic use for instrumental benefits. 
These insights are critical since the increasing political engagement of MNCs in 
traditional government activities and associated softer (voluntary) and indirect modes 
of steering are not matched with corresponding corporate accounability mechanisms 
that guarantee a democratic control of powerful MNCs. So far political CSR research has 
exclusively focused on process of legitimation (Frynas & Stephens, 2014) based on self-
regulating initiatives. For example, political CSR scholars identified at the organizational 
level patterns of legitimacy management over time (Baumann-Pauly, Scherer, & Palazzo, 
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2015) and examined criteria for the evaluation of (input and output) legitimacy of MSI 
(Mena & Palazzo, 2012). Furthermore, exemplary cases of political CSR such as the FSC 
have been criticized for a lack of ‘input legitimacy’ criteria such as transparency (Edward 
& Willmott, 2011) and weak performance with regard to ‘output legitimacy’ criteria such 
as coverage, efficacy, and good enforcement and monitoring of rules (Moog et al., 
2015). Thus, future research should go beyond the question of legitimacy and 
conceptualize a ‘political’ model of corporate governance (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, p. 
921; Whelan, 2012, p. 709) with clear accountability mechanisms for aligning MNCs’ 
decision making with the interests of their diverse citizenries.  
Future researchers taking on this endeavor should take into account how power relates 
to accountability mechanisms. While this thesis has shed light on underlying 
powerrelationships, more research is needed on how power operates in institutional 
settings to create, maintain or delegitimize institutions that aim to impose more 
stringent regulations and control on MNCs. While the criticality of power is still 
underresearched in organization theory in general (Barley, 2010; Clegg, Courpasson, & 
Phillips, 2006; Courpasson, Arellano‐Gault, Brown, & Lounsbury, 2008; Lounsbury, 2003; 
Martí & Mair, 2009) and with regard to institutional dynamics in particular (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, 2008), it goes totally understated in the political CSR 
literature. Future research could lend itself to insights from institutional 
entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004; Munir & Phillips, 
2005) where powerful actors use the resources at their disposal to maintain or create 
new institutional orders. Also, future research could go beyond individual actors or 
organizations and look at how power operates hegemonically in settings such as in 
postcolonial ones, where the values of the colonial power are routinely privileged in 
interpreting, framing, and addressing important issues (Khan, Munir, & Willmott, 2007). 
Future studies could also distinguish systemic forms of power (e.g., domination and 
discipline) from episodic power (e.g., force and influence) (Lawrence, 2008) and how 
actors might be able to resist institutional control and agency (see also Lukes, 2004).  
Another avenue for research for more accountability is reconsidering the role of the 
state. This thesis has shown that the ‘sticks are back out’. A precedent has been set when 
Shell was hold liable by its home governments in the UK and the Netherlands for 
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environmental degradation in the Niger Delta. Also current legal initiatives in the area 
of revenue transparency such as the EU directive and the Dodd-Frank Act in the US 
demonstrate that the state is not only willing, but also able to hold business to account 
for their practices beyond national boarders. Other scholars show as well, that states 
could sometimes use a variety of interrelated technological developments to better 
enforce (variable) social norms. For instance, Earth observation technologies such as 
Google Earth could help states to better enforce environmental legislation (Purdy, 
2009). In the same line of thought, Whelan (2012) asserts that the “nation-state 
continues to be an institutional form that possesses significant strength on a global 
scale” (Whelan, 2012, p. 715) as “1) powerful states remain capable of resisting and 
directing internet MNCs; 2) there is little evidence of a 'race to the bottom'; and 3) some 
MNCs (purport) to support a stronger role for states in certain regards” (ibid). While 
legal and political science scholarship affirm an increased importance of non-state 
actors and private self-regulating initiatives in global governance (e.g. Abbott & Snidal, 
2010; Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000), political scientists also 
suggest that state power not only remains strong, but continues to be a necessary 
precondition for successful economic globalization (e.g. Evans, 1997; Kim & Global 
Policy, 2013; Weiss, 2000). Furthermore, CSR scholarship provides mounting evidence 
that CSR can be very attractive to governments for two reasons. First, they can serve as 
a complement or substitute to government efforts and they can legitimize government 
policies (Moon, 2002). Second, national governments can reassert power with regard to 
CSR by influencing MSI, sustainability reporting and CSR standards (Frynas & Stephens, 
2014). For instance, Indonesia launched in 2007 corporate and investment laws in 2007 
that required companies to implement social and environmental responsibilities 
(Waagstein, 2011), the Chinese government attempts to promote its own version of CSR 
through a plethora of guidelines and regulations since 2006 (Marquis & Qian, 2014), 
Denmark launched in 2008 and 2012 the National Action Plans for CSR (Knudsen & 
Brown, 2015), and India’s Companies Act 2013 requires large companies to spend 2% of 
their profits on CSR related activities (Kumar, 2014). Thus, in face of this increasing 
empirical evidence that states are often capable of legally and/or hierarchically directing 
the activities of MNCs (or elements thereof), I encourage future researchers in line with 
other scholars (Frynas & Stephens, 2014; Whelan, 2012) to re-examine the role of the 
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state with regard to encouraging or enabling different political CSR practices and thus 
providing more accountability to the various sustainable development and human rights 
problems commonly associated with MNCs. In this way, future studies should also 
critically analyse one of political CSR’s main assumptions – that states suffer diminished 
capacities as a result of de-territorialized phenomena (Matten & Crane, 2005, pp. 172-
173; Scherer & Palazzo, 2008, pp. 423-424) and the blurred boundary between the 
private and public shpere (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). To advance future political CSR-
related scholarship, insights from political theory and political science should be applied 
in a more systematic way, “beyond their current use by political CSR scholars, who at 
present largely apply political theory in a very selective manner in order to justify the 
power of non-state actors in a globalizing economy” (Frynas & Stephens, 2014). In sum, 
I fully agree with Frynas and Stephens’ conclusion that a “reassessment of the role of 
the state presents an important challenge for future political CSR researchers, as it may 
lead to a richer understanding of the actual political influence of companies, the 
companies’ role within global governance or the nature and effectiveness of new hybrid 
forms of social and environmental regulations” (Frynas & Stephens, 2014).  
A third way for future research to address the emerging theme of accountability could 
be the development a governance framework from the perspective of main affected 
(but often marginalized) stakeholders that can enable a more responsive and 
accountable approach to political CSR. In detail, this framework could identify tools and 
processes, which can be used by affected stakeholders to hold MNCs to account for their 
political engagement in the delivery of public goods and regulation. This could be 
approached from a practice perspective (Bourdieu, 1990) on corporate social 
responsibility practice in order to focus on how the management of CPR is actually 
done/or suggested to be done by affected stakeholders The term ‘practice’ should thus 
be used in an Aristotelian sense of praxis as opposed to nature. In other words, practice 
relates to areas of human life that do not simply exist by themselves but are created, 
changed and improved by human actions.  
The inclusion of affected stakeholders’ positions regarding unacceptable impact or to 
advance possible remedies sought by external stakeholders would not only allow 
affected stakeholder groups to press for accountability, but also help companies to focus 
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on the right practices for managing their political role and responsibilities. In this sense, 
it would also provide insights into how MNCs can successfully manage such political 
responsibilities while still respecting their economic mandate to run a profitable 
business. Thus, this accountability approach to political responsibilities of MNCs would 
address the call for a ‘political’ model of corporate governance (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, 
p. 921; Whelan, 2012, p. 709) with a clear mechanism that deliberatively aligns MNC 
decision making with the interests of their diverse citizenries (Crane et al., 2008, p. 84) 
and depict the right practices for managing social and environmental issues from an 
empirical perspective (Scherer & Palazzo 2011). Furthermore, it would address 
particularly the previously mentioned call from scholars to shift the predominant 
scholarly focus from finding a positive relationship between CSR and financial 
performance (dependent variable = outcome for corporation) to exploring the effects of 
political CSR on outcomes for society (dependent variable = outcome for society) 
(Banerjee, 2007). 
Ambiguity 
A third theme that emerged from this thesis is ambiguity. While this thesis and other 
scholars have attempted to clarify the conceptual underpinnings of political CSR, there 
is still no consensus on the very definition or boundaries of political CSR. In this context, 
Frynas and Stephens bewail (2014) that scholars have attempted to appropriate the 
meaning of the term ‘political CSR’ for a narrow research agenda. For example, authors 
have exclusively focused on changes in global governance to distinguish between 
instrumental and political CSR (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011), or differentiated between 
‘Habermasian political CSR’, ‘Rawlsian political CSR’ and ‘political CSR’ (Whelan, 2012), 
and between ‘political CSR’ and ‘new political CSR’ (Mäkinen & Kourula, 2012). There is 
also no agreement how political CSR relates to globalization. On the one hand it is 
conceptualized as a ‘consequence of globalization’ (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011) and on the 
other hand as an ‘institutional form of globalization’ (Whelan, 2012). In sum, political 
CSR research is still hamstrung by considerable conceptual ambiguities, conflations and 
a narrow research agenda.  
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I suggest that future research should broaden the meaning of political CSR based on a 
more pluralist and inclusive research agenda and critically review and theorize political 
CSR research at different levels of analysis. One approach could be the application of 
Alvesson and Sandberg’s (2011) novel methodological principles to challenge and 
problematize the implicit and explicit assumptions and boundary conditions. In this way, 
future research should flesh out blind spots and exclusions along with the 
inconsistencies, contradictions, conflicts, and tensions that political CSR may entail, and 
evaluate the articulated assumptions against both empirical evidence and critical and 
reflexive literature with different theoretical stances and resources (Alvesson & 
Sandberg, 2011). The critical reflection on the normative underpinnings and the 
integration of different perspectives on political CSR are particularly important for 
future research because “if a theory is to be properly used or tested, the theorist’s 
implicit assumptions which form the boundaries of the theory must be understood” 
(Bacharach, 1989, p. 498). In this sense, future research should embrace a critical and 
more inclusive pluralist research agenda including the role of state, non-state actors and 
MNCs’ instrumental concerns, among others.  
Another point of reference for this research avenue could be a recent review on 
corporate political activity (Lawton, McGuire, & Rajwani, 2013). Very much aligned with 
the findings of this thesis, the authors depict the domains of the political impact as 
follows: (1) deliberate attempts to influence governments in order to gain firm-specific 
competitive advantages; (2) sometimes unintended side effects of corporate practices 
on the development of institutions (e.g. in ‘institutional voids’); and (3) reactive 
strategies which try to influence the external political environment (ibid). Other scholars 
have already taken up this more inclusive and pluralist approach and “refer to political 
CSR as activities where CSR has an intended or unintended political impact, or where 
intended or unintended political impacts on CSR exist” (Frynas & Stephens, 2014, p. 3). 
This research approach could be a fruitful avenue for future research as it would answer 
the call to for “a new research agenda for theory-informed political CSR research in 
terms of reassessing the role of the state” (Frynas & Stephens, 2014, p. 20; Whelan, 
2012) as it includes scholarly evidence on governments’ involvement as an enabling and 
empowering facilitator of CSR (e.g. Denmark; Knudsen & Brown, 2015; Vallentin, 2015; 
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Vallentin & Murillo, 2012) and increasing concern of the negative impact on the public 
good when irresponsive and irresponsible governments collude with narrow business 
interests under the smokescreen of CSR as this thesis and other scholars  (e.g. Banerjee, 
2011) have shown.  
Altogether, I hope that this thesis has provided not only insights into a predominantly 
normative and underresearched topic, but also guidance and encouragement for 
researchers wishing to explore this important, ambitious and fascinating new frontier. 
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SYNOPSIS 
Royal Dutch Shell has started to assume social and political responsibilities that go 
beyond legal requirements and fill the regulatory vacuum in global governance and a 
public responsibility gap in Nigeria. Which implications does this engagement have for 
the firm, governance and democracy? And which public responsibility strategies can a 
multinational company (MNC) like Shell employ in a complex operating environment 
such as Nigeria to be sustainable? This case explores the implications of Shell’s 
politicized role in a context where a regulatory governance framework is missing at the 
local and the global level. Additionally, the case discusses different public responsibility 
strategies that MNCs such as Shell can employ in a complex operating environment such 
as Nigeria. This case study is interesting as it fleshes out what constitutes Shell’s role 
under the conditions of globalization and a local public responsibility gap and what are 
the consequences of the company’s engagement in global governance and self-
regulation. It also creates an understanding of the challenges which organizations in 
controversial industry sectors face in a context of increasing demands for sustainability. 
STORY  
Mutiu Sunmonu faced a difficult situation. As the Country Chair of Shell Companies in 
Nigeria, Managing Director of the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria 
(SPDC), and Regional Vice President Production, he encountered mounting criticism and 
legal challenges over SPDC’s operations in the Niger Delta which questioned the 
legitimacy, credibility and eventually continuity of the company in the region (see Exhibit 
1).   
The 2011 United Nations Environment Program report based on a scientific assessment 
criticized SPDC’s inadequate oilfield infrastructure and clean up of oil spills, which did 
not meet local regulatory requirements, SPDC’s own procedures nor international best 
practices. From the legal side, Shell faced in the same year parliamentary hearings by 
Dutch lawmakers over its operations in the Niger Delta, and, in the first case of this kind, 
a legal claim brought in the UK for two massive oil leaks in 2008/09 as a result of 
equipment failure. Oil production levels and by extension corporate profits continued 
to be negatively affected due to sabotage of pipelines and continuing attacks on oil 
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installations despite the 2009 Amnesty program. On top of this, the likely upcoming 
fiscal and legal reform (Petroleum Industry Bill or PIB) in Nigeria was expected to 
redefine investor relationships detrimental to the interests of foreign oil firms and in 
particular of Shell. Augmenting these risks was an unstable political structure since 
president Umaru Musa Yar’adua’s death in May 2010 and a continuing public 
responsibility deficit since the commencement of the company’s operations in the 
country. 
It is likely that Shell questioned the future of its operations in the country as the 
company faced a legitimacy and credibility crisis. Also, the “erosion of the business and 
operating environment in Nigeria could adversely impact [the company’s] earnings and 
financial position”.  A newspaper article in the Guardian UK  revealed that when once 
faced with a similar decision over the Ogoni  issue in the mid 1990s, Shell decided that 
pulling out seemed to run against the company’s economic interests and commitment 
to advance social and economic development in the country. At that time, Shell decided 
to adopt a sustainability agenda to protect their license to operate, which went beyond 
traditional philanthropy or corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs and placed the 
company in a quasi-governmental role with by then unknown consequences on their 
responsibilities and legitimacy. “Shell’s future dilemma lies in the balancing between 
these two types of organization” – the ideal-type ‘action’ and ‘political’ organisations.  
This time, if the company decided to stay, Shell would have to consider a redefinition of 
its CSR strategy in the realm of public responsibilities. 
Royal Dutch Shell  
The multinational corporation 
Royal Dutch Shell was formed from the 1907 merger of the British-based Shell Transport 
Trading Company and the Netherlands-based Royal Dutch Petroleum Company into a 
single group. Both parent companies traced back their origins to the Far East in the 
1890s seizing the opportunity for supplying kerosene from the newly developing Russian 
oilfields to markets in the Far East and China and the growing demand for oil for the 
automobile industry and oil-fuelled ships. In 2005, Royal Dutch Shell plc became the 
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single parent company of the two former public parent companies. The company was 
headquartered in Den Hague (the Netherlands) and registered in England and Wales. 
Shell was Europe's largest oil producer, the third most profitable company worldwide in 
terms of revenues in the petroleum refining industry  (Exhibit 2) and the third most 
profitable company worldwide (Exhibit 3). Also, it was the third largest Multinational 
Company (MNC) in the world measured against its foreign assets in 2007 /  Royal Dutch 
Shell employed over 101.000 people and operates in over 90 countries.   
Shell applied a single overall control framework (Exhibit 4) to all wholly owned Shell 
companies and to those ventures and other companies in which the company, directly 
or indirectly, had a controlling interest. The aim was to manage risk of failure to achieve 
business objectives.   
Shell companies in Nigeria 
Shell began exploring for oil in West Africa in the 1930’s. The company discovered oil in 
the Niger Delta in 1956. Since Shell was a partly British company in a British colony, the 
company received the first oil concessions and was the first major oil company to 
commence oil production there in 1958. Nigeria continued to be a cornerstone of Shell's 
operations. In 2009 Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (SPDC) 
contributed around 9% to Shell’s global oil and gas production.  
In Nigeria, there were four Shell companies.  SPDC was a wholly owned Shell company 
that operated oil and gas production on behalf of the partners of an unincorporated 
joint venture between the government-owned Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (55%), Shell (30%), Elf Petroleum Nigeria Ltd (10%) and Agip (5%). SPDC was 
Nigeria's largest onshore producer. Investments in the joint venture proceeded in 
accordance with a ‘cash call system’. Representatives of the venture partners would 
agree on a proposed investment plan and contributed funding in proportion to their 
respective equity stake. A consultant for Shell noted, however, that the Nigerian 
government was not always complying with their part and many planned investment 
projects such as ending gas flaring could not be accomplished. The second wholly-owned 
Shell company was Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company Ltd (SNEPCO) 
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which developed since 1993 Nigeria's energy resources offshore. The company 
produced oil and gas in water depths up to 2,500 meters and established in Bonga 
Nigeria's first major deep-water project. Within the current divestment strategy, the 
company was divesting from some of its onshore holdings - the three oil blocks in the 
Niger Delta - Oil Mining Lease (OMLs) 4, 38 and 41  and planned to move most of its 
production offshore. The appeal of extracting petroleum offshore lay in its relative 
spatial isolation from community pressure and violent attacks on its oil installations. The 
wholly-owned Shell company Shell Nigeria Gas Ltd (SNG) was set up in 1998 and 
operated a gas transmission and distribution pipeline network. And the fourth Shell 
company, the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Company (NLNG), was set up in 1989 and 
ran one of the world’s largest LNG plants. Shell held a 25.6% interest in NLNG, together 
with NNPC, Total LNG Nigeria Ltd and Eni. 
The parent companies Royal Dutch and Shell Transport and Trading did not directly 
engage in operating activities, but acted as the financial and strategic centers of the 
company. Day-to-day oil operations were carried out by Shell operating companies, 
which were assisted by service companies based in the UK and the Netherlands in areas 
such as research and development.  Also CSR policies were cascaded from the 
headquarters to business units down the supply chain, but the business unit level 
decided on their reach and scope and use existing projects budgets for their funding. 
The launch of Shell’s sustainability agenda: keeping the social license to operate 
Shell was a front-running company in the area of CSR and became in 1997 the first 
among the oil multinationals to declare publicly its support for the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development website  
presented the case of Shell’s community development projects in Nigeria as a positive 
case study of CSR. Also, SPDC was voted “Best Company in most Innovative CSR” in 2011 
at the Nigeria CSR awards, known as The Social Enterprise Report and Awards (The 
SERAs). Corporate Affairs Tony Attah commented that “the award is a strong 
acknowledgement of the work we’re doing in the Niger Delta, positively touching lives 
and helping to develop communities. And we are encouraged to do more.”  
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The origins of the company’s social performance agenda essentially lay in Nigeria. The 
protests against Shell’s poor environmental and human rights record in Nigeria and 
eventually the company’s alleged implication in the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa in the 
mid 1990s (Exhibit 5) seriously threatened SPDC’s social license to operate and thus its 
access to the country’s oil reserves along with its long-term commercial interests.   
Shell executives soon realized that the company had grown out of touch with societal 
expectations. Mark Moody-Stuart, then Managing Director, stated in this situation “we 
had to take a good look at ourselves and say ‘Have we got it right?’”  Secret documents 
(see Exhibit 6) even revealed that Shell considered leaving the country in the wake of 
Saro-Wiwa’s death, but decided in favor of the scenario "milking the cow". The "pull-
out" scenario was seen as "giving in" or "caving in" which would set a "very negative 
precedent for the group" and "issues of liability [would] not disappear even with a total 
withdrawal."  
As a response the company embarked on a comprehensive review of its attitude and 
activities. At the corporate level, Shell’s newly articulated core values - honesty, integrity 
and respect for people – provided the basis for a Statement of General Business 
Principles  adopted in 1997. The eight principles integrate economic, environmental and 
social considerations into business decision-making and depict five inseparable areas of 
responsibility to shareholders, customers, employees, business partners and society.  
The Principles committed the company to an apolitical role and stated that Shell 
“companies should endeavor always to act commercially, operating within existing 
national laws in a socially responsible manner and avoid involvement in politics”.   Shell 
also developed Human Rights Compliance Assessment (HRCA) tools, which provided a 
step-by-step approach to assess all potential risks to violate human rights  and offered 
training to employees on Shell’s Business Principles and Code of conduct and for 
managers a special supplement to understand their responsibilities and take action to 
support human rights. In the area of biodiversity, Shell aimed at conserving ecosystems 
through partnerships and new technologies.  Shell also decided to go ‘green’ and 
founded in 1997 Shell International Renewables (SIR) with a focus on wind power, solar 
energy, and hydrogen.  With regard to transparency, the company was a supporter of 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), integrated a commitment to 
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business integrity and transparency in its General Business Principles (since 1976) and 
Code of Conduct (since 2006) and reports in accordance with the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) and in line with the International Petroleum Industry Environmental 
Conservation Association (IPIECA) guidelines.  The company also established both 
internal controls such as audit trails and statistical checks and external controls with the 
help of an external review committee  and well-established auditing firms  to ensure the 
credibility of the report.  Corporate governance structures were also revised. Due to the 
importance of Nigeria for Shell in terms of complexity of the local operating 
environment and the volume of oil production, a permanent Nigeria team was installed 
at the headquarters level.  Corporate responsibility governance structures were also put 
in place at the Board of Royal Dutch Shell plc. The Corporate and Social Responsibility 
Committee (CSRC) assesses Shell’s policies and performance with respect to the 
Business Principles, Code of Conduct, Health, Safety, Security, the Environment (HSSE) 
and Social Performance (SP) standards and major issues of public concern on behalf of 
the Board of Royal Dutch Shell plc. (see Exhibit 7).  
At the global level, Shell supported international human rights initiatives such as the 
Global Compact, the UN Special Representative on business and human rights John 
Ruggie, and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. With regard to the 
latter, Shell introduced a clause on these principles to all new and renewed security 
contracts and expected them all to contain it by 2012.  Shell’s engagement in global 
partnerships to fight HIV/AIDS included UNAIDS scenarios development and the Global 
business coalition on HIV/AIDS. The company also signed the 2002 World Bank initiated 
the Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership (GGFR), joined the Environmental 
Defense’s Partnership for Climate Action and committed themselves to reduce 
emissions to 1990 levels by 2010. Together with BP, they were the only companies listed 
in KLD Research and Analytics’ Global Climate 100 Index, the first investor index 
comprised of companies focusing on solutions to global warming.  The company 
furthermore, provided throughout the year information to the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Indexes, FTSE4Good, and the Carbon Disclosure Project. 
At the local level in Nigeria stakeholder engagement via dialogue and partnering was a 
cornerstone of Shell’s strategy “of being a good neighbor”. Community development 
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projects were channeled indirectly through the Shell Foundation, an independent 
charity that focuses on poverty and environmental charities and directly through 
national programs. These included education and skills development, health and safety, 
the environment, and social cohesion. In the area of health, Shell’s company-wide 
HIV/AIDS program provided medical treatment for employees affected by HIV/AIDS, as 
well as education and prevention programs for employees, their families and 
communities. At the local and global level Shell worked in partnerships to fight the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic.  Shell spent US$106 million on ‘social investment’ in 2004, although 
this still represents less than 0.6 per cent of its net income.  Shell’s CSR initiatives relating 
to community development underwent significant change from ad hoc ‘assistance’ to 
development partnerships with government agencies and NGOs. This change was an 
attempt to enhance the legitimacy and efficacy of its CSR approach and to dispel 
communities’ perceptions from the politicized role it adopted when stepping into a 
public responsibility vacuum and becoming “the only government they [the 
communities] know”.  
Nigerian paradox of want in the midst of plenty 
Nigeria had come to exemplify the resource curse (see Exhibit 8). Five decades of oil 
extraction in the country resulted in failed development, poverty, corruption, 
environmental degradation, ethnic and gang violence, kidnappings, and the like. 
Oil wealth: economic and social performance  
In 2010, Nigeria had the second largest oil reserves in Africa and was the continent’s 
primary oil producer. In the same year, total oil production in Nigeria was slightly over 
2.46 million bbl/d and crude oil production averaged close to 2.15 million bbl/d (see 
Exhibit 9). Planned upstream developments would increase Nigerian oil production in 
the medium term but the timing of these startups would depend heavily on the 
fiscal/regulatory terms of the proposed Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB). Foreign companies 
operating in joint ventures (JVs) or production sharing contracts (PSCs) with the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) included ExxonMobil, Chevron, Total, Eni/Agip, 
Addax Petroleum (recently acquired by Sinopec of China), ConocoPhillips, Petrobras, 
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StatoilHydro among others. Shell operated the most nameplate crude oil production 
capacity, estimated to be between 1.2-1.3 million bbl/d.    
In 2010, Nigeria exported approximately 2.2 million bbl/d of total oil and 1.8 million 
bbl/d of crude oil. Over 40 percent of the country's oil production was exported to the 
United States, 20 percent to Europe, 17 percent to Asia, 8 percent to Brazil, and 4 
percent to South Africa (see Exhibit 10).  
In the wake of the discovery of high quality oil in the Niger Delta and the prospect of 
ever-increasing oil prices,  the oil industry became central to the Nigerian economic 
profile. In 2010, the oil sector provided less than 25% of GDP and accounted for 
approximately 95% of export earnings and 80% of government revenue.  Also Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) inflows were heavily focused on the oil industry. During 2005 to 
2009 only the joint venture operated by SPDC contributed about $36 billion to the 
government.  
However, oil dependence had also its dark side. While this sector provided high 
government revenues, employment, contracts and income for individuals and Nigerian 
companies the petroleum ‘monoculture’ rendered the economy highly sensitive to 
external shocks and hindered the emergence of internal sources of growth.  For 
example, during the global financial crisis the decline in oil revenue turned the fiscal 
balance from a surplus of 3.7 percent of GDP in 2008 to a deficit of nine percent of GDP 
in 2009.  
Also, oil wealth was not translated into social development. The United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization reports in 2010 that even at peak 
production, 92% of the Nigerian population survive on less than $2 a day. Also, in 2007 
Nigeria’s Human Development Index (HDI) was as low as 0.511, which gave the country 
a rank of 158th out of 182 countries and renders unlikely to achieve any of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. In 2011, even more people lived in 
poverty than before oil was found and the rural and oil producing communities were 
most affected.  Also, Nigeria suffered from a high adult illiteracy rate, poor quality of 
education and serious health challenges. Malaria was considered the most significant 
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public health problem and Nigeria was the second most affected country by the global 
health crisis HIV/AIDS. 
Governance 
Nigeria is a synonym of a ‘rentier state’ where state revenues accrued from taxes or 
‘rents’ on production rather than from productive activity. As a consequence, the 
government focused its efforts on controlling these resource rents and failed to set in 
place a robust tax system and with it to develop a system of formal accountabilities to 
secure domestic legitimacy. Instead the regime secured elite compliance and furnished 
instrumental benefits to politically strategic communities awarding public goods and 
services, employment opportunities, and lucrative government contracts among others. 
This patronage system was essentially established along ethnic and religious lines and 
thus marginalized and excluded mostly southern groups and non-Muslim northern 
minorities.  
The government dependence of oil broke the link between authority and territoriality 
leading to neo-patrimonial governance and corruption. Nigeria's anticorruption chief 
claimed, for instance, that 70 percent of the country's wealth was stolen or wasted in 
2003.  Also Shell’s former Senior Vice President Ann Pickard voiced her concern to US 
Ambassador Robin R. Sanders that “corruption in the oil sector was worsening by the 
day. […] Nigerian entities control the lifting of many oil cargoes and there are some "very 
interesting" people lifting oil (People, she said that were not even in the industry). As an 
example she said that oil buyers would pay Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) General Managing Director Yar'Adua, (Note: not related to President Yar'Adua. 
End Note) Chief Economic Advisor Yakubu, and the First Lady Turai Yar'Adua large 
bribes, millions of dollars per tanker, to lift oil” (U.S. Embassy Abuja, 2009). The 
pervasiveness of corruption in Nigeria is corroborated by independent corruption 
indexes. For example, Transparency International, an anti-corruption non-governmental 
organization, ranks Nigeria 134 (same as Zimbabwe and Bangladesh) out of 178 
countries in its 2010 corruption perception index in 2010.  The country ranking of the 
Transparency International Index is further appreciated through the World Bank Anti-
Corruption and Governance Index  (see Exhibit 11). 
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Government reform 
In the last years, the Nigerian government started to demonstrate commitment to 
inculcate a culture of honesty and transparency in the public and private sector through 
the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000 and the incorporation of EITI 
into national law in 2007. The initiatives helped shape the quality of reforms and 
significantly increased understanding and transparency of the oil sector. Also, Nigeria 
has made efforts to increase revenue transparency and in March 2011 was judged to be 
compliant with the EITI. Yet, EITI also received its fair share of criticism from an 
interviewee from the Revenue Watch institute for it did not actually drive reforms but 
instead piggy-backed on other existing initiatives. Also, a 2005 audit report released in 
2009 highlighted unprecedented financial discrepancies, mispaid taxes, and system 
inefficiencies.  
In September 2007, the Oil and Gas Reform Implementation Committee (OGIC) also 
proposed the most comprehensive review of the legal framework for the oil and gas 
sector in Nigeria since the industry began commercial operations in the 1960s. This 
Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) was designed to reform the entire hydrocarbon sector to 
increase the government's share of revenue; increase natural gas production; 
streamline the decision making process by dividing up the different roles of NNPC 
including the creation of a profit-driven company; privatize NNPC's downstream 
activities; and promote local content. The Bill would also provide for a greater share of 
oil revenues to the producing communities and expand the use of natural gas for 
domestic electricity generation. While parts of the Bill have recently been approved as 
stand alone laws (such as the Nigerian Content Development Bill or NCD in 2010), 
differing versions of the PIB were still debated, especially around more contentious 
points such as the renegotiation of contracts with international oil companies, the 
changes in tax and royalty structures and clauses to ensure that companies use or lose 
their assets.  The multinationals' primary point of dissent appears to be the new fiscal 
terms, which they describe as 'harsh enough to stall investments'. Led by Shell, the 
multinationals argue that "Nigeria's oil and gas production has not only failed to grow, 
it has fallen every year since 2005."  They blamed the situation on "hostile policy regimes 
and harsh fiscal terms," adding that "the Petroleum Industry Bill is a clear example of 
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such." Also a leaked embassy cables revealed, “the IOCs are quite concerned about the 
"very flawed" new petroleum sector energy bill” and “that Shell had more exposure to 
the loss of acreage than any other company”. “We could lose 80 percent of our acreage,” 
[Ann Pickard] said.  
Political role and power of MNC 
Professor William D. Graf of the University of Guelph claimed that the discovery of oil 
transformed the political economy and power relations in Nigeria. As the government 
heavily depended on oil revenues and the “production depends […] on techniques, 
expertise, investments – and markets generated outside the territory controlled by the 
state“,  international capital – typically in the form of MNCs – dominated all aspects of 
exploration, production, and marketing. Also Bronwen Manby, senior program advisor 
with the Africa Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project, found that the economic 
power of MNCs had been translated into political power to the extent that “oil 
companies actively pressure the government regarding such things as tax laws.”  For 
example the PIB seemed to grant more favorable terms to Shell and its rivals than 
originally imagined after much internal ‘lobbying’. A lawmaker who is a member of the 
three committees in the Senate handling the bill told Daily Trust that they were put 
under intense pressure from the Presidency to accommodate some of the demands of 
the oil majors. “Our intention was to pass the bill as send to us by the late President 
Umaru Musa Yar’adua but these companies put us under intense pressure, they even 
got the American government to intervene on their behalf.  Shortly after his return from 
the United States early this year when he was acting, President Jonathan requested that 
the provisions of the bill be reviewed after which he asked the leadership of the two 
chambers to look at the issue of tax and reduce it to allow for “investment” in the 
sector,” he said.  In the same line of thought an activist from the NGO social action claims 
“(…) and the officers, they would rather take their mother to court than confront Shell. 
With the bribes, they will give judgments in favor. So there is (…) The ordinary people. 
The voiceless people. (…) Shell is the big oil company, the company that has so much 
influence on the government (…).” An academic researcher working at the Revenue 
Watch Institute in Abuje adds that they do so by “bribing parliament members and 
paying them trips to conferences to Ghana and the US,” in which the new regulatory 
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framework governing investment (Petroleum Industry Bill) in Nigeria was discussed. 
They also directly infiltrate the government seconding people to relevant ministries who 
work in favor of Shell. An interviewee from the African Network for Environment and 
Economic Justice agrees to these allegations.  
The political bearing that the oil industry enjoys in Nigeria had also been observed by 
various actors. An activist from Social Action Nigeria claimed, "Shell and the government 
of Nigeria are two sides of the same coin. (…) Shell is everywhere. They have an eye and 
an ear in every ministry of Nigeria. They have people on the payroll in every community, 
which is why they get away with everything. They are more powerful than the Nigerian 
government." The criticism was echoed by Ben Amunwa of the London-based oil 
watchdog Platform. "Shell claims to have nothing to do with Nigerian politics," he said. 
"In reality, Shell works deep inside the system, and has long exploited political channels 
in Nigeria to its own advantage."  Also, recent Wikileaks revelations  about Shell in 
Nigeria demonstrated the tangled links between the oil firm and politicians. Ann Pickard, 
who was then Shell's vice president for sub-Saharan Africa, was quoted as telling U.S. 
diplomats that Shell had seconded people to all the relevant ministries and that Shell 
consequently had access to everything that was being done in those ministries (see 
Exhibit 12).  
Conflict and Violence 
Since December 2005, Nigeria experienced increased pipeline vandalism, kidnappings 
and militant takeovers of oil facilities in the Niger Delta. The Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was the main group attacking oil infrastructure 
for political objectives. Even after the amnesty program in August 2009 peace remained 
fragile and MEND threatened to resume attacks on oil facilities unless there was more 
progress with regard to a redistribution of oil wealth and greater local control of the 
sector.  Additional security concerns such as kidnappings of oil workers for ransom 
incidents of piracy, led some oil services firms to pull out of the country and oil workers 
unions to threaten strikes over security issues. Shell had been hit hardest by the 
instability, as much of its production is onshore. Much of Shell's crude oil production 
capacity was shut-in until July 2011, when the company lifted force majeure on about 
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300,000 bbl/d of Bonny Light crude oil.  Yet, in August 2011 the company had to declare 
again ‘force majeure’ after several attacks on its pipelines  impacting oil production 
levels (Exhibit 13). 
The dimensions of conflict were complex and interwoven. Professor Watts claimed that 
the insurgency across the Niger delta was locally rooted and reflected a historical 
configuration of inter-ethnic relations, “generational politics, a corrupt and violent 
petro-state, irresponsible and short sighted oil company practice, and the existence of 
a vast oil bunkering network.”  Furthermore, professor Watts identified a key number 
of processes to grasp the transformation of the Niger delta into a space of insurgency:  
Ethno-nationalism was a central force in a region of sixty or more ethnic groups and a 
powerful set of institutions of customary rule. This was central for example to both the 
Ogoni movement in the 1990s and to the Ijaw – the largest ethnic minorities in the Delta 
– since the establishment of the Ijaw Youth Congress in 1998. The exclusion from the oil 
wealth while suffering all the social and environmental costs of oil operations became 
central to the emergence of a new sort of youth politics in which a new generation of 
youth leaders took up the struggle for regional resource sovereignty.  
The second dimension was the unwillingness and inability of the Nigerian state in its 
military and civilian guises to address this political mobilization in the Delta without 
resorting to state-imposed violence by an undisciplined military, police and security 
forces. In this sense, the failure of the non-violent politics of the Ogoni movement left 
behind a generation of militants whose frustrations were further propelled by 
undisciplined violence of state security forces to secure ‘national oil assets’ even after 
return to civilian rule in 1999.  
Third, the militant groups and the rise of youth politics began to challenge both 
customary forms of chiefly power, and the corruption of the petro-state. While many 
militias drew substance from grievances due to exclusion and marginalization and 
unmet goals of peaceful struggle, others paradoxically got their start by being bankrolled 
by the state and politicians.  
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Fourth, the existence and proliferation of oil theft or ‘oil bunkering’ provided a financial 
mechanism through which militants could finance their operations and attract recruits. 
The organization of the oil theft trade involved high ranking military, government official 
and merchants, drew upon the local militia to organize and protect the tapping of 
pipelines and the movement of barges through the creeks and ultimately offshore to 
large tankers.  
Fifth, corporate practice also contributed to an environment in which military activity 
was in effect encouraged and facilitated. Watts named for example in his 2008 article 
the funding of youth groups as security forces, the willingness to use military and 
security forces against protestors and militants alike, and the corrupt practices of 
distributing rents to local community elites and the use of violent youth groups to 
‘protect’ their facilities. While Shell saw the hiring youths as a compliance with their 
stakeholder engagement and promise to provide employment to host communities, 
these ‘surveillance’ contracts essentially perpetuated the cycle of violence for two 
reasons. First, as a member from the NGO social action explains, contracts awarded to 
the youth groups to ‘protect’ the facilities from other youth gangs created competition 
(and eventually conflict) over contracts among the different groups. As a consequence, 
the system became a method of pay-offs for illegal action of vandalism or theft through 
a legitimized contract system, and also a ‘monetary’ mechanism for empowerment of 
some Shell-selected community members. This had essentially distorted established 
traditional power structures and contest over the new social and financial status of 
‘contracted personnel’. Second, in a context of extreme poverty this system provided 
the wrong incentives in that it encouraged the communities to ‘create’ work (i.e. 
incentivizes sabotage). For example in August 2011 Shell had to declare ‘force majeure’ 
on all Bonny light (crude) exports and with it a reduction of Nigeria’s total production 
capacity from 2.6m of crude oil barrels per day (BDP) to about 2.3m BDP due to 
sabotage. Unpublished independent reports seen by the Guardian newspaper and 
interviews conducted by Friends of the Earth Nigeria suggest that ‘Shell must take the 
blame’ as the company withdrew contracts to monitor and protect the pipeline.  
Environmental degradation 
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The geographical conditions of the Niger Delta had always caused certain environmental 
problems, especially flooding, siltation, occlusion, erosion and the shortage of land for 
development. While local people had lived with these problems for many years and had 
found ways of dealing with them (albeit ineffectively for the most part), the negative 
impacts of the oil industry had been more destructive. Apart from more visible impacts, 
such as the pollution of soil, surface and groundwater, and air, oil and gas exploitation, 
socio-economic conditions had been negatively affected as well.  UNDP states in its 2006 
report that the main problems were canalization destroying freshwater ecological 
systems; oil spills occurring accidentally or through sabotage by local people; gas leaks 
and flares producing hydrocarbons that effect the water organisms, biodiversity and was 
being emitted into the atmosphere (causing acid rain and contributing to global 
warming); land subsidence, and erosion. 
Oil spills 
The Nigerian National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) reported that 
approximately 2,400 oil spills had occurred between 2006 and 2010. The amount of oil 
spilled in Nigeria was estimated to be around 260,000 barrels per year for the past 50 
years.   
Responsibilities for oil spills and adequate remediation efforts were very much disputed. 
While Shell claimed to have reduced significantly its oil spills and attributed the majority 
of current oil spills to sabotage and theft,  all civil society organizations that were 
interviewed criticized Shell’s corroded infrastructure and the failure to clean up 
subsequent oil spills. Friends of the Earth and Amnesty International had filed an official 
complaint against Anglo-Dutch firm Shell for shirking responsibility for oil spills in 
Nigeria, wreaking havoc on the environment and thus breaching the Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD)'s guidelines for responsible business.  The Wall 
Street Journal reported that critics of Shell's record, both in parliament and among non-
governmental organizations, were expected to use parliamentary hearings, scheduled 
for Jan. 26 in 2011 to quiz the company over its activities in Nigeria. Shell Netherlands 
President, Mr. Peter de Wit, replied during the hearing to the accusations that, “Shell is 
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doing a good job often under difficult circumstances,” and insisted the company applied 
“global standards” to its operations around the world.  
In 2011, civil society claims were supported by a scientific investigation of the United 
Nations Environmental Program and a legal sanction against Shell. The UNEP report 
criticized SPDC’s inadequate oilfield infrastructure and clean up of oil spills, which did 
not meet local regulatory requirements, SPDC’s own procedures nor international best 
practices. Also in the first kind of this case, Shell faced in the same year in August a legal 
claim brought in the UK for two massive oil leaks in 2008/09 as a result of equipment 
failure.  
Gas flaring 
Many Nigeria's oil fields lacked the infrastructure to produce and market associated 
natural gas. A study by Environmental Rights Action and the Climate Justice Program 
concludes that as a consequence “more gas is flared in Nigeria than anywhere else in 
the world. Estimates are notoriously unreliable, but roughly 2.5 billion cubic feet of gas 
associated with crude oil is wasted in this way everyday. This is equal to 40% of all 
Africa’s natural gas consumption in 2001, while the annual financial loss to Nigeria is 
about US $2.5 billion. The flares have contributed more greenhouse gases than all of 
sub-Saharan Africa combined. And the flares contain a cocktail of toxins that affect the 
health and livelihood of local communities, exposing Niger Delta residents to an 
increased risk of premature deaths, child respiratory illnesses, asthma and cancer.”  
For several years the government of Nigeria worked to end natural gas flaring for several 
years but the deadline to implement the policies and fine oil companies was repeatedly 
postponed, with the most recent deadline being December 2012. Also the 2009 Gas 
Master Plan that promoted new gas-fired power plants to help reduce gas flaring and 
provide much-needed electricity generation showed limited progress.   
 
 
Shell’s future in Nigeria  
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“The situation has not changed from what it were in the past. In fact, it is worse.”  The 
statement from a human rights activist of the NGO social action reflects the frustration 
of most people in the Niger Delta. Today, even more people live in poverty than before 
oil was found and paradoxically, the rural and in the oil producing areas suffer most. 
Lately, civil society claims have been supported in the first case of this kind by a legal 
sanction against Shell in the UK and a scientific investigation of UNEP, which put 
increased international and local pressure on the continuity of Shell’s operations in 
Nigeria. 
History seemed to repeat itself. Again, the relevant question for the Managing Director 
of the Shell companies in Nigeria was eventually should the company stay in the country 
or pull out? In 1998 the company asked themselves “should (we) pull out the deal 
altogether and let another company make the decision?”  Should we “stay out and deny 
the country and its communities the economic benefits (our) presence would bring – 
and indeed the financial returns (our) shareholders might expect from such an 
opportunity?”  Yet, if Mutiu Sunmonu decided to stay the company would have to 
address its public responsibilities more effectively than it did in the 1990s. Choosing the 
right strategy in responding to public service deficits and guarantee sustainable 
development requires more than a one-size-fits-all solution in such a complex 
environment such as Nigeria. Sir Mark Moody-Stuart very well described Shell’s dilemma 
in the 1990’s, which his successor Mrs Sunmonu faced again: “The biggest change […] 
for an international corporation is this extension of responsibility […] beyond just paying 
your taxes and beyond just relating effectively to communities around your factory 
fence.”  
 
 
  
Exhibits 
Exhibit 1. Map of Nigeria and Niger Delta 
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Exhibit 2. Three most profitable companies worldwide in the petroleum refining 
industry 
Rank 
2009 Company Global 500 rank 
Revenues ($ 
millions) 
1 Royal Dutch Shell  1 458,361.0 
2 Exxon Mobil  2 442,851.0 
3 BP  4 367,053.0 
Source: Global Fortune 500; From the July 20, 2009 issue 
Note: Figures prepared in accordance with International Accounting Standards.  
Excise taxes have been deducted. Company is incorporated in Britain. Executive  
offices are in the Netherlands. 
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Exhibit 3. Ten most profitable companies worldwide 
Rank 
2009 Company Global 500 
Rank 
2008 
Profits 
($ millions) 
Profits % 
change 
from 2007 
1 Exxon Mobil  2 45,220.0 11.4 
2 Gazprom  22 29,864.1 16.1 
3 Royal Dutch Shell  1 26,277.0 -16.1 
4 Chevron  5 23,931.0 28.1 
5 BP  4 21,157.0 1.5 
6 Petrobras  34 18,879.0 43.7 
7 Microsoft  117 17,681.0 25.7 
8 General Electric  12 17,410.0 -21.6 
9 Nestlé  48 16,669.6 87.8 
10 Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 92 15,948.5 48.8 
Source: Global Fortune 500; From the July 20, 2009 issue 
Note: Figures prepared in accordance with International Accounting Standards. Excise taxes have been 
deducted. Company is incorporated in Britain. Executive offices are in the Netherlands. 
 
Exhibit 4. Shell’s Control Framework 
 
 Note: “Foundations” comprise the objectives, principles and rules that underpin and establish boundaries 
for Shell’s activities. “Organisation” sets out how the various legal entities relate to each other and how 
their business activities are organized and managed. “Processes” refer to the more material processes, 
including how authority is delegated, how strategy, planning and appraisal are used to improve 
performance, how compliance is managed and how assurance is provided. All control activities relate to 
one or more of these components. 
Source: (Shell, 2010) 
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Exhibit 5. The Case of Ken Saro Wiwa 
Kenule "Ken" Beeson 
Saro Wiwa (October 10, 
1941 - November 10, 
1995) belonged to the 
Ogoni people, an ethnic 
minority in the Niger 
Delta which has 
suffered extreme and 
unremediated 
environmental damage 
from decades of crude 
oil extraction. He was an 
outspoken critic of the 
Nigerian military government of General Sani Abacha, which he viewed as 
reluctant to enforce environmental regulations on the foreign petroleum 
companies operating in the area. As the president of the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), Saro-Wiwa led a nonviolent campaign 
against environmental degradation of the land and waters of Ogoniland by the 
operations of the multinational petroleum industry, especially Royal Dutch 
Shell. At the peak of his non-violent campaign, Saro-Wiwa was arrested, hastily 
tried by a special military tribunal, and hanged in 1995 all on charges widely 
viewed as entirely politically motivated and completely unfounded. Shell was 
accused to be involved in the development of the strategy that resulted in the 
unlawful execution of the Ogoni Nine and the provision of monetary and 
logistical support to the Nigerian police for “security operations” that often 
amounted to raids and terror campaigns against the Ogoni. In 2009, this case 
was settled out of court with Shell paying  $15.5 Million USD compensation to 
the plaintiffs. The company maintains that it “was falsely alleged to have been 
complicit in the men’s death” and agreed to a settlement because they felt “it 
was time to draw a line under the past and assist the process of reconciliation” 
(Royal Dutch Shell, 2009b, p. 25). 
 
Source: humanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/Lawsuitsregulatoryaction/ 
LawsuitsSelectedcases/ShelllawsuitreNigeria; Royal Dutch Shell. (2009). Royal Dutch Shell PLC 
Sustainability Report 2009. London. 
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Exhibit 6. NGOs and BBC targeted by Shell PR machine in wake of Saro-Wiwa death 
NGOs and BBC targeted by Shell PR machine in wake of Saro-Wiwa death 
Secret documents reveal the oil giant’s crisis management strategy following the 
execution of the Nigerian activist 
 
Eveline Lubbers and Andy Rowell 
Guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 9 November 2010 17.33 GMT 
 
In June last year, the company paid $15.5m to settle a legal action over the deaths in a 
federal court in New York without admitting liability. It was one of the largest payouts 
agreed by a multinational corporation charged with human rights violations. 
 
The documents – which were part of this legal case but were never made public – 
describe the company's "crisis management strategy and plan". This was finalised by 
Shell's senior executives at a secret meeting in Ascot in January 1996, two months after 
Saro-Wiwa's death. The strategy was described as "most confidential". 
(…) 
The documents outline a tactic of divide and rule, where Shell planned to work with 
some of its critics but isolate others. Under the "occupying new ground" scenario, the 
document detail how Shell would "create coalitions, isolate the opposition and shift the 
debate." 
(…) 
One suggested tactic to counter these organisations was to "challenge [the] basis on 
which they continue their campaign against Shell in order to make it more difficult for 
them to sustain it". 
(…) 
The documents also noted that "showing progress with the 'greening of Shell Nigeria'" 
was "strategically critical" after Saro-Wiwa's death. Although elsewhere, the documents 
acknowledge that the strategy may not be seen as genuine. "Our present 
communications strategy could be construed as green imagery" the authors wrote. To 
improve its green image, the company had to counter accusations of "environmental 
devastation", so Shell planned to produce a video "to publicise successes" and "to turn 
the negative tide". The most important topic to be included in the film was "oil spills 
generally, focusing on sabotage." This would have had the effect of playing up the 
impact of illegal activity in causing oil spill pollution in the delta, but in another 
document, the head of Shell Nigeria, N A Achebe, had acknowledged internally that "the 
majority of incidents arise from operational failures". 
 
The documents even reveal that Shell discussed whether it should stay in the country in 
the wake of Saro-Wiwa's death. One scenario was called "milking the cow", whereas the 
"pull-out" scenario was seen as "giving in" or "caving in" which would set a "very 
negative precedent for the group". Another reason for not leaving was that "issues of 
liability will not disappear even with a total withdrawal." 
 
This article was amended on 11 November 2010. The original referred to a secret meeting in Ascot in 
January 1995. This has been corrected. http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/nov/09/shell-pr-saro-
wiwa-nigeria 
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Exhibit 7. Overview of Shell’s sustainable development and governance structure  
Source: Shell Sustainability Report 2009 
Exhibit 8. Dimensions of the resource curse: Nigeria in comparison with other African 
countries 
  
Source:  Magrin, G., & Van Vliet, G. (2009). The use of oil revenues in Africa. In J. Lesbourne (Ed.), 
Governance of oil in Africa: unfinished business (pp. 103-164). Paris: Institut français des relations 
internationales (IFRI), p.119 
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Exhibit 9. Nigeria’s Oil Production and Consumption (2000-2010) 
 
 
 Exhibit 10. Nigerian Crude Oil Exports by Destination (2010) 
  
Source: Sources: Global Trade Atlas, APEX (Lloyd's), FACTS Global Energy, EIA  
 257 
Exhibit 11. World Bank Anti-Corruption and Governance Index  
  
 
Exhibit 12. US embassy cable 09Abuja1907, C) Shell Md Discusses The Status Of The 
Proposed Petroleum 
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin 
09ABUJA1907  
2009-10-20 
06:06  
2010-12-08 
21:09  
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN  
Embassy 
Abuja  
VZCZCXRO4227 PP RUEHPA DE RUEHUJA #1907/01 2930617 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 200617Z 
OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7262 INFO 
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 2129 RUEHSA/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 
0101 RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC 
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC 
Tuesday, 20 October 2009, 06:17 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 001907  
NOFORN  SIPDIS  DEPT PASS USAID/AFR/SD FOR CURTIS, ATWOOD AND SCHLAGENHAUF  
DEPT PASS TO USTDA-PAUL MARIN, EXIM-JRICHTER  DEPT PASS TO OPIC FOR BARBARA 
GIBIAN AND STEVEN SMITH  DEPT PASS USTR FOR AGAMA  JOHANNESBURG FOR NAGY  
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USDOE FOR GEORGE PERSON  TREASURY FOR TONY IERONIMO, ADAM BARCAN, 
SOLOMAN AND RITTERHOFF  EO 12958 DECL: 02/04/2029  TAGS EPET, ENRG, EINV, 
ECON, ETRD, PGOV, NI  SUBJECT: (C) SHELL MD DISCUSSES THE STATUS OF THE 
PROPOSED PETROLEUM  INDUSTRY BILL Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Dundas 
McCullough for reasons 1.4. (b & d). Ref: Abuja 1836  
-------  SUMMARY -------  ¶1. (C) Shell EVP for Shell Companies in Africa met with the 
Ambassador on October 13 to discuss the status of the proposed Petroleum Industry 
Bill. She said the GON wanted the National Assembly to pass the bill by November 17 
and that the international oil companies would have to move quickly if the House passed 
the bill in the coming weeks. She said there was “total alignment” among the IOCs and 
with the Nigerian oil companies. She said it would be helpful if the Embassy would 
continue to deliver low-level messages of concern and call on the Speaker of the House 
to see where he stood on the bill. She expected the situation in the Niger Delta to be 
“quiet” until the end of the year but would get “out-of-hand” when the election cycle 
starts up at the end of the year. Shell’s views of the PIB track closely with ExxonMobil’s 
views as reported in reftel. END SUMMARY.  
-------------------------  CURRENT STATUS OF THE PIB -------------------------  ¶2. (C) Shell EVP 
for Shell Companies in Africa Ann Pickard met with the Ambassador at the Embassy on 
October 13. The DCM and Economic Counselor joined the Ambassador, and 
XXXXXXXXXXXX accompanied Pickard. The Ambassador asked Pickard for her views 
about the status of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB). Pickard said the GON wanted the 
National Assembly to pass the bill by November 17 in order for the GON to be able to 
announce it at the upcoming CWC Gulf of Guinea Conference in London November 17-
19. She said that if the House passes the PIB in the coming weeks, “we need to move 
quickly” to obtain any necessary changes before it becomes law. Fortunately, she added, 
“We are working with the House and the House appears to want to work with us.” She 
continued that if the Senate passes the PIB, “We aren’t worried.” Unfortunately, she 
explained, “We think the Senate will pass a bad bill” but it won’t really matter. She added 
that she would be at the Nigerian House and Senate later that day and would let the 
Embassy know if there were any unexpected developments.  
¶3. (C) The Ambassador asked if Shell had had engagements with the GON outside the 
National Assembly, such as with the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Pickard said, “We are meeting with them at all levels.” She noted that an IMF team 
headed by Charles McPherson was in Abuja to look at the PIB and that Shell would be 
meeting with them as well. In contrast, she said, “We are worried about the World 
Bank’s political agenda and it is not clear what their agenda is.” She said the World Bank 
was working on how to make the IJVs “bankable” so that they would be able to go to 
international and domestic banks for financing. ------------------------------  
 
 GAS FLARING AND CLIMATE CHANGE ------------------------------  ¶4. (C) Pickard said the 
PIB requires an end to gas flaring by 2010. She said the industry won’t be able to do that 
due to the lack of investment and security. Shell is ahead of the other IOCs and could be 
ready by 2011. Shell would have to spend $4 billion to do this, but the GON would also 
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have to fund its part and that is a risk. Shell would shut in oil production in fields where 
it is uneconomic to end gas flaring, and it would let others have the gas for free where 
it is economic to do so. 
 ¶5. (C) Pickard continued that NNPC General Managing Director Dr. Mohammed 
Barkindo was interested in doing something on climate change in preparation for the 
climate change summit in Copenhagen December 6-18. Barkindo was spread pretty thin 
so Shell will ask him how they can help him prepare for the summit. She added that Shell 
had recently told the oil producing countries that coal will squeeze out oil as a result of 
the CO2 footprint issue if the oil producing ABUJA 00001907 002 OF 004 countries and 
IOCs do not do more to address the issue.  
------------------  POTENTIAL BENEFITS ------------------  ¶6. (C) Pickard summarized the PIB’s 
potential benefits. The creation of fully integrated and independently functioning 
international joint ventures (IJVs) would solve the oil and gas industry’s longstanding 
funding problems if the proposed IJVs are done right. The Nigerian National Petroleum 
Company (NNPC) was previously forced to reduce its ownership of some existing joint 
ventures to 49 percent to make them profitable enough to obtain financing. The 
proposed division of responsibilities between the NNPC and the Directorate of 
Petroleum Resources also would be good. The IOCs currently do not know if the NNPC 
is their partner or regulator.  
----------------------------  COHESION WITHIN THE INDUSTRY ----------------------------  ¶7. (C) 
The Ambassador asked if the industry was united in its approach to the PIB. Pickard 
replied that there was “total alignment with the international oil companies at every 
level.” She acknowledged that Shell had more exposure to the loss of acreage than any 
other company. “We could lose 80 percent of our acreage,” she said. The problem 
comes from the fact that the PIB will redefine how a company can hold on to its 
exploration and production blocks, limiting what can be kept to two kilometers around 
each well. “Everyone offshore loses a lot,” she continued. “We will have to bring 
satellites on fast or we will lose the blocks.” However, the problem with that is that the 
companies have to be able to pass things through to the blocks quickly and it takes years 
to get a rig in due to delays in the Nigerian approval process. (NOTE: Pickard told Econoff 
in Lagos that Shell “sent away” three platforms in late September. END NOTE.) -----------
--------------------------   
ALIGNMENT WITH NIGERIAN OIL COMPANIES -------------------------------------  ¶8. (C) The 
Ambassador asked about the IOCs’ alignment with the Nigerian oil companies. Pickard 
replied that “the Nigerian companies are with us” because they will be taxed at the same 
rate in the current version of the PIB. The IOCs are starting to see what the Nigerian 
companies want to do.  
--------------  THE USG’S ROLE --------------  ¶9. (C) The Ambassador asked what the 
Embassy could do to help with the Joint House Committee on Petroleum Upstream and 
Downstream and Justice that is working on the PIB. Pickard said she hoped the current 
level of dialogue between the GON and the IOCs continues. Unfortunately, “We have 
not been able to meet with President Yar’Adua for nine months,” she said. “They have 
him protected.” She said it would be helpful if the Embassy would continue to deliver 
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low-level messages of concern. In particular, she thought it would be helpful for the 
Embassy to call on Speaker of the House Dimeji Bankoke to see where he stood on the 
bill. Beyond that, she would like to keep the Embassy in reserve and use it as a “silver 
bullet” if the PIB passes the House. The Ambassador noted that the U.S., U.K., Dutch and 
French Embassies had already made a joint call on NNPC General Managing Director Dr. 
Mohammed Barkindo.  
----------------------------------------  CHINA’S INTEREST IN NIGERIA’S OIL BLOCKS ---------------
-------------------------  ¶10. (C) Pickard mentioned China’s recently reported interest in 
Nigeria’s oil blocks. She said Shell had received a copy of the letter that Special Advisor 
to the President on Petroleum Matters Dr. Emmanuel Egbogah had sent to the Chinese 
which said that their offer for oil exploration blocks was not good enough. Minister of 
State for Petroleum Resources Odein Ajumogobia had denied that the letter ABUJA 
00001907 003 OF 004 had been sent, but later conceded that the GON was only 
“benchmarking” to see what the IOCs should pay for shallow-water licenses. Pickard said 
Shell had good sources to show that their data had been sent to both China and Russia. 
She said the GON had forgotten that Shell had seconded people to all the relevant 
ministries and that Shell consequently had access to everything that was being done in 
those ministries.  
--------------------------------------------- --  CHANGING RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE GON’S 
TEAM --------------------------------------------- --  ¶11. (C) Pickard observed that there might 
be changes with how the GON management of the petroleum sector is organized. 
Minister of Petroleum Resources Rilwanu Lukman may be given the responsibility for 
implementing the PIB, while Minister of State for Petroleum Resources Ajumogobia may 
get the Directorate of Petroleum Resources and ongoing business. The problem with 
these changes is that the GON could still get “unempowered people” who are not able 
to address the issues. The question is whether Ajumogobia would be able to step up.  
(NOTE: Press reports on October 17 reported that Lukman will be given overall 
responsibility for the formulation of policy, and oversee the implementation of the PIB, 
the Integrated Joint Venture negotiation and rollout, the fiscal terms transition and 
implementation, the new organization implementation, and stakeholder management. 
We will also supervise the NNPC and its subsidiaries, the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries, the African Petroleum Producers Association, and the University of 
Petroleum. Ajumogobia will be in charge of the Gas Master Plan Transition 
Implementation, the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas, 
the alternative fuels, and the Petroleum Equalization Fund. He will also oversee the 
Directorate of Petroleum Resources, the Petroleum Training Institute and the Pricing 
Regulatory Agency. END NOTE.)  
--------------------------  SHELL’S CURRENT PRODUCTION --------------------------  ¶12. (C) The 
Ambassador asked about the level of Shell’s current operations. Pickard said Shell was 
producing 663,000 barrels per day as of October 13, including the Bonga field. 
Approximately 80,000 barrels per day had been brought back from the Forcados field 
on the previous day. Some 900,000 barrels per day of capacity was still shut in. Of that, 
Shell could bring back 600,000 barrels per day, while the remaining 300,000 barrels per 
day is “too unreachable.”  
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--------------------------  AMNESTY IN THE NIGER DELTA --------------------------  ¶13. (C) The 
Ambassador asked Pickard what she thought about the future of the GON’s amnesty 
offer to militants in the Niger Delta. She responded that Shell expected the situation in 
the Niger Delta to be “quiet” until the end of the year. It will then get “out-of-hand” 
when the election cycle starts up in December, January and February. She expressed 
particular concern about Bayelsa State, home to Shell’s 500,000 barrel-per-day capacity 
Bonny field. Pickard also noted that Shell saw Israeli security experts in Bayelsa, but not 
in the Delta, and that there had been “a big drop in kidnapping” as a result.  
-------------  Looking Ahead -------------  ¶14. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX -------  COMMENT ABUJA 
00001907 004 OF 004 -------  ¶15. (C) Shell’s views of the PIB and the alignment among 
the IOCs and with the Nigerian oil companies track closely with the views of ExxonMobil, 
as reported in reftel. The main difference is that Shell tends to minimize the different 
tax concerns and financial vulnerabilities of the individual IOCs. Shell is much more 
vulnerable than the other IOCs because its operations are concentrated in less favorable 
JV concessions that are located in the violence-prone Niger Delta. ExxonMobil and 
Chevron’s operations are concentrated in more favorable production sharing contracts 
(PSC) in the relatively violence-free offshore areas. In the event that the PIB retains 
negative terms or violence returns to the Delta, Shell can be expected to hurt the most 
and cry the loudest. ¶16. (U) Embassy Abuja coordinated this telegram with ConGen 
Lagos. SANDERS 
Exhibit 13. Oil production in Nigeria 2000-2009  
  
Source: Wall Street Journal (2010) 
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TEACHING NOTE 
Research Method 
The authors present the facts on Royal Dutch Shell and Nigeria such as they are available 
from public sources and in-depth interviews. Part of the data collection process included 
a 2 weeks fieldwork in Nigeria in July, and a visit of the company’s headquarter in Den 
Haag in September 2011. From the outset and throughout the data collection process, 
22 key contributors to the corporate social performance debate, ranging from 
academia, through civil society to Shell employees in Nigeria, Holland and the UK have 
been contacted. In total, there were 16 in-depth interviews with civil society and 
academic actors, all face-to-face and tape-recorded and subsequently analyzed. The 
participants were promised confidentiality to encourage uninhibited responses. 
Interviewees included the following organizations: The Movement for the Survival of the 
Ogoni People, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Publish What You Pay, Revenue Watch 
Institute, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre, West Africa Civil Society Forum, 
Economic Community of West African States, Environmental Rights Action, Centre for 
Democracy and Development, Zero-Corruption Coalition, African Network for 
Environment and Economic Justice, Niger Delta Budget Monitoring Group, Initiative for 
Community Development, Integrated Ecosystem Management Project, African Center 
for Leadership, Strategy and Development (LSD), Social Action, Ogoni Solidarity Forum, 
and Bangof. For confidentiality reasons responses from interviewees from Shell 
international and Shell Petroleum Development Company have not been included. Yet, 
we thank the company for the insights offered and the sharing of relevant information 
for our case. 
Context of use and audience  
Characteristics of the course and timing of the case 
The interdisciplinary character, innovative stance and the global context of the case is 
especially interesting for students studying subjects such as the global context of 
management, the role of business in society, business ethics, business challenges in 
complex environments such as developing countries, and also legal ethics. The case is 
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thus addressed to diverse disciplines such as management, economics and legal studies; 
yet with a strong emphasis on and always in relation to the first. With regard to the legal 
studies, this case can be used when the course includes a specific part on business ethics 
or is addressed to law students involved in business law practice, either in law firms 
working for companies or as part of the legal counsel of companies themselves. The case 
is interesting as many students are ignorant or highly skeptical of business ethics. 
Furthermore, many have been educated in the traditional 19th century assumption that 
public and private are completely independent areas. The case of Shell in Nigeria helps 
students to open their eyes to the new realities of large MNC with a special emphasis 
on the effects of their engagement in the public sphere and their contribution to 
sustainability issues. In the area of international management, strategic management 
and courses on business in society the case of Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria is interesting 
as it is represents the increasing engagement of business firms in global business 
regulation and the production of public goods in the context of globalization. The key 
management challenge of this case study is twofold. First, the challenge associated with 
operating in an extremely complex environment and in an industry sector that 
inherently entails persistent risks for social and environmental sustainability. Second, 
the challenge to manage the implications of the adoption of public responsibilities in 
relation to the basis for corporate legitimacy, the scope of responsibility and the 
democratic control of MNCs. In general we recommend teaching the case towards the 
end of the course as it brings together the different topics such as social, economic and 
political issues of sustainable development. It thus requires the students to be familiar 
with the most important underlying concepts such as sustainability, CSR, license to 
operate, characteristics of MNC, and global governance amongst others. 
Characteristics of the students and of the class group 
As this case is inter-disciplinary, we recommend using it with students who have a basic 
understanding of (but not necessarily degree in) Management, International Relations, 
Political Philosophy and International Law. It can be used in undergraduate classes, 
though due to its complexity, it is especially recommended for graduate, Master’s and 
MBA students. In the area of legal studies it is particularly adequate for law students 
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dealing with business law practice, either in law firms working for companies or as part 
of the legal counsel of companies themselves. 
Contribution of the case 
The case is a vehicle for discussion and insight on the crucial role of learning and 
adaption over time for two reasons. In the first place, Shell’s experiences demonstrate 
that many companies still hold an apolitical self-perception, but engage at the same time 
in activities that have been regarded as actual government activities. Yet, this strategic 
adoption of public responsibilities to maintain their social license to operate implies 
unforeseen challenges with regard to the company’s legitimacy and the scope of 
responsibility. It also requires continuous efforts from part of the company to reconsider 
and adjust their strategy over time. In this sense, students ‘take away’ for their 
managerial and knowledge skills that learning, not reality avoidance, and a careful 
evolution of the strategy over time are key success factors. Secondly, the case also raises 
concern and consciousness of the ‘dark side’ not only of the company’s practices and 
divergence between words and deeds, but also of the weaknesses of the broader system 
of business and of our society; i.e. the democratic control of powerful MNC in a global 
and local context with a non-existent or weak regulatory authority. Even though Shell is 
considered a forerunner in CSR, the case points to problems of sustainability with regard 
to the application of ‘double standards’ and the sometimes bad consequences of much-
praised practices. Thus this prompts students to think not only about the scope of 
responsibilities, corporate legitimacy and the feasibility of democratic control of MNC 
like Shell, but also provides input for students that allow them to think through the 
scope of feasible and sustainable action if they happen to find themselves confronted 
with such practices. In this sense, this case thus also challenges in a way the ‘bright side’ 
bias of the far more numerous ‘best-practice’ cases in the area of CSR and sustainability. 
Learning objectives 
The case has multifaceted aspects and learning opportunities. Afterwards, the 
students/participants will be able to:  
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 Stipulate the ‘best’ decision and discover implications of each strategic option 
when faced with taking on public responsibilities  
 Analyze and understand the economic and political role of multinational 
corporations like Shell under the conditions of globalization. 
 Understand and reflect upon the consequences of this move into the political 
sphere breaking them down into issues related to corporate legitimacy, scope of 
responsibility and corporate control. 
 Find out and reason on the implications of the company’s application of ‘double 
standards’ and the sometimes bad consequences of much-praised practices on 
sustainability 
Teaching plan 
Depending on how comprehensively the instructor wishes to discuss the case, how 
much of the video is shown, and how extensive and lengthy is the discussion or role-
play, this case can run from a single 90-minute session to two such sessions. Below we 
provide a teaching plan for two 90-minute or one 3-hour session. 
Activity Estimated time Activity leaders 
Prior class 
Preparation: case reading 1 hour Individual students 
Prior work:  
- Search for information (Shell & Nigeria) 
- Background readings 
3 hours 
Individual students or 
Students in groups 
In class 
Opening 
- Answer W-Questions on blackboard 
- Show Video 
10-20 min 
Professor with input from 
students  
Setting the scene  
- Nigeria 
- Shell’s triple bottom line & main critique 
10 min Professor 
- Mapping Shell’s local & global engagement 10 min Professor with students  
Consequences of political engagement with 
regard to  
- Scope of corporate responsibility 
- Basis for corporate legitimacy 
- Democratization of global governance 
structures 
50 min Students in groups 
Present and discuss findings 40 min Students in groups 
‘Mini-lecture’ on four strategic pathways 10 min Professor 
Decision & discussion 30 min Professor with students 
Close discussion by sharing findings on political 
CSR & summarizing learning objectives acquired 
10 min 
 
Professor 
 
  
266 
PRIOR CLASS 
Preparation 
The case has been designed so that students have enough information to be able to 
analyze it thoroughly. Notwithstanding, it is recommended that students get familiar 
with the company and context in which Shell operates in a more active and exploratory 
way. Below we provide diverse websites and sources for this purpose: 
Corporate Website: 
http://www.shell.com/ 
http://www.youtube.com/shell#p/u/3/0aHa4VbQBZ8 
Information about Shell & Nigeria: 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/ 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/Oilpollution/Nigeria 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=NI 
http://web.ng.undp.org/ 
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/subsaharan_africa/countries/nigeria/index.html 
http://www.fmf.gov.ng/ 
http://english.aljazeera.net/video/africa/2010/12/201012101525432657.html 
Anti-Shell Websites: 
http://royaldutchshellplc.com/  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zciWUOrIUqo 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ejym4mKelhM 
http://www.hrw.org/africa/nigeria 
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http://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/index.php?page=65 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bEhhiKJDUTM&feature=related 
From previous test sessions we learned that the case works especially well if students 
have a background in elements of CSR, sustainability, strategy and the economic and 
political role of MNC. In particular, assignment of the following readings can be used to 
motivate parts of the discussion:  
 Banerjee, S. B. (2007). Corporate Social Responsibility: The Good, the Bad and 
the Ugly. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 Friedman, M. (1970). ‘The social responsibility of business is to increase its 
profit’. The New York Times Magazine, 13 September.  
 Frynas, J. G. (2005). The false developmental promise of Corporate Social 
Responsibility: evidence from multinational oil companies. International Affairs, 
81(3) 
 Scherer, A. G., & Palazzo, G. (2011). The New Political Role of Business in a 
Globalized World: A Review of a New Perspective on CSR and its Implications for 
the Firm, Governance, and Democracy. Journal of Management Studies, 48(4), 
899-931. 
 Valente, M., & Crane, A. (2010). Public Responsibility and Private Enterprise in 
Developing Countries. California Management Review, 52(3). 
We also advise the instructor to send out to the students some initial questions, which 
they should keep in mind when reading the article(s): MNC are operating at the global 
and local level (esp. in developing countries) in a challenging environment:  
 What role do they play? 
 Which consequences do their operations have on corporate responsibility, 
legitimacy and what does this imply for the democratic control of corporations?  
 What strategy should they employ to maintain their license to operate?  
 Can an organization be sustainable and socially responsible if its core operations 
entail persistent environmental, social or ethical issues? 
 
  
268 
IN CLASS 
1. Opening 
We recommend projecting the quote by Sir Mark Moody-Stuart (Managing Director of 
Shell Transport and Trading Company, p.l.c. in 1991 and Chairman of Royal Dutch/Shell 
from 1998-2001) to capture the students’ interest in and curiosity about the company’s 
role in a complex operating context such as Nigeria: 
“The biggest change […] for an international corporation is this extension of 
responsibility […] beyond just paying your taxes and beyond just relating 
effectively to communities around your factory fence.” (Sir Mark Moody-Stuart 
in Valente & Crane, 2010) 
A good way to begin the discussion is by asking the students for the main decision and 
dilemma the company faces. To answer the ‘why-question’ the instructor should 
summarize the main points of the case on the chalkboard (see example below) 
answering to the questions who, where, and when. This introductory exercise assures 
that all students are familiar with the key figures and facts, which lay the foundations 
for later discussions: the company, actors, the complex operating environment in 
Nigeria, timeline of events etc. 
 What is the main decision? Why? 
 What do we know about the situation of Shell in Nigeria? 
Even though this information-seeking activity highlights relevant pieces of information 
and ensures a common database, these factual responses can trigger boredom so that 
students tune out and their listening acuity falls. To avoid this situation and to get a 
more visual illustration of the situation in which Shell initiated its sustainability agenda 
the instructor might show the 8 minutes video “The Case Against Shell: 'The Hanging of 
Ken Saro-Wiwa Showed the True Cost of Oil'” by ShellGuilty: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htF5XElMyGI&feature=player_embedded 
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The instructor should also inform students that this case was settled out of court in June 
2009. Shell agreed to pay $ 15,5 Million USD compensation to the plaintiffs but denied 
any responsibility or complicity in the alleged human rights abuses. The documentary 
was produced by Rikshaw films for Earth Rights International and the Center for 
Constitutional Rights who were the plaintiffs’ co-counsel in the case. This fact could be 
perceived as a one-sided source of information as it does not take into account the 
company’s point of view. Yet, the instructor should emphasize that this video is 
interesting as it illustrates the circumstances in which Shell was forced to initiate its 
sustainability agenda; a situation that today is perceived to be worse by many people 
on the ground and in which ‘the struggle continues’ – with different actors but for the 
same cause. 
2. Setting the scene  
Here students should understand the move in to the political sphere under the 
conditions of globalization and the complex operating environment in Nigeria. 
2.1. Complex operating environment: Nigeria 
At this point the instructor should set the scene for a subsequent reflection on Shell’s 
role in a concrete context: Nigeria. We suggest classifying information according to the 
different three sustainability dimensions (economic, social, and environmental) and 
particular governance challenges related to the ‘resource curse’ and the nature of 
Nigeria’s ‘rentier state’. The instructor should briefly explain some terms and concepts 
used in the discussion to insure a correct understanding: 
 The resource curse refers to the paradox that countries and regions with an 
abundance of natural resources tend to have less economic growth and worse 
development outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources. The term 
resource curse thesis was first used by Richard Auty in 1993.  
 In a ‘rentier state’ state revenues accrue from taxes or ‘rents’ on production 
rather than from productive activity. As a consequence, the government focused 
its efforts on controlling these resource rents and failed to set in place a robust 
tax system and with it to develop a system of formal accountabilities to secure 
domestic legitimacy 
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 The Human Development Index provides a composite measure of three 
dimensions of human development: living a long and healthy life (measured by 
life expectancy), being educated (measured by adult literacy and gross 
enrolment in education) and having a decent standard of living (measured by 
purchasing power parity, PPP, income).  
 Corruption is defined by Transparency International as ‘the abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain’ (Transparency International, 2009, p. 7) 
2.2. Multinational corporations (MNC) as economic and political actors:  
2.2.1. Introduction to Royal Dutch Shell 
The instructor should now briefly introduce the corporation Royal Dutch Shell and the 
main critiques (below) with regard to the performance of its sustainability agenda. We 
recommend structuring the information either according to Shell’s triple bottom line - 
economic, social, and the planet – or according to the different levels – corporate, global 
and local - to facilitate the discussion. With regard to the term CSR the instructor should 
clarify that the literature on CSR is very diverse and no consensus has been reached on 
the precise definition. In this case CSR should be used as an umbrella term, which 
considers concepts such as corporate citizenship, corporate sustainability, stakeholder 
theory, and business ethics. Shell also uses different terms for their CSR agenda such as 
sustainability or social performance agenda.  
Shell’s triple bottom line approach to sustainable development 
Corporate level: 
 1997: General Business Principles & Shell International Renewables 
 Human Rights Compliance Assessment tools 
 Training for employees (Business Principles & Code of Conduct) 
 Transparency & reporting: EITI, GRI, IPIECA, internal controls, Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index, FTSE4Good, Carbon Disclosure Project 
Global level: 
 Supporter of GC, VP’s 
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 Global partnerships: HIV/AIDS, GGFR, Climate Action 
Local level: 
 CD: Shell foundation & cooperation with national programs 
 Change from ad hoc assistance to dialogue & partnering 
 
Main critique 
Double standards & destruction of livelihoods: 
 Oil spills: 2011 Shell admits liability (2008/09 Bodo community) 
 Gas flaring: for 50 years (JV) 
Transparency: 
 Access to/disclosure of information  
CD: 
 Underperformance, lack of impact on community well-being 
 Divestment & move offshore 
 Policy of appeasement 
Corporate governance & self-regulation 
 Alleged HR abuses & environmental damage 
 ‘Shell police’, purchase of weapons, cooperation with military to ‘deal’ with 
protesters 
 
“Shell has in spite of extremely high self-imposed standards of social responsibility, 
manifestly failed to change the way it operates” (Christian Aid, 2004). 
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2.2.2. Mapping Shell’s local and global engagement 
At this point we recommend posing the questions below to stimulate the student’s 
critical thinking and reasoning. Yet, depending on the students’ knowledge of the theory 
of the firm and concepts of a political role of MNC, the instructor might feel necessary 
to remind Friedman’s (1962) premise that there is a clear separation of business and 
politics, i.e. firms are entitled to earn profits within the rules of the system but should 
not interfere in the political system itself. In this sense, managers of corporations should 
maximize shareholder value while leaving the responsibility for social miseries, 
externalities, environmental protection, and the production of public goods to the state 
system. With regard to a political concept of corporations, Scherer and Palazzo (2008) 
explain that “corporations become politicized in two ways: They operate with an 
enlarged understanding of responsibility and help to solve political problems in 
cooperation with state actors and civil society actors. Furthermore, they submit their 
growing power and political engagement to democratic processes of control and 
legitimacy”. This in turn means for CSR an “extended model of governance with business 
firms contributing to global regulation and providing public goods. It goes beyond the 
instrumental view on politics in order to develop a new understanding of global politics 
where private actors such as corporations and civil society organizations play an active 
role in the democratic regulation and control of market transactions” (Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2011, p. 901). 
 What role does Shell play at the global and local Nigerian level?  
 Does the strict division of political and economic domains still hold for companies 
when becoming not only the addressees of public rules but also their authors? 
 Has Shell even assumed a state-like role in the Nigeria? 
The aim of this task is to understand how the company is positioned not only as an 
economic but also as a political actor. Also, students should become aware that the 
driving force of political CSR is the global expansion of corporations and the consequent 
erosion of (primarily national) institutions and processes of governance. Eventually, 
students will be able to appreciate that Shell has engaged in global governance and self-
regulation policies, which has offset the strict division of labor between private business 
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and nation state governance on which the dominant economic paradigm and many 
conceptions of CSR are built. This exercise can lead to an interesting discussion, in which 
many students involved in the management of organizations might disagree with the 
politicized role of corporations.  
3. Consequences of engaging in public responsibilities 
The learning objective of this section is to understand and reflect upon the 
consequences of the move into the political sphere. Furthermore, students should also 
reason on the implications of the company’s application of ‘double standards’ and the 
sometimes bad consequences of much-praised practices on sustainability. 
3.1. Discussion in groups or role play 
Once Shell’s role has been identified, the instructor can turn to the associated challenges 
with this new political role. The instructor should ask the question:  
 Which implications does Shell’s role have for the scope of corporate 
responsibility, legitimacy, and democratization of global governance? 
To begin to respond to the main question, the instructor can divide the discussion into 
three groups so that one group can focus on one dimension - corporate responsibility, 
legitimacy, or democratic global governance structures. As an alternative the instructor 
can set up an interchange between different case actors in form of a role play to foster 
greater empathy with the case protagonists and increase class attentiveness. Depending 
on the class size, roles can be assigned to individual or groups of students during class 
or prior to the session. We recommend splitting the class into different roles such as the 
company Shell, civil society, the Nigerian government etc. discussing all dimensions with 
regard to their respective role. In a later exercise these different perspectives can be 
contrasted with each other. Apart from the information in the case study, the instructor 
should provide stimulating inputs and questions (see below) for each group discussion 
and students could search for updated facts and figures in real time.  
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a. Scope of corporate responsibility: 
 Is Shell responsible for the social and environmental conditions, and governance 
challenges in Nigeria? 
 Is it making things too easy when blaming and shaming Shell alone in a context 
of global interconnectedness of the oil industry? 
 Does the structure of the global energy industry in which the Shell is operating 
diffuse responsibility for human rights and environmental conditions? 
 Does Shell have a higher degree responsibility than other actors due to the 
company’s privileged position, power, interest, and collective ability? 
 Should Shell turn into a human welfare organization? Or should the company 
create only value for its shareholders? 
 Discussing these questions students should become aware that the fact that Shell’s 
operations extend beyond nation-state boundaries and include globally dispersed 
persons imply ensuing challenges for corporate social responsibilities. Here it is 
important for the instructor to drive home important points. For example, in a context 
of structural social processes where there is structural social injustice (according to 
Young, 2006), a liability model is not sufficient for assigning responsibility. Students 
should consider – given Shell’s position within the structural processes in terms of 
power, privilege, interest, and collective ability – that the company has a high degree of 
political responsibility to be(come) active and contributing members of the global 
commonwealth. For example, Shell together with other MNC was able to advance the 
development of international law in the areas such as multilateral trade agreements, 
bilateral investment pacts and domestic liberation to ensure their rights and interests. 
Now their rights have to be balanced with commensurable political responsibilities 
towards society and the planet. Still, students should not expect corporations to turn 
into human welfare organizations. They should do what they are best at: providing life- 
conducive goods and services and creating value for a multiplicity of stakeholders.  
b. Conditions of corporate legitimacy: 
 What is the impact of Shell’s sustainability agenda on the organization’s 
legitimacy? How do various stakeholder groups react to CSR activities?  
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 Is Shell’s responsibility-discourse a function visibility to maintain its legitimacy or 
a genuine commitment to pro-actively contribute to social and environmental 
justice? 
 Is Shell’s legitimacy based on a pro-social logic or marked by unequal power-
relationships, lack of transparency, and the intent to silence discourse 
participants? 
 Has Shell’s engagement come before or after the fact? 
 How could Shell employ sustainability-related activities and practices to meet its 
public legitimacy requirements? 
In the course of the discussion, students should develop a concern about the precarious 
legitimacy of globally active corporations in general and in controversial industry sectors 
in particular.  Also, they should learn from this discussion that Shell has formally 
committed to dialogue and transparency to secure its legitimacy and thus social license 
to operate. Yet, the previous review of Shell’s legacy in the Niger Delta should make 
students question a ‘pro-social’ communicative logic in praxis and thus discuss the basis 
on which corporate legitimacy should and can be build in controversial industry sectors 
such as oil. 
c. Democratic control of corporations 
 How can we control MNC when corporations do start to act as regulators 
themselves and when government regulation is not available or not enforced? 
 How and in what sense can regulatory activities of private actors be integrated 
into the established concept of democracy? 
 How can CSR activities promote self-regulation and diminish government 
intervention in and regulatory actions in relation to practices that inherently 
entail persistent social and environmental risks? 
In line with the precarious legitimacy of globally active corporations, students should be 
become aware of the facts that their growing political engagement also infringes on the 
legitimacy of democracy at large. It questions one of the basic characteristics of liberal 
capitalist societies: the separation of economic and political realms on the level of 
society. Contrary to Friedman’s (1962) claim that in capitalist societies business firms 
are entitled to earn profits within the rules of the system but should not interfere in the 
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political system itself, the students have learnt that Shell has already started to engage 
in traditional government activities.  
In this discussion, the instructor can probe students about some of the deliberative 
elements of both Shell’s sustainability agenda and Habermas’ theory of democracy 
(1996) to point to applicability and effectiveness of an alternative concept for the 
democratic control of MNC. It is based on dialogue and a ‘pro-social’ and a ‘forceless-
force-of-the-better-argument’ communicative process. Yet, students should be highly 
skeptic of the applicability of deliberative elements in view of Shell continuing 
malpractice despite of highly self-imposed standards, and a lack of the 
institutionalization of procedures and conditions that guarantee deliberation at the 
global and local Nigerian level. 
When addressing these questions students should realize that there remains 
considerable controversy as to the answer. Business can provide an important 
contribution to public sector resource deficits and inefficiencies. Yet, companies can 
face a whole host of problems if their strategies backfire and unsustainable outcomes 
can be (are) a reality where deliberative concepts are co-opted and formalized in a 
sustainability agenda but not implemented in praxis. Yet, students should also become 
aware of the importance to appropriately manage a company’s politicized role with 
regard to the three dimensions in order to maintain its license to operate. 
4. Decision 
The learning objective of this section is to stipulate the ‘best’ decision and discover 
implications of each strategic option when faced with taking on public responsibilities.  
If students have not had a chance to read the Valente and Crane’s (2010) article, the 
instructor can simply advance the four strategic pathways in a “mini-lecture” (p.58-70), 
explaining that these are held to be essential to successfully adopt to the distinct 
challenges that companies face addressing public responsibility. After discussing, some 
time should be held out to take a step back and critique the framework.  
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4.1. Decision 
At this point students should be confronted with the decision. The questions posed by 
the instructor should lead towards a decision and make them deal with the 
implementation process. For this purpose we suggest dividing the class in two groups so 
that each group can defend a decision – leave or stay – and argue how and why they 
would do so. 
 What would you do in this situation? Leave or stay? 
 And how would you do it?  
 And why? 
To identify consensus on the decision ‘leave or stay’ we recommend taking votes. From 
our test experience and also from the fact that financial issues take prominence over 
environmental and social issues, students tend to favor the option to stay in the country. 
Yet, in this case it is crucial to discuss with the students the ‘why’ and ‘how’ question for 
each option to create polarity. From our experience, some students quickly reconsider 
their initial vote when faced with the decision to resolve an alternative strategy and deal 
with the challenges encountered by Shell. Revisiting Valente and Crane’s (2010) 
recommendations the students will find that Shell has not been very successful in 
overcoming mistrust and superficial relationships or making longer-term contributions. 
This might lead students to think that these challenges endure as Shell’s engagement at 
the micro or project level within its sustainability program has had no real impact on 
how the core business activities are undertaken nor have they ameliorated the negative 
social and environmental impact of oil production on host communities. This discussion 
can thus lead to a more essential question: Is the company able to change the way it 
operates and become more sustainable? 
For the discussion of the different options we provide some points which can be 
considered: 
 
LEAVE 
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 Past decisions/experiences:  
o Chad Shell suspended operations due to increasing civil unrest in 1979 
o Shell left Ogoniland after massive community protests 
 Shell also considered leaving Nigeria in the wake of Saro-Wiwa's death  
 PIB (Petroleum Industrial Bill) 
 Reputation & legitimacy affected by 2011 UK court ruling & UNEP report  
STAY 
 Nigeria is important for Shell and Shell is important for Nigeria 
 Issues of liability will not disappear even with a total withdrawal 
 
To close the discussion the instructor can repeat Valente and Crane’s (2010) message:  
“The burden of public responsibility is real, and only by effectively developing an 
appropriate strategic orientation can programs be developed in ways that add 
value both to the business and to the communities in which they operate.” 
5. Closing 
The instructor should close the session by sharing findings on political CSR, public 
responsibility strategies, sustainability and summarizing learning objectives acquired. 
He should also mention that the case of Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria is representative 
for the challenges and dilemmas firms encounter when faced with a public responsibility 
deficit and demands for greater sustainability. 
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